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Abstract 
 
The field of international relations and security studies is among the most 
dynamic and challenging aspects of politics. Relationship between states 
depend on various factors such as politics, economic cooperation and 
socio-cultural partnerships. Despite the growing interdependency between 
states through the means of bilateral, multilateral or regionalism, security 
issues have remained to play a vital role in determining their level of 
cooperation and coexistence. This qualitative research entitled: Indonesia-
PNG Border security, underlines Indonesia and PNG’s foreign policy while 
addressing the impacts of Papuan separatism on the 750km border. The 
relationship of Indonesia and PNG has remained cordial and robust over 
the years; however, the existence of the Papuan conflict has often 
threatened to destabilize mutual understandings between the parties.  
The findings specify that the issue of Papuan separatism is one the sensitive 
and complicated political and cultural problems of the modern era. The 
sensitivity that lies behind the Papuan separatism issue has often caused 
difficulties to Indonesia and PNG policy makers. Border policies are 
designed to obtain the state objectives; however, cultural aspects have 
always benefited the third party (OPM) in their existence along the border. 
Subsequently, the Papuan autonomy has allowed for the acknowledgment 
of Papuan’s cultural rights. Moreover, the Papuan separatism has managed 
to gain support from many external parties. The growing participation of 
external parties have triggered internal security concern. This study 
indicates that the Papuan separatism issue will remain to influence 
Indonesia-PNG border security in the years to come. The designing of 
border policies should focus and encourage more on building trust as 
means of overcoming misunderstanding. More cooperation between all 
relative authorities such as the CIQS is vital to maintain a good and 
favorable a relationship.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The subject of power and interest are evidently prominent to the study of 
politics in any sphere, (Lawson, 2015) Security, as (Buzan, 1991) explains, 
concerns vital issues affecting people both domestically and internationally 
with countries possessing power and influence over most of the factors that 
dominate the nature of security. States are often unable to evolve peacefully 
because one's existence deliberately threatening the function of the other. 
Hence, the emergence of the need for security whether domestic or 
international has become one of the most significant challenges dating back 
to the end of the Second World War. According to (Snow, 2016) security is 
defined into 2 parts; first, the physical and second the psychological. The 
physical threats represent the objective of the state's capabilities in attaining 
military means and its potential to use it carelessly for securing national 
interest, while the psychological threats refers to insecurity driven by the 
human mind and its abilities to analyze conceptions based on vigorous 
security challenges. Thus, in this case states turn to consider a more reliable 
and peaceful form of relations either bilateral or multilateral as mechanisms 
to minimize the risks of war or jeopardizing national security. Nonetheless, 
the devastating impacts of WWII has introduced a massive change in the 
global international system. Also, (Lawson, 2016) argues that the increase 
in security dynamics has forced states to deliver safety first out of their 
fundamental interest while ignoring the greater international system.  
 
Furthermore, (Buzan, 1991) argues that the power and economic build-up 
of countries in the name of securing national interest often triggers tensions 
resulting in clashes among states. The nature of national security shifts over 
time ranging from higher to lower pressures leading to a closer coordinated 
partnership role. However, regardless of the change, the question of 
national security remains unanswered.  Nonetheless, the condition of 
insecurity did not entirely apply to real ambitions of the state to foster the 
power approach, but also to the hands of armed civilians and networks of 
irresponsible trans-international criminal organization capable of harming 
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both citizens and state. As a result, out of the many vital issues that 
determine the standard of national security this paper focuses on the issue 
of border security and the need for states to manage and maintain their 
borders and territories, scrutinizing the rapid growth in security challenges 
that have gained much attention throughout the decades such as threats of 
terrorism, illegal transactions of narcotics and drugs, international crime, 
human smuggling, illegal border crossing, piracy and armed robbery at sea 
and illegal fishing etc. 
 
This paper will concentrate on the border security issues of the Republic of 
Indonesia; an archipelagic state that comprises of an estimated 17000 plus 
islands that stretch throughout the vast area of the Asia-Pacific region. As 
(Simons, 2000) writes, the overall length of Indonesia ranging from East to 
West equals the distance between New York and London. Also, Indonesia's 
is the world’s fourth most populous state with the largest population of over 
250 million people in Southeast Asia and the largest Islamic democratic 
state in the world. On the one hand, it attributes to provide Indonesia a 
strategic platform to part take in the regional and global level, however, on 
the contrary, provides a significant challenge to the basic need of securing 
and maintaining its border security along the vast region of Asia-Pacific. 
According to (McInnes & Rolls, 1994) security in Asia-Pacific is a clear 
system consisting of complicated and sensitive issues that are common in 
the domestic, regional and global level. Based on this assumption this 
research will primarily aim to analyze the secure borders of Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
 
As part of this particular task, this study will also examine the processes of 
how politics is conducted on both the domestic and international level and 
to what extent these policies provide or influence the countries’ goals and 
ambitions bearing in mind the cultural and structural aspects (Viotti & 
Kauppi, 2001). This research will focus on the RI-PNG international border, 
with its links to separatism which makes it one of the quietest yet most 
sensitive areas of the relationship between Indonesia and Papua New 
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Guinea. It is apparent that domestic and foreign policies do play a significant 
role in the management of the RI-PNG Border. 
1.1 Background 
The end of World War II saw an increase in nationalism throughout the 
world. Like many other states, victory for the allied forces provided the 
Indonesian nationalist the momentum to launch a coordinated resistance 
big enough to the over-through the Dutch occupation. It ended the Dutch 
Empire's rule from what used to be the Dutch colonial territories to what is 
called the Indonesian territory of Sabang in the far west to Merauke in the 
far east which in Bahasa Indonesia is often referred to as Nusantara. As 
(Hatta, 1957) explains, “the recent birth of states is driven by the greater 
sense of belonging crafted by the extreme demand to preserve its dignity. 
The colonial experience over hundreds of years has poisoned their 
ideologies so that no single person would ever consider being ruled again”.   
Indonesian history recalls the challenge towards gaining independence as 
a rather long and dreadful path. However, since the proclamation 
(proklamasi) of independence just two days after the Japanese forces 
surrendered to America and its allies, Indonesia was on track to become a 
nation based on Pancasila the official philosophical foundation of the 
Indonesian state that consists of two old Javanese Sanskrit “panca” 
meaning five and “sila” meaning principles, (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
1998) bonded by Bineka Tuggal Ika, which primarily means unity in 
diversity. Although the proclamation of independence together with the 
ideology of the state confirmed the birth of a new Indonesia from the ashes 
of World War II, the Dutch forces never give up the region quickly; the 
inexperienced Indonesian state was still quite vulnerable as it faced a major 
challenge to overcome security risks that threatened its territorial integrity. 
On the 17th of August 1945, just few days after the Japanese surrender, Ir. 
H. Sukarno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia and prominent 
leader of the revolution, proclaimed the country's independence. 
Independence did not eliminate all problems encountered throughout the 
revolution; the Dutch remained in control of most of the territory until after 
the ‘round table conference' at the Hague in 1949, that saw a formal 
agreement to the transfer of sovereignty from the former Dutch East Indies 
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to the Republic of Indonesia, (May, 2009). However, the Eastern New 
Guinea (Irian Jaya), or what is called the provinces of Papua and West 
Papua today, was never included within the transfer of sovereignty due to 
specific reasons. The exclusion of Papua then gave every right for the Dutch 
influence to remain in the eastern part of Indonesia for an additional four 
years. This illustrates that Indonesia's history of national security dates back 
to the early years of independence. The Dutch influence in Papua 
threatened Indonesia's national security so that Sukarno had to consult with 
the major powers to determine the removal of the Dutch Empire in the east. 
Nonetheless, the impact of the Cold War had to rescue the interests of the 
capitalist world and input democracy in the best interest of the majority that 
in the end, the growing tensions caused a national uprising of communism. 
This drew the concern of the United States to decide that Papua is given to 
Indonesia as payment to prevent Sukarno from joining the Communist bloc. 
The security risks and challenges during the vulnerable Cold War era lead 
to the establishment of the non-alignment foreign policy approach that 
allowed Indonesia to sail neutrally between the two largest reefs of the 
Soviet and the United States. Furthermore, Indonesia maintained a ‘free 
and active’ foreign policy approach as the basis of its political and 
international relations. 
 
Fast-forwarding to today, Indonesia is a major force in Southeast Asia, with 
a medium influence in the greater Asian region. (Lowry, 1996) has seen the 
country after the Cold War predicted to be a potential giant in the area. This 
has upgraded status quo to its role within ASEAN. Indonesia is a founding 
member of the ASEAN that sees regional cooperation somewhat promising 
in providing secure pathways toward achieving some of the long-term 
development goals, including the achievement of a stable regional security 
that is a great concern, which is an important instrument in protecting 
Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, (Rolls, 1994) 
argues, that though ASEAN is founded to promote ‘regional stability and 
security cooperation’ and to some extant might be the best medium to 
comprehend a future of stable relations such as emphasized by the 1976 
Declaration that produced the ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’ primarily 
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focuses on the interest of encouraging peaceful relations among members, 
is still unforeseeable. As a consequence, Indonesia faces great security 
challenges in maintaining and implementing security measures to counter 
the external threats by now capable of tormenting the country’s internal 
security. For example, the international terrorist networks operating in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippine, such as Abu Sayyaf, Al-Qaeda, 
Darul Islam, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jemaah Islamiyah etc. 
Such has in recent years illustrates a rather worrying image on the region 
especially to the internal security of Indonesia as (Parameswaran, 2016) 
reports, video footage of several Philippines militant groups pledging 
allegiance to IS has stocked fears that the group may be moving closer to 
its goal of establishing a foothold in Southeast Asia. Another similar attack 
believed to be linked to IS was launched early 2016 in center of Jakarta 
involving a gun battle with Indonesian security forces before bombs went off 
to at least claim lives of 6 people. In addition, Inspector-General of the 
Malaysian Police Khalid Abu Bakar told CNN that a grenade attack on June 
28, 2016 at a nightspot near Kuala Lumpur was organized by Malaysian 
Islamic fighter in Syria. According to a report published by (Straitstimes, 
2016) over 200 suspects were being detained with links to terrorist networks 
such as ISIS, including 27 foreigners.  
 
Providing the external security threats imposed by the region it is no doubt 
considered to be a high priority threat to the internal stability and security of 
Indonesia. Thus setting a platform for Indonesia to balance its role within 
the region and internationally by projecting a rather friendlier approach to 
foreign policy of a “million friends and zero enemy” under President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (Piccone & Yusman, 2014) Such actions seem more 
promising in enhancing cooperation’s on various aspects including the 
security aspect. However, matters of national security resulting from 
external threats still portrays a huge challenge to the internal stability 
especially the case of RI-PNG Border.  
 
These genuine threats truly underline the importance to improve safety 
measures that will serve the best interest of the state primarily to provide 
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security to all its citizens. Indonesia's status as the largest archipelagic state 
makes it one of the biggest in the world which shares sea borders with ten 
neighboring countries and land borders with three neighboring countries. 
Indonesian borders are widely spread out with various typologies ranging 
from hinterlands to the most outside islands. This difference in conditions 
provides a major challenge towards organizing and implementing an 
effective framework to monitor and secure and regulate its territorial 
boundaries. As (Hatta, 1957) writes, primarily, it is the duty of the state to 
oversee that independence, freedom, sovereignty and its borders be well 
protected from internal and external and abstain from any possible war or 
conflict besides the purpose and defending itself against domestic and 
international threats.  
 
The challenges faced in securing the Indonesia borders differ from one 
another due to the distinctive conditions and characteristics found on each 
border. Issues surrounding the border areas are most commonly related to 
geographical locations, the availability of both the human and natural 
resources, socio-economic factors, political and cultural determinants and 
in some cases the level of development in the neighboring state. The 
underlying problems found in the majority of Indonesia's border areas are 
mostly related to poverty and the lack of basic structures and infrastructure. 
Border management has, over the years, become a strategic and urgent 
issue that relates to the territorial integrity of the Republic. Among the many 
factors that contribute to the lack of obtaining an optimum outcome is the 
low level of coordination between institutions that are specifically designed 
to coordinate and conduct all border affairs on the domestic and 
international level. Besides, the central government's idea of decentralizing 
power through various constitutions between the central government, 
provincial government, regional government and the municipal government 
has, in most cases, seen its policies deteriorate over the long line of 
bureaucracy that in most cases are determined by politics and other self-
driven interest.  
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State cooperation is vital to the management of border security, in particular 
between related institution internally and in neighboring state to consider 
and improve coordination to maintain and uphold democratic norms of 
dealing with security measures. In Indonesia's case, most of the problems 
that often arise in the border areas are dealt with in a bilateral form. Such 
cases are being communicated through diplomatic channels to notify and 
involve related parties. Some common cases that need urgent attention are 
often dominated by particular misunderstandings that commonly occur 
regarding border demarcations and human settlement based on given 
coordinates that position the border markers whether on land or at sea. Over 
the years it has been a high-profile issue within bilateral border discussions 
as its sensitivity deals with land ownership and other traditional variables 
that link both peoples. One of the biggest challenges that the Indonesian 
border authorities face along most of its border areas is the agreement on 
state border lines; this includes maritime borders. As mentioned above, the 
sensitive nature of this issue often results in disputes among local villages 
and sometimes involves the state and its neighbors forcing the authorities 
to take strong legal actions. This problem forms a gap between the people 
and government, peoples’ demands are often turned-down by the 
government or the government simply deals with other people outside the 
traditional systems, this is one of the reason why some border problems 
overlap and remain in agendas of annual bilateral border discussions.  
 
Indonesia's extensive maritime territory borders ten countries which 
provides easy access for illegal border crossers, who are usually local 
fishermen who end up fishing in hot waters, due to the minimum availability 
of resources and knowledge that points out the exact direction and location 
of maritime border lines such as indicators based on precise coordinates. 
Thus, enforcing security requires more active cooperation between 
government institutions to pursue an overall outcome. In most cases, the 
local fisherman is detained and later fined for illegal fishing and illegal border 
crossing, authorities have been forced to work extra hard along the 
boundaries. Transactions of illegal substances or materials that are 
prohibited from entering Indonesian soil, suggest that these illicit activities 
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are more likely via sea transportation as local villagers, whether fishermen, 
gardeners or hunters, are among the most suspected entities that 
participate in illegal activities along border areas. Development throughout 
Indonesia has been progressing quite well. However, the lifestyle of the 
people along the border has been significantly affected due to the lack of 
development in previous decades. Villagers have to seek other ways to 
obtain income, and some means were involvement in buying and selling 
illegal goods to neighboring countries. Illegal fishing has over time cost 
Indonesia's economic sector millions of dollars, the exploitation of maritime 
resources by foreign fishing companies has implied a negative impact on 
the local fishing industry, as local fishermen are losing income in local 
markets. 
 
Another problem is that traditional border crossers are often classified as 
illegal border crossers due to the similarity found through culture, custom, 
and traditions that exist along border areas. In this particular case, it is 
considered to be an old issue, however, with the importance of securing 
border surveillance it has been brought to the attention of border authorities, 
this is common in Kalimantan, Lesser Sunda Islands (Nusa Tengara, and 
Papua (Ichsan, 2015). Most cases see that individuals abuse the use of the 
exemption of traditional border crossing, this refers to people using the 
regular border crossing passes who by legal terms do not qualify to be 
classified as a traditional border crosser. 
 
Relations, traditions and cultures shared among the peoples of Indonesia 
and its neighbors have existed for centuries making it rather impossible to 
deal with security issues. The tolerance for these norms and values to a 
great extent does affect the overall function of border security. Therefore, at 
most occasions, traditional chiefs and landowners are included in low-level 
dialogues with related institutions to consider the best approach to dealing 
with such issues, so that misunderstandings between people and state 
representatives are not triggered. 
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Among other major border issues in Indonesia comes the problem of armed 
robbery at sea, which until today most officials and related authorities still 
encounter difficulties in combating piracy, due to the limited availability of 
resources. According to the (ICC, International Maritime Bureau), ‘Live 
Piracy & Armed Robbery Report 2016’ shows the attack of a product tanker 
with attack number: 151-16, Thursday, Oct 20, 2016 over the Malacca Strait 
exactly in Dumai, over the coast of Pekanbaru a province in Indonesia’s was 
‘unknown’. These types of crimes occur near sea borders and are mostly 
sensitive triggering tension between armed security personnel as it 
generally interferes with national jurisdictions. Indonesia is facing a tougher 
security challenge as concerns over abductions and piracy continues to 
bother policy makers and strategists along the ‘tri-border area’ (TBA) 
between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in the Sulu Sea and the 
Celebes Sea (Espenilla, 2016).  
 
Indonesia's growing role in maintaining border safety in the region includes 
combating piracy, armed robbery on the high seas, with terrorist attacks of 
great importance to Southeast Asia and the Pacific region because most of 
the exports and imports of the region pass through Indonesian borders. 
Together on this level arises the issue of drug trafficking; in recent years 
Indonesia has taken a tough stance on Illegal drug trafficking which had 
made international headlines. Such as the execution of the Bali 9 including 
two Australian citizens who had their clemency pleas rejected. (BBC News, 
2015) Reports suggest that a lot of this illegal substance is transported by 
sea and air from foreign entities. Therefore, steady security improvements 
in Indonesian airports and harbors to scan for unwanted substances that 
are banned are seen. Human trafficking is also among the issues that 
affects border management: made though most of this happens offshore, 
the impact is quite devastating to Indonesia as criminals brainwash the 
victims. Another important and dangerous issue that complete the range of 
tasks that border officials combat is the problem of arms smuggling along 
borders. This crime commonly occurs along the maritime boundary. 
However, this is not to say that it does not take place on land borders, often 
linked to black markets along the boundaries of Indonesia-Malaysia and 
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Thailand. Indonesian police authorities recorded 170 cases of armed 
robberies involving 193 suspects from the first four months of 2000. 
Recently, Indonesian authorities arrested illicit arms traders from the 
Philippines heading to North Maluku and South Maluku provinces where 
religious conflicts have been going on for more than a year. Members from 
the secessionist group Free Aceh Movement are believed to be receiving 
weapons smuggled from Malaysia, (Dursin, 2000).  
 
Like other issues relate to terrorism in Indonesia, maritime terrorism has 
forced the Indonesian security forces to triple their efforts to counter 
possible attacks that target one of the world's biggest trade lanes. Illegal 
logging also contributes to border security issues because almost half of 
Indonesia's rainforests are found along land border areas which are prone 
to dangerous exploitations, even though this area is incredibly rich with 
natural resources criminals take advantage to conduct illegal activities. The 
difference in border regulations is also identified as a major contributor to 
the ongoing criminal acts. 
 
The growing security challenges to Indonesia’s borders have prompted the 
central government to establish an institution on the 17th of September 2010 
called the National Border Management Agency, (Badan Pengelola 
Perbatasan National) or abbreviated as BNPP. The intent was later 
amended through the Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia 
(PERPRES) No.12 of 2010, as a follow-up to the National Constitution (UU) 
No.43 of 2008, concerning territorial boundaries. Headed by the Minister for 
Internal Affairs, over the last five years, the central government, through the 
national border management agency, has been very committed to working 
tirelessly to develop its border areas with the aim of transforming its borders 
from what used to a forgotten backyard into becoming the nation's gateway 
or the country's pride. (Ichsan, 2015). The agency is tasked to perform and 
regulate programs based on the grand design of the management of state 
borders covering a long-term goal planned for 2005-2025. The agency is 
mandated to prioritize five main areas namely: the determination and 
affirmation of state boundaries, an increase in defense, security and law 
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enforcement, boosting economic growth in the area, the improvement of 
social and essential public needs, and strengthening organizations that 
manage the country's borders. 
Overall, Indonesia's border policy does have a lot in common; most 
approaches are carefully designed and implemented to serve an overall 
purpose of maintaining the state from either internal or external threats. 
However, the border on the eastern part of Indonesia, the RI-PNG 
international border, slightly differs from the other western borders of the 
country. One fundamental reason relates to the history of today's 
Indonesian provinces of West Papua and Papua also known as West Irian 
or Irian Jaya (Western New Guinea) as it used to be called back in the 
1950's. The history has often determined the functions of the border through 
the view of local Papuans. Papuans and Papua New Guineans have a 
100% similarity that cannot be differentiated and separated by imaginary 
borderlines. The ideology derived from these similarities have contributed 
to most border issues since the integration of Papua into the Republic of 
Indonesia. Local villagers cross the frontier and reside without the officials’ 
knowledge causing fluctuations in census counts as people in this area 
migrate places in search of basic welfare. The lack of appointed institutions 
to pinpoint these matters have grown to affect other areas linking to the 
security chain. 
 
The demand for Papuan independence has, through the early 1960's and 
towards the late 1990's, seen a massive impact on border security violations 
and the approach that it has gone through since the independence of Papua 
New Guinea. Various administrations have in the past dealt with the 
Indonesian authorities regarding the border, such as the British and 
Australian governments that influenced the policies before PNG's 
independence. Having that history, PNG, however, since having its 
sovereignty transferred from Australia has rather softened its policies to 
indirectly permit the settlement of Papuans refugees in PNG who according 
to Indonesia, had illegally crossed the border into PNG territory. PNG's 
position in providing refuge also impacted on the state of border surveillance 
by both countries in the early 1980s. Reports indicate that the Indonesian 
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armed forces have deliberately stormed into PNG territory on several 
occasions in search of Papuan activists or armed members of the OPM and, 
in doing so, the PNG government often raised fears of the possibility of an 
Indonesian armed forces intervention along the border. Like in the past, in 
April 2015 around 8 Indonesian armed military personnel were spotted 
inside PNG territory walking across the border and along the beach of 
Wutung Village (Radio New Zealand, 2015). Further reports, also state that 
the Indonesian troops opened fire on PNG defense force (PNGDF) patrol in 
May 2015. This events are believed to be fueled by recent conflicts between 
the OPM fighters and the Indonesian military leading to frequent border 
incursions (Scoop, 2015).  
 
The brutal acts of Indonesia's New Order regime under General Suharto 
quickly set in place a different function to the boundary between RI-PNG; 
this particular Indonesian border was used as a way to safety for Papuans 
who fled in fear of their lives due to the authoritarian style of leadership. 
Human security versus national security has led to massive human rights 
violations around Jayapura and nearby towns. The border is derived to be 
highly sensitive as most rebels operate along the frontier implementing 
successful guerilla techniques. The border then obviously developed to be 
a war zone. 
 
Also, the Indonesian political change in Jakarta has impacted the methods 
and approach to security over the years. Suharto's fall in 1998 paved the 
way for little change to take place, even though the changes did not last for 
an expected five-year period it did provide some room to advocate the rights 
of local people and the use of the border. Consecutive changes of 
Indonesian presidents from Suharto, to B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid 
(Gus Dur), and Megawati Sukarnoputri did allow for little change, almost 
unnoticeable. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, however, 
things started to look different as more attention was given to strengthen the 
security approach in the border areas basically to regain more focus on 
physical developments. The primary focus during this era was to implement 
a style of leadership based on a more straight-forward approach to speed 
 13 
up development such as infrastructure, social and economic services that 
could transform this forgotten backyard into a symbolic icon of the state. 
The approach had a huge impact on infrastructure developments such as 
road construction linking the town of Jayapura and the Skouw-Wutung 
border and the upgrade of local border posts into national borders with a lot 
of funding made available to house the projects. The primary aim of this 
approach is to develop border regions especially through capacity building.   
In relation to the management of the RI-PNG border, both states have 
inclusively depended on the Basic Agreement on Border Arrangements, the 
‘Treaty of Mutual Respect Friendship and Cooperation" (May, 2009). Along 
with another subsidiary, bilateral agreements have served as the foundation 
and guiding principles for healthy and constructive neighborly ties between 
the Republic of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Mostly, the relationship 
between the two countries in the twenty-first century has seen characterized 
by the two countries common land border. Despite the affinity between the 
two sides of New Guinea, a border drawn down the middle by European 
colonialists in 1895 and 1910 officially separated them, (Saltford, 2003b).  
Furthermore, as (Saltford, 2003b) argues, that the traditional boundary 
between the two states decides the form and manner of its relationship, in 
other words, the sensitivity surrounding the issues that occur determines 
the overall communication and relationship between Jakarta and Port 
Moresby depending on the potential threats. The necessity to maintain good 
relations based on shared product paved the way for the initial signing of 
the Agreement concerning Border Administrations. The collective spirit of 
understanding between the two states has positively shifted the state of 
border affairs from a highly suspicious and or hostile situation, to a more 
mutual and friendlier area of cooperation which has reduced fear on both 
sides of the frontier. 
 
Furthermore, to ensure the practical implementation of the ‘Basic Border 
Arrangements,' some formal subsidiary arrangements have been concluded 
such as; the Joint Border Committee (JBC), Border Liaison Officers Meeting 
(BLOM), Border Liaison Meeting (BLM), and Joint Border Committee (JBC) 
(Bandoro, 2007). Such meetings are scheduled on an annual basis to settle 
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any relevant concerns on the shared border to foster stable relations 
between the two countries. With the background experience of certain 
sensitive border issues such as illegal border crossings, environmental 
degradations, health problems, illegal fishing, Traditional Border Crossing 
(TBC) remains one of the major challenges among the inexplicit issues. In 
some cases, residents who by legal terms do not qualify for a TBC permit 
illegally obtains it by providing false information. Others simply cross over 
using bush tracks on various unattended locations of the border.  As a 
circumstance, the complexity has impeded on the success of recent BLOM, 
BLM and JBC meetings; contentious issues are then referred to the 
Ministerial Joint Commission for deliberations and concrete actions at the 
highest level. 
 
As (Radio New Zealand, 2015) asserts, that the 750 plus kilometer border 
is extensive and penetrable, difficult to secure and an artificial barrier to 
tribal groups existing along the area. The growing links between the people 
of the Indonesian province of Papua and Papua New Guinea communities 
along the border are inevitable and becoming increasingly blurred. 
Traditional links in and across the border is one of the main purposes people 
of both sides travel to and from for customary purposes some of course 
legal others illegal. Traditional Border Crossing (TBC) cards are normally 
required which is visa exempted. Another issue that adds to the complexity, 
is the presence of OPM elements, armed fighters who has troubled the 
Indonesian armed forces over the years. Due to the complexity surrounding 
the disputes it is important to analyze the role of policy makers who at the 
end of the day are responsible for the day to day operations of the border.  
 
1.2 Research Identification 
In designing border policies, the process of decision making is considered 
as a fundamental principle. It is regarded as an important part amid the 
constantly developing nature of politics. Such systems act as anchors that 
determine the state's position toward attaining national interests. Therefore, 
the decision-making processes remains a far-reaching part in conducting 
international relations. Indonesia's ‘free and active' foreign policy has 
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positioned Indonesia in a strategic point to select and pursue goals based 
on its national objectives freely. 
Border issues between Indonesia and PNG has been one of the most 
sensitive domestic issues of Indonesia. In particular, this issue is essential 
to state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Local uprisings due to the issue 
of separatism have over time posed the need for Indonesia to guide and 
adjust its policies regarding border security. The involvement of other 
parties such as states and non-government organizations (NGO’s) have 
substantially internationalized the issue that poses a threat to internal 
security. The relationship between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea has 
required the use of foreign policy as a guiding principle toward decision-
making process in dealing with border security.  Apart from the many causes 
of unstable border relations (May, 1986) argues, that a possible borderline 
conflict occurs when officials from one state reach a certain conclusion that 
the country’s objectives have been significantly threatened by actions of its 
neighbor on borders. 
 
The two countries border problems started after the departure of the 
Netherlands from Papua in 1962. (May, 1986) argues, that the main issue 
along the New Guinea border is that its location is so remote that even the 
two countries cannot determine the precise locations regarding border 
demarcation. It was in 1965 that the frontier problems initially become more 
political as movements across the border increased. The cycle of repeated 
border crossing to PNG throughout the late 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s until the 
fall of the ‘new order regime’ had a common motive of fleeing the Indonesian 
military government. Among the many that crossed over about 80 percent 
of the people were in some way linked to the resistance.  (May, 1986) 
defines, as a ‘flight of rebels and refugees resisting Indonesian rule,' this 
lead to the creation of some rebel camps on the Papua New Guinea side of 
the border. 
 
Movements of this kind, of course, threatened to harm the national interest 
of both states. Records indicate by the end of 1960’s the Australian 
administration across the border had recorded an increase in border 
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movements of about 1,695 people as the result of what the Papuan people 
claim as a failure of the Act of Free Choice. Since then, in total, including 
the great influx of border crosses recorded in 1984 forced the Australian 
authorities to establish a sizeable refugee settlement in East Awin in West 
Sepik Province under auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner of 
Refugees. Since then, there are more than 10, 400 West Papuan living in 
Papua New Guinea (Matbob, 2012). Despite the Australian influence in 
PNG between the 1960’s and early 1970’s the Indonesian military 
expansion inflicted fears of a possible conflict escalation due to the use of 
force along the border.   
 
During this period, the Indonesian army conducted massive raids along the 
boundary area, which due to the isolation, was not properly demarcated and 
caused some operations to be carried out in PNG territory. This misconduct 
caused by the Indonesian armed forces along the border triggered 
Australian concerns for the security and safety of the border crossers that 
prompted the Australian administration to quickly established camps. The 
massive influx is believed to be fueled by information that there is safety and 
security on the other side of the border.  The border crossers who fled into 
PNG in the 1980’s was mostly linked to the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM) the Papuan Freedom Movement who aided the organization's 
resistance to Indonesian rule. Border developments during these years 
signaled a sympathetic view that Papua New Guinea was indirectly 
concerned of the security and safety of its Melanesian brothers. The 
movements across the border saw a deteriorating relationship between the 
Indonesian armed forces and the armed OPM guerrilla forces and the 
government of Papua New Guinea.  Though there were empathies within 
the PNG government relating to the situation in West Papua, Papua New 
Guinea significantly maintains a firm position to respect the Indonesian rule 
over the Melanesian’s of West Papua and Papua.  
 
Apart from PNG the border crossers then went on to seek asylum in other 
parts of the world such as Australia, England, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
and the USA. As time went on these former refugees have come back to 
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influence the stability along the RI-PNG border causing several political 
hiccups such as organizing mass demonstration that completely disturbs 
the daily activities in Papua. Today this groups of people campaign under 
various umbrellas such as the Free Papuan Movement or the recent 
Unification of all parties under the banner of United Liberation Movement for 
West Papua (ULMWP) that is currently an observer to the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG), such ambition is of significant impact to the 
struggle of West Papua. Today there are various organizations and NGO 
that support the fight. According to the (Free West Papua org) this 
organization are based in 12 countries, including New Zealand under the 
Peace Movement Aotearoa - Wellington and West Papua Action Auckland.  
The Papuans who reside in Papua New Guinea today have been around for 
over 30 years, most of the young generation were born and educated in 
PNG still believe in a free West Papua. These refugees have been living in 
PNG since then; the PNG government has given them special permissions 
(permissive resident) that grants them almost the same rights as Papua 
New Guineans, such as equal access to basic health and education, job 
opportunities, etc. 
 
The granting of permissive resident status to refugees has, in other words, 
increased their bargaining position. Some even remain along the border 
area to operate rebel resistance that mostly affects the regular use of the 
border. The use of the border area and PNG as a buffer zone to seek neutral 
grounds has managed to contribute together to the other ongoing 
campaigns to cause an upgrade of the Papuan issue into one of 
international concern. Out of the many initial refugees that settle in PNG, 
some managed to re-establish themselves through education and careers 
within the PNG government; others had links to PNG political elites that 
often seen the issues of Papua being debated in PNG. The Papuan issues 
have thus remained an important part of PNG politics as political candidates 
have linked their personal interest with the West Papuan issues that sees 
them gain much success in national elections. The ideology of one people 
one solwara, a Melanesian solidarity slogan, often whole-heartedly 
influences the level of support from the greater Melanesian community. As 
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a result, it affects the domestic political stability in Indonesian West Papua 
and Papua regions; the PNG government has often seen criticized for 
turning a blind eye at the human rights violations that occur in neighboring 
West Papua and Papua regions. The RI-PNG border has presented a major 
problem to the border authorities due to the public pressure that are 
launched in relations to issue. According to International Peace Academy 
(1989) Indonesia and PNG agreed that illegal border crossers who enters 
PNG must be turned over to Indonesian authorities and not harbored by 
PNG locals.  
 
The primary challenge found in this part of the Indonesian border is the 
political issue caused by human rights violations and pleas for self-
determination. The problems that occur along this particular border are in 
most cases substantially influenced by the political ambitions of pro-Papuan 
individuals and groups who operate under a secret network. The 
relationship between local based pro-Papuan activists and internationally 
based ones, whether in PNG, the Pacific, Europe or the United States today 
has been focused on increasing the awareness of human rights violations 
in West Papua and Papua provinces which is focal point of the Free West 
Papua organization. This has forced both Indonesia and PNG to address 
the concurrent border issues in a more intensive manner so as to provide 
security and welfare to the peoples of the border. In most cases, rebel 
groups have proven their ability to cause disturbances along the border that 
affect the relationship between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. 
 
1.2.1 Research Limitation 
To gain a proper understanding on the dynamics surrounding this sensitive 
issue, this research begins with a brief history of the range of security 
challenges threatening Indonesia’s national security, particularly, West 
Papua’s plea for Independence that have plagued the Indonesian 
authorities for over 5 decades and its impact surrounding policy making on 
RI-PNG border security. The RI-PNG border security, like other issues is of 
course a very sensitive one due to the involvement of a third party (OPM) 
that often-tested Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial legitimacy. This 
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paper will also seek to analyze the significant involvement of various agency 
in managing the security affairs of the shared border. However, in 
constructing this research the writer must clearly acknowledge the 
limitations throughout the research. Firstly, the factor of time and cost is a 
major determinant to the completion of this research, in covering the length 
and size of the border requires more time and schedule visits to border 
locations in some of the rural parts, therefore most of the data and 
information gathered are from the Skow-Wutung and Keerom regency 
border area. Secondly, the research would be more challenging if access to 
classified government documents were granted. Third, the timing of located 
research collided with the preparations for the 2016 annual bilateral 
meetings between senior border officials of RI-PNG, this means that heads 
and senior authorities of related border agencies were all out of office 
completing all necessary documents for the trip, which had to restrict the 
progress of the findings. Fourth, the excess to the third party were strictly 
not permitted for safety reasons, thus most of the sources used to analyze 
the third party’s involvement would be mainly secondary sources.  
 
Another major obstacle that the writer came across was the case of 
decentralization of power that saw the regional governments in the province 
of Papua gain more autonomy in running its own affairs, this simply caused 
a major hiccup in obtaining the required information, bureaucratic formalities 
also minimized the use of up-to-date official documents for comparison in 
further analyses. Overall, the writer seeks to admit that the given length of 
research has in most cases restrict the writer to spend more time digging 
out more information to accomplish a more positive result. Despite the 
limitations, this research will try to examine the issue West Papuan 
separatism and its relations between various border security policies under 
multiple Indonesian governments, however, the main focus of this research 
will be based on President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 10 years in office 
(2004-2014). 
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1.2.2 Research Question 
How do internal and external factors affect the making of Indonesian and 
PNG’s policy in dealing with Papuan separatism and its impacts on border 
security? 
 
1.3 Purpose of the Research 
1.3.1 Purpose of the Research 
This paper, like other previous research, aims to examine Indonesia's 
policies in dealing with the issue of Papuan separatism and their overall 
impact over the 750 plus kilometer borderline between Indonesia and PNG. 
Furthermore, this research aims to concentrate explicitly on those external 
and internal factors that by nature have extensively influenced the decision 
making and implementation of border management and security policies. 
 
1.3.2 Benefit of the Research 
This research aims to contribute to the literature in the field of international 
relations and security studies, and to provide useful analysis for scholars, 
students and government institutions interested in the issues of Papuan 
Separatism in Indonesia and its relations in managing border security on 
the Indonesia and PNG border. To gain a deeper knowledge regarding the 
dynamics of RI-PNG border issues it is significantly important to take into 
account the historical and cultural aspects that continue contribute in 
shaping interests over the decades.  
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
The Issue of Papuan separatism, classified as a dispute over territory which 
in the past had the Dutch and Indonesia go head to head, remains a national 
issue consisting of cross-border disputes that have significantly 
characterized the relationship of Indonesia and neighboring PNG. In this 
case, it then makes the border a priority zone of interest within the 
relationship of both countries. Indonesia's domestic issues of separatism 
are by far different from one another providing its history and ideological 
background. Separatism issues in Indonesia have long involved 3 separate 
indigenous groups, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, (GAM), the Republic of South 
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Moluccas (RSM) and of course the OPM. However, the OPM’s plea for 
Independence have directly impact on the common border causing it to 
develop into an important aspect of relationship between RI-PNG since 
PNG’s Independence. Thus, scholars and researchers have to utilize 
various concepts and theories to analyze perceptions on separatism. 
Nonetheless, knowledge raised regarding Papuan separatism has resulted 
in the need to construct effective policies to enhance cooperation along the 
boundaries. Furthermore, (Lentner, 1974b) argues that foreign policy is the 
focal point of the internal and external aspect of the country's development 
thus causing all policies to reflect the overall purpose of engaging particular 
resources to obtain the ultimate result. 
 
Also, (Lentner, 1974b) further elaborates that policy is a set of customary 
recommendations that highly demands the achievement of selected 
objectives, secondly the mobilization of means for achieving those goals 
and lastly, the actual process of implementing, or the actual expenditure of 
the efforts of resources in pursuit of selected goals. In relations, (Rosenau, 
1980) adds that external behavior of nations was considered to be 
exclusively a reaction to external stimuli. In other words, domestic issues 
such as separatism have to an extant provided the need to adjust security 
measures to assure it meets the internal needs. Propositions of this sort are 
considered to be partial and not part of the general theories. This partial of 
the theory best explains how internal and external factors affect the making 
of border security policies. According to Jose Balazs, international security 
is determined using the internal and external security of the range of social 
systems (Buzan, 1991). 
 
This research is centered on how Indonesia deals with its domestic issues 
and conducts its internal policies to counter external pressure. Furthermore, 
it will cover the objectives that are achievable and non-achievable. The 
Papuan separatism issue has developed into an international problem that 
often challenges Indonesia's sovereignty, stability, and security through 
international forums such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Pacific 
Islands Forum and United Nations General Assembly (UN). It is common 
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that when an issue like separatism has been linked to massive human rights 
violations, it will no longer be bilateral in nature. The inclusion of non-
government bodies, sympathetic groups of both ethnic and non-ethnic 
persons have mobilized international support from various concerned states 
upgrades the problem into a regional concern; this has automatically lure in 
interests of other regional organization such as the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group’s (MSG) increasing support for is Melanesian brothers. Thus, it is 
evident that sensitive domestic issues do greatly influence foreign policies 
while, on the other hand, local issues do the same in return. 
 
In relation to the effectivity of theories and the securing of selected 
objectives surfaces the extreme importance of the aspect of implementing 
the selected objectives. Thus, providing a bargaining position for Indonesia 
to secure matters that related to its internal security. The sensitivity that lies 
beneath the border problems is often connected to the increasing media 
publications and propaganda on both domestic and international levels. 
However, Indonesia's border policies have maintained a flow of positive 
response from PNG. The overall maintenance and management of the 
boundary areas, especially in preventing instability, have forced both 
Indonesia and PNG to reposition their policies conforming to the dynamics 
of the border problem amid international pressure that are elaborated within 
the research. As previously explained, the implementation process will 
determine the success of strong border security policies. This research will 
examine the effectiveness of the policies and the level of tolerance that both 
states apply on certain issues that in reality affects the design of systems. 
In emphasizing border security, the role of decision makers is extremely vital 
in providing critical outcomes that will serve as guidelines to maintain a safer 
and stable border relations. Furthermore, Rosenberg’s rational choice 
theory argues, “that the decision making process includes: (i) the search for 
significant information regarding the conditions of choice; (ii) integrating that 
information so as to discover existing alternatives for action; (iii) drawing 
upon empirical generalizations to deduce the likely results each alternative 
will yield; (iv) judging which will best satisfy his or her want; (v) choosing a 
course of action accordingly” (Redd & Mintz, 2013). 
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Also, (Griffiths, 1999) asserts that theorists such as Morgenthau emphasize 
the importance of the state that decides which circumstances affect the 
process of decision making in obtaining selected goals, the precise 
objectives aimed at, the means used to attain selective objectives and 
suitable strategies to prevent the failure of achieving the selected goals. 
Furthermore, (Buzan, 1991) has emphasized Richard Ullman's definition of 
national security as an action or sequence of events that (i) threatens 
severely across a lengthy period of time to vitiate the value of life for the 
citizens of the country, or (ii) threatens drastically to restrict the sort of policy 
preference available to the state, nongovernmental entities (persons, 
groups, corporations) within the country. 
 
Overall, decision making whether foreign policy or national security decision 
are key elements in providing the basic structure toward achieving national 
interest. Instruments such as negotiations, diplomacy and international 
cooperation have been vital part to the process of acquiring selected 
national goals. These have indeed set the pace to ensure that the 
relationship between countries do not deteriorate into a relation 
characterized by hostility and tension, however, to achieve a more friendly 
and peaceful cooperation. Such theories relate to the rational choice theory 
as mentioned above, that underlines the role of man as the “rational actor” 
capable of impacting the degree of decision on different levels of decision 
making at any given time (Redd & Mintz, 2013). The theories of decision 
making are often identified to be influenced the behavior of the man who is 
capable of making an impact on a particular decision before it reaches its 
final stage, or in other words, before it is finalized and set for implementation 
as government standing position. 
 
The dynamics of foreign policy and security in recent times has shown what 
power is becoming less transferable from one issue to the other, less 
coercive and less tangible (Viotti & Kauppi, 2001). The need to pursue other 
aspects such as economic and social developments have caused states to 
rely heavily on one another causing a high level of interdependency that in 
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the event warns out the coercive use of power to replace it with soft power 
approaches such as international cooperation and settlement of issues 
based on mutual agreements. Countries through its authorities are official 
decision makers that have every right to represent the government in any 
particular cases dealing with national interest.  
 
Regarding Indonesia-PNG relations, the Treaty of Mutual Respect, 
Friendship and Cooperation have provided a straightforward foreign policy 
that in most cases evidenced to be a reliable means of achieving the 
selective national security objectives, such as the exchange of information 
relating to sensitive security matters, coordinating joint verification visits, 
joint military patrols along the border, combatting the illegal transactions of 
drugs and narcotics, and transporting and selling of motor bikes and 
petroleum products etc. The democratic norms adopted by both states 
appears as a guiding principle and are a foundation to pursue goals on a 
win-win basis. Nevertheless, policy makers are highly influenced by the 
context of the internal and external environments, that to some extant are 
interrelated. Thus, theories of decision making suggested above aim to 
provide a more accurate and concrete base to the analysis of the research. 
 
1.5 Research Methods and Data Collecting Technique 
 
1.5.1 Research Method 
In this research, the writer uses a descriptive, analytical method aimed at 
defining the issues based on collected data. The descriptive type adopted 
here seeks to openly analyze the characteristics of specific issues of the 
problem based on data, facts, and documents including information from 
reliable sources that can be observed. This research applies a qualitative 
method of research aimed at providing answers to the research question 
through collecting, describing and analyzing data. In fact, many writers have 
found it difficult to restrict themselves from providing a subjective view. 
Therefore, through this method the author seeks to make certain that 
personal opinions do not interfere with the phenomena’s that take place in 
reality so that objective explanations are analyzed based on data collected.  
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Qualitative research, according to (Creswell, 2007), starts with 
assumptions, a global view, the potential usage of theoretical approaches, 
and the review of analytical issues that question the definition provided by 
individuals and groups that relates to a social problem. Therefore, this study 
seeks to expand on an emerging qualitative approach to examine the depth 
of the range of problems that impend on Indonesia’s national security, thus, 
asserting a tougher exertion on sensitive border security decision making.   
 
1.5.2 Data Collecting technique 
The use of data and documents in this study are obtained mostly from 
primary and secondary sources, such as books, journals, newspapers, 
speeches and other official documents this implies that in doing the 
analysis, the writer uses data and documents that were written previously 
by another person. 
 
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis will consist of five chapters. The first contains the introduction 
covering research background, research identification, research limitation, 
research question, the purpose and benefit of the research, theoretical 
framework, and the research method and the data collecting techniques. 
 
The second chapter will provide an overview of Indonesia's foreign policy 
towards PNG in general. Furthermore, it will also explicitly provide a clear 
understanding of Indonesia's foreign policy towards PNG in relations to the 
struggle for West Papuan independence and issues affecting border 
security along the RI-PNG border. Also, it will also explain the role, position, 
action and function of Indonesia and PNG within the structure of foreign 
policy. 
 
The third chapter will explain comprehensively, based on detailed 
information collected, regarding the process of foreign policy decision 
making in Indonesia regarding border security. Hence, the writer will also 
discuss and account for the selection of objectives, the ways of achieving 
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those goals and the implementation of selected foreign policy. Explanations 
provided include general definitions, the purpose of assessment, and 
various agreements or recommendations that have been agreed upon by 
the government of Indonesia and PNG. This chapter is considered as the 
core content of the research. 
 
In the fourth chapter, the writer will explain to what extent the West Papuan 
independence struggle has affected the political playground in Indonesia, 
PNG and the Pacific and its implications that affect security issues along the 
750 plus kilometer borderline. Here, the writer aims to make an evaluation 
based on chapter's II and III explaining what Indonesia have done so far in 
relations to the West Papuan struggle for independence and its role in 
implementing safer border security. 
 
Finally, the fifth chapter will contain the summary of the whole research and 
answer the research question of "How internal and external factors affect 
the making of Indonesian foreign policy in dealing with Papuan separatism 
and its impacts on border security." 
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CHAPTER 2 
Indonesia and PNG’s Policies and Implementations 
Lentner (1974a) argues that foreign policy is the outcome of international 
politics containing the essentials of cooperation and conflict, demand and 
support, disruptions and regulating. In addition, Diez, Bode, and Da Costa 
(2011) argue that traditionally foreign policy is the outcome of decision 
making toward external parties and in specific other states. Nonetheless, 
Diez et al. (2011) emphasise that this traditional definition has been 
somewhat transformed into a more problematical concept, specifically as it 
blends together with the trends in globalisation and regional integration, 
making it difficult to differentiate between those that are considered 
domestic factors and those that are foreign.  
 
Despite the complexities surrounding both domestic and foreign policy, 
states maintain their role as solitary actors, rightfully responsible for the task 
of influencing, designing and implementing both foreign and domestic 
policies. In general, a spill over effect of instabilities and conflicts generated 
by internal and external factors has in one way or the other affected the 
general outcome of border policies over a certain period of time. Hence, 
border policies often reflect the goals of foreign policy, although in a rather 
more detailed aspect, with the overall aim of securing the national interest. 
In this case, it is the Indonesian government’s border policies that are being 
reviewed. The government of Indonesia has undertaken its foreign policy 
orientation to peacefully improve international cooperation through bilateral 
and multilateral means to purposely protect its ideology, national security, 
national interests and economic prosperity. The end of World War II 
presented the need for an increase in foreign policy dealings, with almost 
all the states in the world now coexisting with each other in some form of 
interaction through diplomatic means. The goal of this thesis is to cover 
major foreign and domestic policy determinants that impact the aspect of 
border security between Indonesia and PNG. Concurring to the realist 
assessment, the governments of Indonesia and PNG retain the absolute 
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right to solely influence their affiliation, even though it is certain that the 
relationship centres on their common border, and that the presence of the 
third party (OPM) is critical to the interstate relationship between Indonesia 
and PNG.  
 
Even though the task to design and implement border policies in Indonesia 
is no longer fully exercised by the central government, the central 
government, through the National Border Management Agency (BNPP), 
sets out the national goals that are in line with state interests. More 
specifically, today the provincial governments of Papua and West Papua 
enjoy more freedom to deal with issues concerning border and security 
affairs, something that was not attainable in the past. The decision to 
transfer power to the provincial governments specifically aims to encourage 
more local participation with the overall aim of minimising the spread of 
separatist movements. Therefore, this allow provincial governments to take 
up more responsibilities in administrating their own affairs. In addition, the 
decision to allocate more power to the provinces in Indonesia is a result of 
the central government’s strategy to decentralise its government systems to 
cater for the growing demand that has arisen due to long established 
dissatisfaction. The dissatisfactions of the Papuan people have obtained a 
legal basis through the constitution for autonomy that allows provincial 
government agencies to perform duties such as designing policies that are 
of interest to their provinces and at the same time they must portray policies 
set out by the central government. In the case of the Indonesia-PNG border, 
the responsibilities carried out by Papua’s border and international 
cooperation board are enacted through the 2001 constitution on Special 
Autonomy for Papua. The central government’s decision to offer autonomy 
was purposely to divert secessionist demands that resulted in violent 
conflicts between the armed forces and supporters (McGibbon, 2004). As a 
result, the decision now enables the provincial government to design and 
implement policies on behalf of the central government including the task of 
designing and implementing border policies. Although the provincial 
government is given the task to exercise its power by constructing and 
executing border policies, it remains a necessity that the provincial 
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government continues to harness a profitable relationship with the central 
government that could cater for continuous consultation regarding certain 
high-profile issues concerning national security.  
 
It is important to understand that apart from the mechanisms set out within 
the constitution on special autonomy to the provinces of Papua (and later 
West Papua), there are two important aspects of the government that are 
purposely not outlined within the agreement. These include the right to 
conduct foreign and diplomatic relations, and the right to have their own 
security forces (police and military). Although both Papuan provinces do 
take part in international affairs in relation to the common border, internal 
and external security remain the responsibility of the central government 
which is carried out by the Indonesian police and military (POLRI/TNI). 
Despite the 2001 constitution, Papua and West Papua still retain the right 
to coordinate and perform their day to day duties in line with the national 
constitutions that legally identifies them as Indonesia’s eastern, most 
provinces. The governors are the heads of the provinces who represent the 
Indonesian President in making sure that the design of policies, whether 
domestic or international, must be coordinated with the central government 
before it is amended through the provincial house of assembly prior to its 
implementation.  
 
Although important aspects such as security and foreign relations are 
excluded from many rights granted under the special autonomy, Papua and 
West Papua province still maintain the right to pursue, manage and execute 
policies in line with amendments as set out in the Indonesian national 
constitution (Undung-Undang 1945) as the overall benchmark. Another 
important part of the implementation of policies that will be considered in 
detail is the distribution of power between Papua province and its regencies. 
Specifically, at this stage, the distribution of power and legislative rights 
equally and legally permits municipalities and regencies to act on their own 
grounds under the constitution, which enables them to attend to their own 
regional affairs including those concerning the border. As a result, major 
miscommunications are often the case in the processes of designing and 
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implementing border policies between provincial governments, the 
municipal government, regional governments and, in the end, the outcome 
has often falls short in meeting the criteria set out by the central 
government’s endorsements. Hence, in most cases the agendas put 
forward by the border committees regarding the aspects of border security 
between Indonesia and PNG remain unanswered in bilateral forums, 
despite the case that meetings are being held annually. Also, such bilateral 
meetings are often prone to experiencing a repeat in discussions on the 
same unsettled issues for a length of time, due to the different policies that 
all respective agencies put together.  
 
2.1 PNG Foreign Policy 
2.1.1 General Foreign Policy 
Unlike Indonesia, PNG’s independence came with a rush, and it was 
granted before any serious uprisings. Dorney (2000) argues that 
independence would have not been chosen by the majority of the people if 
a referendum had been put forward in the early years of the 1970s. 
Evidence of this claim can be illustrated by Sir Michael Somare’s immediate 
nation-wide drive to seek support from his local Papua New Guineans on 
the importance of independence and also his bold initiatives to influence the 
local people to support PNG’s independence. Despite the reasons 
mentioned, PNG went on to become a sovereign state with Somare 
becoming PNG’s first Prime Minister. As independent sovereign nations, 
Indonesia and PNG have both had their share of difficulties in dealing with 
domestic instabilities. As an example, PNG has also gone through political 
skirmishes on the Gazelle Peninsula and Bougainville (Dorney, 2000), 
where the vast majority did not believe in the idea of independence. On the 
contrary, Indonesia itself has had to put up with separatist conflicts in Aceh, 
Ambon and Papua. Despite these domestic instabilities, both countries have 
had to apply a friendlier foreign policy approach to make room for further 
cooperation. Today, the ongoing nature of friendly bilateral ties between the 
governments of Indonesia and PNG has been made possible through 
various government initiatives aimed at maintaining and preserving a 
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positive and harmonious environment ideal for cooperation between both 
countries.  
 
Dorney (2000) reports that, back in 1983, a radio broadcast was aimed at 
reassuring the people of PNG that an Indonesian invasion was not possible. 
Somare went on to tell the people of PNG that the fears of invasion were 
just after effects of the expansionist era of the Sukarno regime. In this same 
report, Somare was later quoted saying that “ever since General Suharto 
took over power, Indonesia has consistently strived for regional peace and 
stability” (p. 200). The continuation of such interpretations began to 
formalise relationships between both countries that in the end produced the 
non-aggression pact (Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-
operation) of which in Article 7 states that “Indonesia and PNG shall not 
threaten or use force against each other” (Dorney, 2000). 
 
Primarily, PNG introduced itself into the world of politics by adhering to its 
foreign policy outlines which very much portrayed universalism and 
successively active and selective engagement, which led the newly 
independent PNG to avoid the prejudices of the Cold War era and the 
configuration of its geo-political military alliances. Like other states, PNG 
has likewise set forth its foreign policy, mainly its trade policy, to fulfil 
requirements and take advantage of the merits of regional integration 
arrangements and globalisation consistent with its comparative and 
cooperative benefits based on their essential structural features. In the 
scope of the Asia-Pacific, PNG aspires to be a suitable partner in seeking 
mutually beneficial forms of constructive cooperation that yield practical 
outcomes for its citizens. Externally, PNG strives to implement good 
partnerships with other countries to consolidate, strengthen and diversify its 
involvement in the Asia Pacific region. In relation to its foreign policy 
progressions, PNG consistently applies a rather more win-win system by 
making use of limited opportunities for its benefit. Primarily, PNG aims to 
make the most of its mutual participation in return for strategic financial 
benefits that would increase its total revenue.  
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PNG’s foreign policy was first reviewed by the government of Sir Michael 
Somare and succeeded by the “Selective and Active Engagement” of his 
predecessor, Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan in 1980, under which emphasis 
was placed on selected issues around the different aspects of foreign policy 
management to pursue international relations (PNG Embassy, 2008). The 
governments of PNG under Prime Ministers, Sir Rabbie Namaliu and Paias 
Wingti further reviewed foreign policy respectively, wherein the latter’s “Look 
North” foreign policy of 1992 has had a profound impact on PNG’s relations 
with ASEAN member countries (including Indonesia), South Korea and 
China. The initiative was aimed at further consolidating the existing 
relationship with PNG’s development partners in the northern regions of 
Asia. The government of former Prime Minister Sir Julian Chan elaborated 
further on the “Look North and Work Pacific” in 1994 (PNG Embassy, 2008). 
During those years, PNG made sure that bold commitments produced real, 
tangible results, thus enabling PNG to also strengthen its relationships 
pertaining to economic cooperation. In particular, and more recently, PNG 
is playing a more prominent role in arrangements of political and economic 
cooperation with its Asian and Pacific neighbours, including Indonesia.  
One such very important initiative is the Pacific Plan for Strengthening 
Regional Cooperation and Integration of 2004, which had the following 
priority goals: economic growth, sustainable development, good 
governance and security. Specifically, strengthening regional cooperation 
and integration should result in increasing the levels of sustainable returns 
to the Pacific; ensuring the successful implementation of regional 
cooperation at national levels; meeting common responsibilities and 
providing services cost-effectively; and developing partnerships with its 
neighbours and beyond(PNG Embassy, 2008). Essentially, the application 
of Indonesia-PNG relations has, to a certain extent, reflected the implication 
on PNG’s conduct in the Asia-Pacific region and in the global context. 
PNG’s foreign policy principles guide its international relations within the 
parameters of the existing geopolitical conditions. Structurally, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea, through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Immigration, has been the state apparatus 
responsible for the formulation and discharge of foreign policy directions 
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and goals within its function of international relations. May (2013) argues 
that despite PNG’s public-sector reforms being highly guided by major 
donors such as AusAid, and other multinational organisations like the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, PNG’s policy making and 
implementation has often failed to fulfil both domestic and international 
expectations.  
 
2.2 West Papuan Separatism 
The preamble of Indonesia’s Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD) (1945 national 
constitution) underlines that, as an independent state, Indonesia vows to 
participate towards the establishment of a world order based on freedom, 
perpetual peace and social justice (Indonesia, 1945). On this specific note, 
Indonesia introduces itself as a peaceful nation that by virtue primarily 
adheres to the values of pluralism that in general constitutes the unitary 
Republic of Indonesia. On the other hand, there have been many 
contradicting phenomena that have occurred within the diversity that is 
found among Indonesia’s societies. In fact, the differences in societies do 
not comply with the values that were initially formulated in Indonesia’s 
national constitution upon its independence. Problems arising within the 
factions of Indonesia’s pluralist society have been difficult for the 
government and its agencies, who are responsible for preventing, 
containing and managing internal conflicts amid the ever-growing 
international pressure. Nevertheless, since its independence, Indonesia has 
been quite vulnerable to internal conflicts created by differences in ideology, 
ethnicity, race and religion that form the very basic values of its vibrant 
society.  
 
Similarly, with respect to the Papuan issue, it was the difference in societies 
that caused the dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch throughout the 
first decades of Indonesia’s independence (Van der Kroef, 1958). This was 
made possible through the growing uncertainties in domestic affairs that 
occurred during the early stages of Indonesia’s independence. With this, the 
Dutch continued to maintain superiority over the territory of Papua. This was 
possible because of the difficulties Indonesia had to deal with due to the 
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international pressure instigated by the unstable conditions of post-World 
War II, which exhibited political and military tensions. Moreover, it is also 
important to highlight that as a young republic, Indonesia had to ensure that 
it was progressing within profoundly benign conditions free from the 
upheavals of the post-war period. In fact, not only did the impacts of World 
War II change the face of world politics, more importantly, it also paved the 
way for the birth of countries due to the growing sense in nationalism. 
Nationalism, as Griffiths (1999), argues, is becoming more popular, 
threatening to split-up some present day countries and unite others into new 
nation-states. This notwithstanding, Indonesia’s independence 
proclamation in 1945 proved no link to the territories of West New Guinea 
and Irian Jaya (now Papua and West Papua provinces). The conflicted 
island (Tanah Papua) has been home to local Papuans (Melanesians) for 
over 3000 years (King, 2004). It was on these grounds that the Dutch 
managed to install a Papuan nationalism that up to this date has remained 
one of the most complicated and recurring political conflicts in international 
politics. 
 
Consequently, negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch failed to find 
a breakthrough, allowing the Dutch to maintain their occupation Western 
New Guinea. More specifically, as a relatively young nation born out of the 
aftermath of the Japanese conquest, Indonesia had to cautiously confront a 
deteriorating domestic economic and political situation which included a 
battle for power between the rising communist party and the armed forces. 
The failure in negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch urged 
President Sukarno to pursue an outside approach of expansionism which 
included the procurement of Papua and West Papua, by force if necessary 
(May, 1986). Indonesia’s Permanent Mission to the UN made mention that 
the developments in domestic disputes portrayed Indonesia’s legitimate 
battle to liberate the territory of Papua from its colonial Dutch rulers. Van 
der Kroef (1958) argues that to understand the claims put forward by 
Indonesia and the Dutch regarding the territory of Papua, a distinction 
should be made between: 
1. Conflicting legal arguments; 
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2. Relevant historic and ethnological factors; 
3. The problem of the development of the West New Guinea area itself 
and of the expressed needs of its inhabitants; 
4. The general character of Dutch-Indonesian relations since Indonesia 
officially acquired her independence and; 
5. The international aspect of the New Guinea dispute, especially in so 
far as it has involved the United Nations and as it influenced relations 
between East and West.    
Since then, there have been many types of agreement between Indonesia 
and the Dutch regarding the territory of Papua and West Papua provinces, 
such as the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements that vowed to transfer 
sovereignty of the entire territories of the colonial Dutch to the Republic of 
Indonesia. This was followed by other agreements that fueled the conflict; 
for example, the 1949 agreement that left out the Papuan territory (Dorney, 
2000). With Papuan nationalism already set in place in the 1950s, it seemed 
almost impossible to contain the issue as it began to fuel more disputes 
linked to separatism based on ideology, racial and ethnic claims and 
religion. It was through these developments that Papua and West Papua 
began to refuse Jakarta’s occupation of the conflicted territory.  
 
New Guinea’s border problems have been around from as early as colonial 
times, fuelling random friction between neighbouring administrations (May, 
2004). In addition, May (2004) also argues that the recent border problems 
between Indonesia and PNG have been accredited to four sources: first, 
villagers from the border area who repeatedly cross to and from the border 
for traditional and customary purposes; second, the presence of West 
Papua nationalists vying for political asylum in PNG; third, West Papuan 
villagers that cross the border for short-term shelter from the militarised 
Indonesian side; and fourth, the presence of OPM fighters operating 
between the borders. In this case, the first point refers to the local villagers 
who travel across the border either from PNG or Indonesia’s side to conduct 
traditional rituals, whether paying of bride price or dealing with deaths, while 
some may be for such reasons as gardening or harvesting crops, fishing 
and visiting their relatives. This type of border crosser travels to seek the 
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advantages found on either sides of the border that are more developed. 
Furthermore, May (2004) claims that during the Dutch colonial era, many 
PNG villagers moved across into Jayapura because it was more developed 
than the PNG side. The second is of course related to Indonesia’s concern 
regarding a handful of West Papuan nationalists who have been granted 
asylum and permission to settle in PNG and other parts of Europe. The third 
point is undoubtedly caused by the military aggression in the Indonesian 
side that prompted local villagers to cross the border to seek safety with 
relatives on the PNG side. The fourth and most sensitive of all the points is 
the OPM network of freedom fighters that often uses the border as shelter, 
or what May (2004) refers to as “R & R” (rest and recreation) to avoid 
Indonesian military operations. All these points have contributed to the 
various border problems; though there have been efforts to control the 
issues, it remains challenging for both governments.  
 
Fast forward to today, with respect to the Free West Papua Movement 
(OPM) and the achievements it has received for over 50 years, the 
separatist conflict in Papua and West Papua province has progressed from 
a minor and unpopular domestic conflict to be identified as a relatively more 
complex, international, political problem of this generation. Moreover, the 
ongoing struggle for independence has lured in more interest from various 
stakeholders: for example, local and international political elites, 
businessmen, governments, non-governmental organizations, international 
human right lawyers, advocates and activists who have dedicated their time 
and effort to denounce Indonesia’s rule by standing together with the people 
of West Papua in their struggle to demand political freedom. Actions from 
these supporters can be illustrated by the growing criticism that has 
bombarded Indonesia on various diplomatic stages, like the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group Forum (MSG), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly sessions concerning claims of 
ongoing human rights violations in both the Papuan provinces. In addition, 
widespread campaigns from the Free West Papua organizations over 
allegations representing “systematic neglect, terror, killings, genocide and 
government deprivations” (Wenda, 2015) have managed to capture 
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international attention. Accusations of such a kind are supposedly aimed at 
condemning the oppressive role of the Indonesian military.   
 
Similarly, human rights campaigns on the abuses instigated by the brutal 
rule of the Indonesian armed forces in both Papuan provinces have been 
the revolutionary force behind the success in increasing in global 
awareness. Several global petitions have been signed to provide motivation 
and support. Furthermore, the struggle seems to be gaining more and more 
supporters through its promotions via social media. Although, arguably, 
many from the Indonesian government may argue that the progress of the 
West Papuan campaigns has been biased, it seems that there are real 
indications of a rapid increase in followers both domestic and internationally. 
For example, the official West Papuan campaign page on Facebook has 
reached about 260,907 followers (Free West Papua Campaign, 2004b), and 
other Facebook pages with the same interest have secured about 2000-
5000 followers which illustrates the success in promoting the issue via the 
use of social media. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram 
have all played a huge part in transferring information around the globe in a 
faster and more reliable manner. Those social media accounts also act as 
a tool of networking that channels sensitive information between 
campaigners and people back in Papua and West Papua, linking their ideas 
and strategies to continue to fight against the Indonesian occupation. 
Information shared on Facebook, for instance, is absorbed and later 
coordinated through the existing channels of organisations that are present 
on the ground in both West Papua and overseas. In most cases, it triggers 
a rather more dangerous outcome as it does help to build-up anti-
Indonesian sentiments. In addition, the people’s continuing participation in 
acts of mass demonstrations and rallies has often been practiced as a part 
of fulfilling democratic obligations.  
 
The problems of separatism are not the only reason behind the fight for 
separation from Indonesia. There are also other major factors that are at the 
core of these conflicts. Issues relating to political involvement, socio-
economic and cultural deprivations are among the factors related to this 
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long and complicated conflict. Conflicts of such nature are commonly 
ascribed to the increase in dissatisfaction among the people and 
government over a period. In fact, some may be caused by a history of 
conspiracy, while others may involve pure government interest, or even 
multinational corporations and profit making. Subsequently, at some point, 
citizens may have given up on the government for reasons that the 
government’s sole interest is only to exploit the natural resources, but it 
does not provide enough infrastructural and human development in return. 
Despite Indonesia’s state ideology of the Pancasila (5 principles) that aims 
to uphold unity in diversity, others such as Papuans continue to find ways 
to exclude themselves from the republic based on their history, difference 
in ethnicity, race, religion and ideology. 
 
Indonesia’s internal conflicts have been relatively well-known across 
various international media for a long time, starting with the historical wiping 
out of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)–communist party–then the 
separatist conflicts of East Timor, Aceh, Ambon and Papua, making 
headlines across the globe over the last two decades. In fact, media reports 
illustrate the lack of government actions to strategically tackle matters that 
surface from the country’s diverse ethnic, racial, religious and social groups, 
thus indicating the Indonesian authority’s failure to address the various 
internal problems that have evolved within its society. Also, internal conflicts 
in Indonesia often involve violence, especially when the armed forces are 
involved in conflict prevention. However, military involvement has often 
fallen short in providing a proper long-term solution to the problems. In 
general, government and other related stake-holders have failed to provide 
long-term solutions because these conflicts have forced many people into 
fear and trauma, thus refusing to take sides with the government. Some 
attempts to control this internal conflict have actually had opposite outcome 
by instead fueling domestic differences that in the end threaten to cause 
major separatism issues for the Indonesian state, despite all the efforts and 
measures that have been implemented to provide a possible long-term 
solution. It is obvious that one of the factors influencing this unique struggle 
for independence is the involvement of various international stakeholders 
 39 
such as sovereign states, political elites and NGOs. This can be illustrated 
by the involvement of the United States, Australia and the Dutch, together 
with the United Nations, during the handover of Papua to Indonesia. With 
respect to the Act of Free Choice, the Papuan issue continues to demand 
for the rights of the indigenous inhabitants of the island. Another point to 
consider is that international support from individuals, political elites and 
lawyers throughout the years has become an inspiration in the struggle for 
freedom. This group of activists find motivation in themselves, heavily reliant 
on the dark history of the early Indonesian occupation, which helps to 
regenerate the struggle of West Papuans to surge on and to rightfully 
question the legal aspects of the disputed Act of Free Choice (Pepera), 
which to many Papuans was an act of no choice (May, 1986).  
 
To gain a deeper understanding of separatism issues in West Papua, it is 
essential to recall the day the Netherlands decided to deliberately exclude 
the territory of Irian Jaya, now the Indonesian Provinces of Papua and West 
Papua, from the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 to the Republic of Indonesia. 
Specifically, the move by the Dutch began to generate an anti-Indonesian 
sentiment. The Dutch claimed that it was the people’s desire to separate 
from the greater Indonesian republic because they were different in ethnicity 
in terms of different language and dialect, different cultural and traditional 
practices including a different religion with a Christian majority. Identifying 
as totally Melanesian, a Melanesian culture forced into becoming Asian was 
something most Papuans consider to be unacceptable until this day. 
Sentiments have grown into doctrines used to provide the foundation to 
build a resistance; this then developed into a struggle for an independent 
state of West Papua.  
 
At the beginning of the struggle, the idea of freedom and independence 
promised a lot of beneficial norms. These ideas and norms began to lure 
more and more local Papuans into accepting that it was true that they were 
different from the Indonesians as far as skin colour was concerned, and in 
the end, a resistance was quickly established to oppose Indonesian rule. 
The nature of politics during the early years seemed in favour of Papuans 
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so that, by the 1980s, the majority of the young men left school to quickly 
establish themselves with the OPM. Training camps were built in the deep 
jungles of Papua to train Papuan rebel fighters. Most of the young were well 
trained by local Papuans who were ex-members of the armed forces. 
Despite the progress, the OPM did not possess enough guns and 
ammunition to come into contact with the Indonesian armed forces.  
 
Negotiations between the Indonesians and Dutch representatives continued 
to encounter an unsatisfactory result. In the end the outcome forced 
President Sukarno to what (May, 1986) was defined as adventurous or 
expansionist motivations that signalled fears among its neighbours, 
including PNG. Australia, which initially supported the early Indonesian 
nationalism, began to realise that the growing instability caused by an 
economic and political struggle for power amongst the communists and the 
army was dangerous and threatening to security in the region; especially 
the eastern half of New Guinea, now PNG.  
 
Since its independence, PNG has always recognised West Papua as an 
integral part of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, any related matters 
concerning the West Papuan independence movements such as the OPM 
remained an Indonesian domestic issue, despite ongoing concerns about a 
possible spill over effect along the border, with massive influxes of Papuan 
locals seeking asylum over the border. PNG, being a young country during 
the early 1980s, was aware of the dangers and the long-term effects of the 
presence of OPM elements in PNG territory; therefore, it did everything 
necessary to maintain good and stable relations with Indonesia. Despite the 
willingness to build an understanding with Indonesia, the OPM managed to 
build camps on the PNG side of the border. The border then became an 
important route in the rebels’ operations. Although it seems that the OPM 
had gained momentum, including the possession of safer ground in PNG 
territory to get away from Indonesian military operations, there was still 
disunity among the OPM factions. The two prominent OPM leaders, Jacob 
H. Prai and Seth J. Rumkorem, kept the OPM divided due to political 
interests until they united to join their factions in Vanuatu in 1985 in an 
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agreement whereby it was decided that Mr Prai would head the political 
mission while Mr Rumkorem would command the military operations 
(Dorney, 2000). During these years, the Indonesia-PNG border was almost 
impossible to cover due to its length and rugged geography. The size and 
strength of the Indonesian military often caused fears. The biggest concern 
for PNG was to prevent an escalation of Indonesian military patrols within 
PNG territory on the border. PNG denied any means of protecting OPM 
elements hiding in its territory. PNG, like other democracies, has always 
been obliged to preserve the value of humanity so that, in this case, PNG 
has welcomed West Papuan refugees who claim to have been deprived of 
basic human rights under the military rule of General Suharto, who was very 
well-known for unaccounted military operations which claimed the lives of 
many innocent Papuans. 
 
Until today, West Papuan human rights activists and independence 
supporters, both domestic and international, have often protested against 
the number of human rights violations in Papua and West Papua provinces. 
Among the top issues illustrated are major breaches of civil and political 
rights. Individual rights have been denied through military operations aimed 
at combating separatism. Indeed, in relation to the issue, the Indonesian 
government under Suharto has violated various articles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), as stated 
below: 
▪ The right to life, liberty and security of person (article 3); 
▪ The prohibition of torture (article 5); 
▪ The prohibition of arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (article 
9); 
▪ The right to fair trial (article 10); 
▪ The right to freedom of movement (article 13); 
▪ The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(article 17); 
▪ The right to freedom of opinion and expression (article 19); 
▪ The right to freedom of assembly and association (article 
20); 
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Indonesia’s independence and the exclusion of Papua and West Papua 
provinces from the transfer of sovereignty, together with the Dutch success 
in establishing an anti-Indonesian sentiment, has grown into a more 
complex issue that has claimed the lives of around five hundred thousand 
of Papuans over the course of 50 years. In reality, OPM leaders have come 
and gone, some vanishing without seeing what they had fought for over 
decades; time has indeed become an important part of the struggle for 
independence. Despite the ongoing campaigns carried out in both Papuan 
provinces and some being able to gain popularity in Europe, Australia and 
the Pacific, the issues are yet to make an impact on Indonesian politics. 
Nonetheless, the Indonesian government has renewed its commitment by 
ratifying several other international agreements to take up responsibilities to 
improve the standard of living in its provinces of Papua and West Papua. 
Despite developments implemented under President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s term in office, most Papuans still consider that the real factor 
motivating the call for a separate Papuan nation was not about 
infrastructural developments, but about being different people, with a 
different culture and tradition. Such demands have been high because 
many Papuan lives have been lost, and the people are traumatised with 
their own experiences of the brutal Indonesian military operations. Stories 
and testimonies have been told to the younger generations over and over 
again that take more than just infrastructural and economic developments 
to erase.  
 
More importantly, May (1986) argues that the changing nature of President 
Sukarno’s regime forced Australia to tighten its New Guinea border and 
rethink its position to allow the Dutch to work on a joint development 
program on political, economic, social and educational advancements of 
peoples in their territories, including strengthening the Australian-Dutch ties. 
In total, the precipitous transformation in Indonesian policies triggered an 
American interference to conclude that Australia and the Dutch should 
agree that West New Guinea be a small price to pay to keep Sukarno out 
of the Communist camp abroad.  
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2.2.1 Indonesia-PNG Relations and Border Security 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea’s relations have, over time, been 
consequently subjected to the issues that are constantly evolving within the 
vicinity of the two countries’ common land boundary. Whether at sea or on 
land, international borders of this kind can be somewhat sensitive in 
accordance with the number of various security risks the border sustains 
over time. Although political, economic and socio-cultural factors, for 
example, are of significant importance to the overall function of the border, 
safety and security remains the highest and most sensitive agenda that tops 
the priority list in the relationship between Indonesia and PNG. The 
prevailing security dynamics in and around the border area will determine 
the stability of the relationship between them. In addition, a safe and secure 
border is, of course, beneficial to both Indonesia and PNG in the long run, 
specifically, to the tens of thousands of villagers that call the sizeable length 
of the border home. Frankly, throughout the years, the Indonesia-PNG 
border issues has not been much talked about. One of the main reasons 
behind the lack of publicity is generally linked to the sensitivity that 
surrounds various political issues that come into direct contact with the 
border. One of the issues is certainly separatism and its effect on the 
increase in illegal border crossings (people who cross over the border from 
unattended sections of the border). In fact, some problems that occur along 
this border do seek special attention from both society and government; 
these include land disputes that strictly require traditional and customary 
solutions. Movements of people from one part of the border to the other in 
search for proper basic services like health and education have lately 
gathered more attention, and it has all been blamed on poor government 
services. Nevertheless, this specific border separates two indistinguishable 
Melanesian people that by race and culture have no difference. Besides, it 
is also known to be the only land border that is simultaneously separating 
and linking the vast regions of Southeast Asia to the Pacific.  
 
In particular, though not as popular to the international media as other 
borders have been, this unique border has been known to be quite 
vulnerable to security threats in recent times. The border itself is often 
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exposed to external and internal threats that, at some point, have violently 
impinged on a couple of high profile matters sensitive to national security, 
state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of both Indonesia and PNG, 
thus making it the most important aspect of the relationship between both 
countries. Moreover, PNG, as a democratic state, has always maintained 
its position to respect Indonesia’s sovereignty across the border; this has 
been attained through the ongoing border cooperation that oversees the 
daily management of the border. Nonetheless, it can be claimed that today 
the border stands tall as a token of pride, emphasising the endless efforts 
and hard work that both governments have agreed to accomplish 
throughout their relationship. In general, the basic agreement remains the 
cornerstone of the achievements obtained through bilateral means.  
 
The border has gone through a major infrastructural development, 
portraying the political goodwill of both governments. Despite current 
progress, May (2012b) argues that the border itself was once poorly 
defined, as only fourteen border markers stood along the vast area of the 
boundary throughout the 1980s. One of the basic reasons is, of course, the 
tough geographical features of the border, which complements its isolation, 
causing it to be very difficult to access with other forms of transportation 
such as vehicles. This Indonesia-PNG border extends through a long range 
of rugged limestone terrains passing through cliffs, forming the 
extraordinary Star Mountains of New Guinea. Hence, most parts of the 
border are still left unattended (are under-developed). Moreover, this 
specific land boundary between Indonesia and PNG stretches for some 750 
kilometres. The border itself runs from the centre of the Northern top of the 
Island between the capital cities of Jayapura (Papua Province) and Vanimo 
(Sandaun Province), here it is referred to in Bahasa Indonesia as 
Perbatasan Skouw-Wutung (Skow-Wutung border), located in the Muara 
Tami sub-district of Jayapura. The borderline later continues to cut further 
inland through to the regency of Keerom where it ascends further up to the 
highland towards the regency of Pegunungan Bintang–Star Mountains 
slicing south through to the regency of Boven Digoel, before it finally 
descends down the coastlines of the regency of Merauke’s Torasi basin. 
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The geographical features found across the border differ from one to the 
other causing difficulties in engaging with local villagers. In addition, goods 
and services also take a while to arrive at these isolated locations along the 
border, due to the deteriorating conditions of the roads and airstrips. For 
example, health workers have to walk then travel by canoe to be able to 
provide services.  Despite multiple inconveniences, the locals still love to 
perform their daily routines such as traditional trade, bride price ceremonies 
and visiting fellow wantoks (tribesmen) across the border.  
 
In total, this 750-km long land border is covered by six different 
administrations on the Indonesian side. Indonesia’s current system of 
border management has come about after Jakarta’s decision to formally 
decentralise and distribute more power to allow for provinces, municipalities 
and regency governments to manage their own affairs, including those of 
the border. The transfer of power to the provinces of Papua in 2001 and 
later West Papua in 2003 (formerly Irian Jaya) to be self-governed within 
Indonesia has been made possible via the 2001 constitution for Papua’s 
Special Autonomy (Tosiks, 2011). This allows ethnic Melanesians to run 
their own affairs based on identified characteristics such as ethnicity, race, 
tribe, language, religion and also territorial distribution that has ended up 
with two Papuan provinces, two municipalities and 40 regencies. As far as 
this even distribution of power is concerned, the administrative chain of the 
border management in Papua starts with the provincial government through 
Badan Pengelola Perbatasan dan Kerjasama Luar Negeri (the border and 
international cooperation board) which is responsible for the overall function 
of the border. Second, the municipal government of Jayapura is also tasked 
with the responsibility to see out the day-to-day functions of the Jayapura-
Vanimo (Skouw-Wutung) border through its border and cooperation board. 
Third, the regencies of Keerom, Pegunungan Bintang, Boven Digoel and 
Merauke also have the same administrative responsibilities under their own 
border cooperation boards to cover for each of their regency’s border affairs. 
In addition, all border-related issues encountered by either the municipal 
government and regency governments are later brought forward to the 
provincial government’s border and international cooperation board as the 
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agency in charge, to be discussed in accordance with the mechanism set 
out in the provincial constitution that underlines the autonomous 
responsibilities of departments within the provincial government system. 
Nonetheless, discussion such as those of the Border Liaison Officers 
Meeting (BLOM) are treated as low-level discussions, through which all 
border authorities from the municipality and regencies meet with the 
provincial border authorities annually (Indonesia-PNG, 2013). On the other 
hand, the PNG side of the border has only two provinces that border 
Indonesia. Sandaun Province borders Jayapura (Skouw-Wutung) and the 
regency of Keerom on the Northern side, while Western Province borders 
the regencies of Pegunungan Bintang, Boven Digoel and Merauke on the 
Southern part of the border.  
 
The Indonesia-PNG international boundary is known to have indirectly 
witnessed various setbacks in recent times. Border shootouts between the 
OPM armed rebel group and the Indonesian military have often been the 
disturbing factor along the border. As a result, border incursions by 
Indonesian forces often take place; some are reported and protested 
through diplomatic channels while others continue to be ignored. In relation 
to this, the dense jungles of the New Guinea border have, over time, 
provided the armed resistance with a strategic hide-out to set up base 
camps, regroup and continue to fight for their rights to be free from the 
Indonesian occupation; most attacks occur along the roads to the border in 
Jayapura-Papua (May, 2012a, 2012b). The involvement of the third-party 
(OPM fighters) from time to time has proved crucial to the stability and 
security of the 750-km border, thus leaving it vulnerable to tensions fuelled 
by a high degree of suspicion between Indonesia and PNG. Nonetheless, 
the increasing presence of West Papuan nationalists, together with the 
armed members of the OPM rebels along the border and in other parts of 
PNG, has also helped in aiding concrete evidence of struggle and 
motivation in ideology for an Independent West Papua.  
 
For these Papuans, resisting the Indonesian authoritarian military rule is a 
matter of do or die. Therefore, most of these pro-independence activists and 
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fighters found themselves seeking cover in the territory of the neighbour. 
Their uninvited arrival in PNG was a breath of fresh air and a new chapter 
to the ongoing struggle to politically pronounce a self-governing Melanesian 
state of West Papua. Border crossings of such nature were illegal in 
character; however, it was, on humanitarian grounds, that the PNG 
government treated refugees who crossed the border respectfully. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, the escalation of Papuan refugees into 
PNG territory in 1984 displayed the spill over effect of the brutal military 
operations of the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian 
Armed Forces) under the Suharto regime, now known as the Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI), after a split between the Indonesian Military and 
Police.  
 
Between 1980-1990, more and more local Papuans consisting of men, 
women, and children made their way into PNG to seek shelter and, most 
importantly, security. The more West Papuan activists and villagers who 
arrived on the PNG side of the border, the more unsettled the Indonesian 
military were. In attempts to seek cooperative outcomes, Indonesia has at 
times tried to convince the PNG government to conduct joint military 
operations along the border purposely to eliminate suspicion that PNG is 
indirectly harbouring the rebels to mount anti-Jakarta attacks from PNG 
territory. Continuing attempts to conduct joint military operations along the 
border were later dismissed by Papua New Guinea’s Defence Force Acting 
Commander, Tom Ur, in a statement to the PNG Post Courier stating that 
under no circumstance will PNG hold any joint military exercises with 
Indonesia and that each country is responsible for its own part of the border 
("PNG will not hold joint military operations with Indonesia against OPM 
rebels," 2003). Hence, the existence of the OPM elements within PNG’s part 
of the border provided concrete evidence that future relations between 
Indonesia and PNG would heavily rely on the role and function of the OPM, 
whether domestically or internationally. As part of both Indonesia and PNG’s 
security concern, it is of equal importance and duty that the safety of 
villagers along the border area be considered as a significant feature of 
border security initiatives. Whether or not the OPM will make an impact 
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along the border depends on how Indonesia and PNG set out their border 
security policies to counter and manage their common interests along it.   
Once a two-way approach towards security matters between two countries, 
border security issues between Indonesia and PNG have now developed 
into a seemingly triangular patterned. The resistance, through its multiple 
umbrella organisations trading under the Free West Papua Movement 
(OPM), is increasingly becoming an important player equipped with the 
capabilities to determine the future prospects of issues surrounding border 
security. One of the many reasons for this is the growing influence of OPM 
sub-groups on both the international and domestic political sphere. 
Moreover, the growing international recognition, because of continuing 
lobbying and awareness across the globe, has been highly accredited to the 
hard work and brilliance of some of West Papua’s finest generation of 
diplomats who promote the struggle word-wide. The Free West Papua 
diplomats, through the various sub-groupings, have succeeded in seeking 
wider recognition such as that of the United Liberation Movement of West 
Papua (ULMWP). The ULMWP was initially formed on 6 December 2014 in 
Port Vila, Vanuatu; following a long week of consultations and consolidation 
between the various sub-resistance groups of the OPM, they came to a 
single consensus that all shall unite under one umbrella representing the 
fight for a free and independent Melanesian nation of West Papua. The 
consultations ended in an agreement called the Sarlana Declaration. The 
agreement acts as a binding instrument uniting several groups such as the 
Federal Republic for West Papua (NRFPB), the West Papuan National 
Coalition of Liberation (WPNCL) and West Papuan National Parliament 
(WPNP/New Guinea Raad) under the ULMWP banner ("Soldiers injured at 
border," 2014). Today, the ULMWP is headed by Octovianus Mote 
(Secretary General), Benny Wenda (International Spokesman), Jacob 
Rumbiak, Rex Rumakiek, Leonie Tangahma (Executive Members), Edison 
Waromi (President of Federal Republic of West Papua), and Buchtar Tabuni 
(Chairman of the National Parliament of West Papua) (ULMWP).  
 
The surge in support for the independence of West Papua has been making 
waves all over the globe including in Papua and West Papua. 
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Communication networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram have 
played an enormous part in the West Papuan campaign. The way 
information is spread today has been very effective, in that it helps to 
mobilise and regroup all Papuan sympathisers and activists to support the 
overall purpose of freedom. One sector of the campaign that this research 
primarily focuses on is the impact of information between campaigners and 
rebels operating along the border. On various occasions when the ULMWP 
has attempted to gain further recognition, such as in the attainment of full 
membership in the Melanesian Spearhead Group, it always triggers 
domestic chaos including several incidents of unreported unrest along the 
border. To be more precise, the Skouw-Wutung Border has at times 
experience gun battles between the rebels and the Indonesian armed 
forces.  
 
The increase in the presence of Indonesian military personnel, together with 
their sophisticated defence systems, along the Indonesia-PNG border has 
tried to provide maximum security for border crossers who travel to and from 
Vanimo-Jayapura. Nonetheless, the OPM resistance has always applied 
pressure via its military wing known as Tentara Papua Nasional (TPN) 
(Papuan National Army) and Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat 
(TPNPB) (National Freedom Revolutionary Army of West Papua) by 
causing disturbances that threaten the security and stability of the border 
area. Major locations in the border area, such as main trading routes from 
Jayapura to Skouw-Wutung and business sites are located just a kilometre 
in radius from the boundary (Border Market). Although the border remains 
a high risk in security concerns, the majority of villagers from both sides of 
the border still continue their daily traditional and customary routines that 
have existed since the day of their ancestors. The routines involve the basic 
needs for survival such as fishing, hunting and gardening or visiting family 
and relatives across the border.  
 
Apart from the risk on land, security issues at sea are also among the 
important aspects discussed bilaterally. Illegal fishing and illegal 
transporting of drugs and narcotics, together with other illegal trading, are 
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contributing to criminal activities along the sea border. Although fishing 
along the border has, in recent years, attained special attention from the 
local media, illegal fishing is still treated as a low threat because in most 
cases local or traditional fishermen are forced over by sea-currents or 
swelling tides into foreign territory. Some cases illustrate that in the 
excitement of fishing these locals forget to keep track of coordinates thus 
ending up being arrested by authorities in either one of the territories. 
Another important illegal activity that occurs at sea is the transportation of 
drugs like marijuana from Vanimo PNG to Jayapura-Papua in exchange for 
illegal petroleum products such as petrol and diesel. These illegal crimes 
are often done by local people that are in one way or the other related by 
family. Apart from illegal fishing and the illegal transfer of petroleum 
products, it is also important to point out that in comparison to other routines, 
activities such as hunting and gardening pose a greater security risk 
because of the involvement of local innocent lives which are at risk in the 
act of performing traditional rituals of this type.  
 
Moreover, it is clear that advancements in science and technology have 
contributed towards the shift in developments of the border region; 
specifically, the border posts up in the Skouw-Wutung area that have seen 
more infrastructural developments that are not only moving to the forefront, 
but also becoming an icon that proudly promotes various development 
success (Timisela, 2015). In addition, infrastructural developments like 
roads, bridges and buildings along various parts of the border have forced 
traditional hunting grounds to shift further inland into isolated territory (often 
unmonitored parts of the border). These sections of the border are only 
accessed by foot and recently motorcycles that share bush tracks (jalan 
tikus). They are limited in transportation options due to their unique 
geographical features that require basic knowledge and understanding of 
nature. The unmonitored sections of the border are by far geographically 
more suitable to the resistance because these parts of the border are 
usually unattended, giving more space and opportunity for illegal activities 
to take place.  
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Armed OPM separatist elements that operate along these parts of the 
border often trigger a sense of insecurity among the locals that use the land 
for traditional purposes. Like some of the reasons mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the presence of armed OPM elements sparks fears among the 
local landowners along the border because their daily activities have been 
limited to fears of being blamed by either the OPM or the military for spying. 
Young women and children are among the most vulnerable due to the 
demands of intermarriage. Another reason is because the OPM 
experiences shortages in food supplies causing them to raid villagers’ 
gardens in search for basic food so as to continue to operate.  
 
Over the years there have been several recorded accounts of OPM guerrilla 
attacks mounted on local businessmen and traders who constitute the 
economic supply chain at the Skouw-Wutung border post. Incidents of this 
kind have significantly disrupted the flow of goods and services, including 
the number of tourists and visitors that contribute to the border’s economy 
and trade. The sequence of attacks along the border has mostly targeted 
non-Melanesian (Asian) businessmen and traders. These local Indonesian 
businessmen are exposed because of the anti-Indonesian sentiments that 
were inherited from the ideological doctrines of the OPM. Despite the 
presence of the Indonesian military and police, the border continues to be 
often recognised as a hostile territory. Although disturbances are prone to 
occur at any time, the pasar berbatasan (border market) at Skouw-Wutung 
continues to operate under maximum supervision from the regional, 
provincial and central levels together with their counterparts from PNG who 
try to make sure that the trade along the border is benefiting the 
communities. Nevertheless, the market is located within a kilometre of the 
border’s main entrance and is always maintained and heavily guarded by 
the military and police to ensure that the objective of security is attained to 
mutually boost their relationship. The presence of the army and police at the 
Skouw-Wutung border post is often tested with surprise attacks involving 
heavy artillery such as the shooting in May 2014("Another Shooting at PNG 
Indonesian border," 2014), shootouts and threats. The military, being 
subjected to an internal security dilemma, often reacts with high caution as 
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in most cases the actions of the military and police are used against them 
as violations supporting anti-human rights campaigns. The armed forces 
have often been caught off guard in the act of preventing conflicts or 
maintaining law and order because the victims of such military activities 
would use the evidence against the Indonesian government as being human 
rights violations. This strategy has been heavily used in the Free West 
Papuan campaigns to promote human rights violations in Papua and West 
Papua provinces.  
 
Many of the victims are non-Melanesians who are of different ethnicities 
from people from South Sulawesi (Makassar) and Java that own businesses 
such as trade stores and market stalls at the Skouw-Wutung international 
market. They travel to and from Jayapura city every day to operate their 
stores, and their supplies are also transported from Jayapura by road to the 
border. Another of the major security determinants is the border’s locations 
that make travelling rather unsafe, because the roads linking to Jayapura 
cut through the lower jungles of the Blue Mountains, known to be OPM 
territory. Even though there are routine military and police patrols, still some 
parts of the roads are prone to be used as ambush points by the rebels. The 
OPM rebels carry out surprise attacks by shooting at passing vehicles, local 
villagers, visitors, tourists or other Indonesian businessman who travel to 
the border; in some cases, they shoot at the armed military forces. An 
example, in mid-2014, it was reported that a few hours after the reopening 
of the Skouw-Wutung border, it came under ambush by the OPM rebels 
who shoot two Indonesian soldiers. After the shootings, the rebels took 
cover in PNG territory causing the Indonesian military to stop in pursuit due 
to territorial jurisdictions ("Soldiers injured at border," 2014). The person in 
charge of the Papua New Guinean Defence Force (PNGDF) operations, 
Col. Dominic Bulungol, delivered a statement saying that the OPM rebels 
were not targeting the PNGDF; however, they could end up in the middle of 
crossfire between Indonesia’s TNI and the OPM Rebels ("Soldiers injured 
at border," 2014). 
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Separatism, as Knight (1982) argues, whenever it is linked to the idea of 
nationalism, is intended to be linked with forms of territorial separation, thus 
confirming the linkage between separatist motivated activities along the 
border and other related events such as international lobbying and 
organised mass demonstrations in West Papua by diplomats of the free 
West Papua movement through networking and synchronising with each 
other. In total, the overall accomplishments of the Free West Papua 
campaign indicate evidence of success. For example, the international 
recognition of West Papuan Independence leaders like Benny Wenda in 
Oxford UK and Octo Motte in leading the United Liberation Movement for 
West Papua (ULMWP) in the Melanesian Spearhead Group Forum (MSG) 
as an observer. It seems all this progress, whether domestic or international 
is instrumental, in setting the momentum for the supporters and also the 
rebels that operate along the border. For instance, border security is 
tightened in the lead up to MSG Forum meetings for fear of the border being 
used as a transit zone to major MSG destinations like Vanuatu or the 
Solomon Islands and also to prevent the armed OPM members from 
manipulating politically driven agendas.   
 
Hence, Indonesia and PNG are faced with extraordinary challenges in 
designing and implementing border security policies. Indeed, sentiments 
derived from the relationship between Indonesia and PNG in relation to the 
ever-increasing presence of refugees and the armed OPM has always been 
at the rear of the two countries’ border security issues. Policy makers and 
other designated officials from both governments have tried to contain and 
design policies that will provide a win-win solution for the two governments. 
Nonetheless, security policies do not always portray Indonesia’s military 
power despite the advancements of its military compared to PNG. Although 
there are certain indications that show an unequal distribution in military size 
along the border, Indonesia has always maintained a friendly and 
cooperative bilateral approach in regard to the designing and implementing 
of border security policies.  
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Although the relationship between Indonesia and PNG has expanded and 
strengthened over the years (PNG Embassy, 2012), the common border 
remains the most complex aspect of the two states’ relations. Issues arising 
from the disputes along the border, whether they are between government 
and government or people and people or government and people, have 
always remained at the top of all agendas. The reason as to why this has 
maintained special attention is based on the fears that if not properly 
contained, or should a dispute break out or escalate, it might generate 
potential harm to the relationship between Indonesia and PNG. 
Furthermore, it might trigger separatism in Indonesia. Therefore, problem-
solving mechanisms such as annual border meetings, are vital for 
addressing issues and making available all means to maintain the stability 
of the border area and, most importantly, a harmonious relationship 
between both governments.   
 
2.2.2 Indonesia’s National Approach and Border Policy 
Indonesia has moved on from a series of financial, political and 
environmental catastrophes to be distinguished as an important partner in 
attempts to address global challenges. The post-Suharto era showed 
promising signs of possible developments in both government and society. 
The removal of Suharto’s military regime provided the citizens with more 
space to contribute and influence the different sectors of the state. 
Eventually, the country transformed from a highly militarised and centralised 
authoritarian state into a relatively open, stable and democratic one (Harris 
& Foresti, 2010). Like many other countries, the government of the Republic 
of Indonesia has, over the years, undertaken to review and improve the 
decision making and implementation of its security policy orientation to 
protect its national interests, national security, and ideological and economic 
prosperity. To achieve its objectives, Indonesia has 132 missions abroad, 
consisting of 95 embassies, 3 permanent missions to for the United Nations 
in New York and Geneva, and for ASEAN in Jakarta, 31 Consulates General 
and 3 Consulates as well as appointed 64 Honorary Consuls (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2010). In respect to this, the 
Indonesia-PNG relations have been stable as a result of successful 
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peaceful and friendly cooperation through the mechanisms set out within 
the bilateral, multilateral, regional and international agreements (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Republic Of Indonesia, 2005).  
 
Considering the range of domestic and international factors that impinge on  
Indonesian political stability and security, one example is the historical 
riotous violence of May 1998 that shattered Indonesia’s main cities, 
including Jakarta, and which terrorised the whole country (Purdey, 2002). 
Nationwide concerns over the impact of the Asian financial crisis sparked a 
massive domestic uprising against President Suharto’s regime in May 1998, 
which was subsequently caused by the devaluation of the Baht in Thailand 
that triggered a region-wide economic convulsion dragging Indonesia down 
with it (Donald, 2000). The riots that brought down the Suharto regime 
signified a revolution inspired by the mounting external pressure, igniting 
internal political and security instability that was affected by anarchy and 
chaos, thus rationalising the impact of external and internal factors and its 
role of overcoming potential security risks. These factors greatly contributed 
to the reform of the government systems through the various constitutions 
favourable to supporting the growing demand for the allocation of domestic 
power to provinces and regencies. The domestic transfer of power through 
the democratic mechanisms of decentralisation clearly demonstrates the 
strategic decision making that guided Indonesia to develop into an important 
global partner willing to cooperate with other governments including PNG in 
the security sector. Likewise, Harris and Foresti (2010) argue that 
Indonesian policy makers have been quite successful in endorsing 
strategies to pursue the shift they needed to the advantage of the 
Indonesian people despite the lack of “good governance” found in various 
regions of Indonesia.  
 
Historically, Indonesia’s post-reformasi (the reform movement and program 
initiated after Suharto’s downfall after 1998) has set the foundation for a 
relatively open, stable and democratic government system, which is 
signalled through the range of policies such as “pembangunan ekonomi” 
(economic development) and national stability achievable through “benar 
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membangun demokrasi” (building a strong democracy) (Roberts, Habir, & 
Sebastian, 2015) under the leadership of the country’s first democratically 
elected, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY). A measurement of 
the success of relative stability and high growth was the subsequent 
decision to democratically decentralise its system by utilising political and 
economic devolution to reduce the power of the central government, which 
cut the deeply embedded legacy of Suharto’s rule, encouraged more local 
involvement in politics and economic, and increased the people’s sense of 
belonging to the polity (Kurlantzick, 2012). Political manoeuvres of such sort 
have taken the lead in massive conversions within the different government 
sectors, and have been cornerstone of the institutional reforms and a focal 
point toward the decision making and implementation of programs and 
policies. An example of these decentralisation processes was the granting 
of otonomi khusus (special autonomy) to provinces of Papua and Aceh 
(McGibbon, 2004).  
 
McGibbon (2004) argues that Jakarta’s decision to transfer power to other 
provinces including Papua, was a matter of answering the growing demand 
for separation due to the rapid increase in violence after the fall of Suharto, 
with the aim of diverting the secessionists’ demands. Power to exercise 
more political freedom between provinces and the regencies within the 
country then breathed new life into government institutions to purposely 
transform a direct form of cooperation between the regency, and the 
provincial and the national levels. In addition, the creation of Badan 
Pengelola Perbatasan Nasional (National Border Management Agency) 
proved to be a legal form of decentralising power that was aimed at 
enhancing the roles of the provincial and regional border authorities. The 
national government’s decision to exercise more political flexibility also 
played an advantage in legitimising more rapid cooperation among the 
provincial and regional border agencies (Ichsan, 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, security dynamics in the twenty-first century have contributed 
to a rapid rise in the significance of border security measures, with 
essentially all countries around the globe now being able to work together 
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in some subtle system. In addition, (Buzan, 1991) argues that the intensity 
and character of the national security problem varies dramatically over time, 
moving into periods of lower tension and increased cooperation. The aim of 
this thesis is to cover major border security policy aspects of the Indonesian-
PNG bilateral relations, concurring with the realist perspective that 
governments do exhibit absolute power to define and affect foreign policy, 
meaning they do not take orders from anyone higher (Morgan, 2006). 
Indonesia and PNG also face the challenge of addressing security issues 
that impact the relationship between them; although it is clear that the 
relationship centres on their shared border, the presence of the third party 
(OPM) is crucial to the subsistence cooperation among intergovernmental 
institutions, for instance the security sector and border management.  
 
2.3 Indonesia-PNG Relations 
Evidence of numerous border incursions made by the Indonesian military 
has regularly prompted the PNG government to raise their concerns in 
international forums ("Sarlana Decleration," 2014). Reports on skirmishes 
in West Sepik province between the Indonesian military and PNG citizens 
("Border issues present new challenge to PNG's relationship with 
Indonesia," 2013) have alerted both sides that there is yet more work to be 
done to maintain a solid relationship. Given the peaceful co-existence 
between both countries, interactions at the political level have continued to 
be robust compared to economic trade and socio-cultural areas; an example 
of the continuity of cooperation is the joint ministerial commission that was 
subsequently formed to facilitate bilateral relations (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2010).  
 
The relationship has over time been represented by a significant increase 
in specially arranged visits such as that of the annual joint verification 
exercises–carried out throughout specified parts of the border–mandated 
by the annual bilateral border meetings. The usual joint exercise is mostly 
aimed at inspecting the ongoing progress of initial programs that are jointly 
funded by both governments. Multiple delegations ranging from district 
councils, provincial authorities to even ministerial visits have painted rather 
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friendlier and cooperative relations throughout 41 years of relations. Those 
high-level exchanges of visits between heads of state and government 
ministers have continued to consolidate the understanding and cooperation 
between the two governments. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
visit to Port Moresby in 2010 has alerted the PNG government to 
Indonesia’s interests in improving relations with its neighbours. The meeting 
symbolised Indonesia’s interests in venturing into key issues including 
cooperation along common borders and economic and trade and defence 
cooperation. (Thom, 2012). 
 
Given the peaceful co-existence of the Indonesia-PNG border relations, 
interactions at the political level have continued to be robust; however, with 
recent progress, there has also been an increase in interactions in both the 
economic and socio-cultural sectors. Overall, there has been a significant 
increase in exchange of visits by respective delegates of both governments. 
Those high-level exchanges of visits between heads of state and 
government ministers have continued to consolidate understanding and 
cooperation between the two states. Moreover, outcomes of political 
relations have successfully created more opportunities in other sectors; for 
example, Law and Order focusing on Trans-National Crime, Fisheries, 
Agriculture and Livestock, Youth and Cultural Exchange Matters and Health 
Matters have been part of the agendas in recent years (Indonesian 
Government, 2013). 
 
2.3.1 Foreign Relations 
Much of the literature confirms that relations between the two countries 
existed prior to the independence of PNG. However, PNG’s independence 
in 1975 paved the way to official relations between both countries (PNG 
Embassy, 2012); (May, 2012b) . Among other important accomplishments 
throughout their relationship it is important to point out the significant impact 
of the initial agreement that yielded the “Treaty of Mutual Respect 
Friendship and Cooperation” and recently the “Joint Commission,” which 
serve as major pillars of existing cooperative relations (PNG Embassy, 
2012). The agreement laid emphasis on the, interests as immediate 
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neighbours. The treaty, being a reciprocal covenant, responded to the 
people’s common desire for peace, progress, and prosperity, in accordance 
with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as stated 
in the official document of the treaty (Treaty of mutual respect, friendship 
and cooperation, 1986). Moreover, the current status of pleasant, 
consensual dealings between Indonesia and PNG has been accredited to 
continuous government determination and pursuance of the state goals 
through their strategic approaches within the broad scope of foreign policy 
frameworks. For example, successive PNG governments have constantly 
stated their objection to the OPM guerrillas mounting attacks from PNG soil, 
and this has been followed with an increase in the PNG military’s budget for 
the purpose of border patrol throughout the years (May, 2004). 
 
The treaty, now a benchmark to various “special arrangements” including 
that of the border security, has, in particular, developed to become the spine 
of a-strong two-way interaction. Besides, Papua New Guinea’s growing role 
in the Asia-Pacific (Wallis, 2014) region is boosting the relationship as 
Indonesia seeks Papua New Guinea’s close cooperation as a special 
partner to address present and future security challenges. Strategically, the 
notion has become more evident in that, currently, the two nations continue 
to enjoy a very peaceful and harmonious state of relations. Moreover, 
inaugural visits by high ranking officials from both sides have painted a 
rather more serious sense of cooperation portraying the political goodwill of 
each state. Despite all means of cooperation, including that of the high-level 
talks between heads of states, border issues still remain the main cause of 
tension between Indonesia and PNG because of the sensitive political links 
connected to the issue of separatism.  
 
Whilst the mutual dialogues and interactions between leaders of the two 
countries continue to provide the political will for enhancing cooperation 
between the two governments, it is apparent that tangible areas of 
cooperation like trade and investment opportunities, technical and 
technological assistance, transportation and security have not been 
vigorously pursued as substantive matters. The establishment of the 
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bilateral Joint Commission in June 2003 between Indonesia and PNG 
elevated the level of dialogue between Foreign Ministers to oversee and 
effectively deliberate on core bilateral issues affecting relations between 
both countries at the ministerial level. In addition, this dialogue substitutes 
as a proactive forum for both countries to discuss technical frameworks of 
cooperation to further diversify and expand potential areas of tangible 
mutual benefits. Close cooperation and follow-ups should be appropriate for 
other functional ministers of both countries to also participate in the Joint 
Commission meetings with reference to the Inter-governmental Relations 
Minister of PNG and the Home Affairs Minister of Indonesia, who are both 
involved at the annual JBC meetings (PNG Embassy, 2008).  
 
2.3.2 Political Relations 
Before and after independence, PNG was considered amongst other states 
in the Asia Pacific region as a strategic partner for relations with Indonesia. 
This was later confirmed in 1973 during the self-government period when 
there were attempts made by Sir Albert Maori Kiki (First PNG Foreign 
Minister) who willingly offered himself to become a negotiator in secret talks 
with the OPM and his Indonesian counterpart, Mr. Adam Malik (Dorney, 
2000). The initiatives taken were not entirely appreciated by Indonesia, 
which later forced Sir Maori Kiki to provide a report stating that Prime 
Minister Somare had conducted a meeting with OPM frontman Seth 
Rumkorem. At this time, Indonesia and PNG relations were heavily 
dependent on the OPM issues; Seth Rumkorem and Jacob Prai, leaders of 
the two OPM factions, were invited for talks in Port Moresby in early 1977 
with then the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Olewale, 
Defence Minister Louis Mona, Foreign Secretary Tony Siaguru, and PNGDF 
Commander Ted Diro, in which Rumkorem and Prai were told that PNG 
recognised Papua as an integral part of Indonesia and would continue to 
prevent its territory from being used for anti-Indonesian acts (Dorney, 2000). 
Such bold commitments from the PNG government have from time to time 
become the core of political relationships between both countries.  
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2.3.3 Economics, Investment and Trade 
In retrospect, the level of the Indonesian investment in PNG also remains 
relatively low in comparison to other states. In aggregate value, investment 
opportunities have obtained a rather low profit; for example, between 1992 
and 1998, Indonesian investments in the sector of retailing and forestry 
were valued at only K3.2 million (Soerjanto, 2007). Nonetheless, there have 
been indications of regular growth inclusive of the mining sector within the 
highlands and the West Sepik province of PNG (Soerjanto, 2007). Other 
prospective investors that have indicated interest in areas of oil and gas, 
telecommunication and agriculture in PNG include Indonesian companies 
like Greencom Dawamiba Mobile Telecommunication company and 
Indorama Petrochemical Company (PNG Embassy, 2008).  
 
Moreover, foreign investments between Indonesia and PNG have been one 
of the important developing issues behind more negotiations on the 
conclusion of the “Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA)” 
(Soerjanto, 2007), which needs to be revisited as a matter of utmost priority 
for subsequent signing, signing the agreement is intended to technically 
protect investments from high risk insecurity. On the domestic scale, the 
government should focus on the main aspects that counteract likely 
investment such as excessive service charges, law and order conditions, 
land compensations, political instability and, most importantly, language 
barriers. For example, many problems that arise in relation to the common 
border are often not handled well due to the different languages spoken 
along the border, where Pidgin and Bahasa Indonesia seem more 
dominant. Despite being used in exchanges more frequently, both 
languages often fall short in playing an important role in the settlement of 
disputes. Hence, disputes are later forced to be settled with the help of 
English speaking officials, which in Indonesia’s case, still need to increase. 
Evidence illustrates that a stable society and financial security are deemed 
as paramount preconditions for attracting of foreign investments between 
both countries.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The Political Impacts of Separatism on Border Security 
Conflicts relating to the issue of separatism or self-determination are among 
the most significant factors affecting the domestic and international stability 
of states. Indeed, instabilities triggered by such conflicts threaten the level 
of national security. Moreover, security, as Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 
claim, concerns survival as it deals with issues that “pose a threat to a 
designated referent object” (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, 
incorporates government, territory, and society) (Anthony, Emmers, & 
Acharya, 2006). Nonetheless, the Copenhagen School has divided the 
elements of security into five categories; military, environmental, economic, 
societal, and political security.   
 
In relation to the existence of separatist movements, levels of security along 
international border areas are often maximized or tightened to safeguard 
national interest. In fact, such conflicts bring vulnerability to the state’s 
political, economic and social development. Despite the number of attempts 
to prevent such sensitive conflicts from taking place, it seems that the fragile 
nature of separatist conflicts does not accommodate for short-term 
solutions. One of the main reasons behind this argument is because 
separatism involves human lives (citizens) who are by law entitled to safety 
and basic human rights. Hence the state in this case is tasked with the 
challenge to simultaneously maintain its integrity and at the same time 
protect its sovereignty and citizens from both external and internal threats. 
The issue of separatism remains a problem that requires immediate 
cooperation and bargaining to secure a favourable outcome. 
 
It is important to point out that separatism concerns movements of political 
interests’ hostile to a sovereign government or nation. Separatist 
movements in the past were considered domestic problems with the aim to 
politically disaffiliate from a sovereign state. The main idea was to basically 
configure a new self-governing state in accordance with their own ideologies 
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and principles. Nowadays, the advancement in information technology 
deserves huge credit for its role in converting a once domestic struggle to a 
more global one. Furthermore, contributions from the internet through social 
media and other forms of media have rather transformed separatist conflicts 
from their traditional form to a more advanced and organized movement. 
For instance, by capitalizing on these developments, the separatist 
movements intend to take up a more advanced role in diplomatic lobbying 
at the international level through their global campaigns.  
 
The ongoing ambitions and affiliations of separatist movements have 
captured the attention and interest of more than one sovereign state, non-
government organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IGOs), 
multi-national corporations, together with civil societies, individual political 
elites and individual sympathizers around the world who are concerned with 
the issues surrounding human rights, environmental conservation or animal 
welfare that affect the lives of people in the separatist region. The NGOs 
have become more instrumental because of their role and connections 
around the globe. With respect to NGO support, separatist movements are 
likely to gain more support as the issue becomes a commodity within NGO 
markets. Such contributions from the NGOs are prone to add more fuel and 
motivation which supports the activists. Sometimes the relationship 
between separatist movements and NGOs is questioned, because the role 
of NGOs can complicate and prolong the conflict.  
 
Accordingly, the existence of separatist movements is driven by the 
people’s desire to politically determine their own destiny as a nation-state. 
Separatist conflicts are, mostly, fuelled by the ongoing dissatisfaction 
caused by the disturbances found among the various aspects of statehood 
and society. For example, the “losses of lives and property among the 
civilian population” (Singh, 2007) are some points that describe the factors 
that dictate the conditions upon  which the struggle for separatism is built. 
Furthermore, separatist movements cause “threats and insecurities on 
individuals as well as communities” (Anthony et al., 2006). Consequently, 
human security can be imperilled by the existence of separatism. 
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Nonetheless, separatist conflicts remain a great threat to the “national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states, which include 
individuals and respective societies” (Anthony et al., 2006).  
 
Besides human rights violations, other factors such as religion, ethnicity, 
history, race, language, political, economic and social deprivations or 
environmental catastrophes make up some of the issues that give rise to 
the existence and continuation of separatist conflicts. In relation to the basic 
factors mentioned above, some of these have developed to become the 
demands and desires that feature as the core components that underline 
the structural motive behind separatist movements. Similarly, others are 
undoubtedly caused by political and economic distress, hostility or trauma 
that emerged from an oppressive government system, poor handling of 
domestic affairs, minimum availability of basic services, inequality in the 
implementation of policies whether it be economic, political or social justice 
etc.  
 
Despite the measures taken by the government to improve related 
conditions, dealing with such conflicts remains complicated and long-lasting 
because almost all the reasons above are known to have successfully 
formed a strong bond within the hearts and minds of separatists and their 
supporters. Individuals and communities affected by the problems of 
separatism, often find themselves trapped. Overall, the psychological fight 
motivates and aspires separatist movements to remain solid as an 
organization, even though, at times, some activists physically suffer at the 
hands of the government’s armed forces.  
 
Another important factor to consider is the involvement of the armed forces 
in the process of securing national interests. More specifically, the increase 
in the deployment of security personnel (military and police) to areas 
marked for separatist conflicts commonly illustrates the presence of danger 
and insecurity found among the state and its citizens. The growing 
insecurities among a state and its citizens thus accumulate to accommodate 
potential domestic and international instabilities. The main reason is that 
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most separatist conflicts obtain international support. On the other hand, the 
use of armed forces is well-known as a method to release direct pressure 
off the central government. However, in doing so, the armed forces often 
end up committing human rights violations because, most of the time, they 
take matters into their own hands.  
 
Some may argue that the government takes cover behind the armed forces, 
while letting the armed forces handle the field work. Moreover, the armed 
forces are faced with huge challenges as their conduct might turn out to 
violate human rights laws or be just simply just protecting national interest. 
In this case, the armed forces are often left to face a domestic security 
dilemma. Despite who gets the first call to maintain order, the use of armed 
forces can paint a bad image. The armed forces are known to threaten 
citizens with great force when asking them to cooperate according to laws 
and regulations set out by the central government. Nonetheless such 
security strategies are imposed to provide a peaceful and harmonious 
platform for the development of government programs. However, many may 
argue that these practices are normal in a corrupt and oppressive system of 
government. Ironically, the increase in the number of military personnel in 
separatist marked areas often creates tensions that fuel the conflict.  
  
In the case of this research, the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) is a 
separatist movement that operates today through its leading organization, 
the Free West Papua Movement, and the United Liberation Movement for 
Free West Papua (ULMWP) on the international level. The OPM’s 
involvement on the international stage has been widely credited to the 
benefits of information technology. Together, these two organizations and 
some other of its sub-organizations, continue to reject the Indonesian 
occupation in the territories of both Papua and West Papua provinces. 
Again, such rejections are aimed at condemning the acts of the Indonesian 
authorities and armed forces for their illegal large scale human rights 
violations (Rutherford, 2012). Even though there are many other aspects 
that have contributed to fuel the prolonged fight for self-determination, one 
of the major issues raised inside the Free West Papua campaign is the 
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allegations that lead to a human rights violations report on the “genocidal” 
operation which claimed the lives of over 4000 Papuans between 1977-
1978 that included helicopter bombings (Rollo, 2013).  
 
Accordingly, with respect to such infringements, the Indonesian government 
has been continuously criticized for failing to meet international standards 
that have been set out in conventions, such as, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Even though Indonesia continues to receive criticism from 
other concerned parties, the initial relationship of Indonesia and PNG 
remains cordial. Moreover, the focus that sustains much criticism remains 
the border when it comes to dealing with suspected border incursion by the 
Indonesian armed forces. The PNG government has often raised concerns 
regarding reports of Indonesian soldiers spotted in PNG territory. The 
Indonesian government simultaneously blames the PNG government for 
harbouring OPM elements. Political disruptions remain possible due to the 
existence of high levels of suspicion between both countries. Nonetheless, 
Indonesia and PNG has been cooperating within their existing mechanisms 
and paradigms to make sure that cautious security measures are executed 
on their common border.  
 
To gain a thorough understanding of the impacts of Papuan separatism on 
the Indonesia-PNG international border, it is vital to consider the kinds of 
internal and external influences. Indeed, international and domestic factors 
do somewhat come into direct contact with the border and its role in 
providing the line of defence. It is also equally valuable to examine the 
impact it produces on understanding the processes of designing and 
implementing border security policies. In this context, internal and external 
forces are at some point linked to each other due to their “resonance and 
credence in the light of emerging threats and uncertainties” (Anthony et al., 
2006). Hence, such impacts are prone to have many security implications 
along the PNG-Indonesia border. First, the impact of Papua’s struggle to 
separate from Indonesia through various political and social platforms (such 
as the ones existing in Europe, Africa, America, Asia, Australia, and the 
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South-West Pacific) has greatly enhanced the level of security and the role 
of the Indonesia-PNG border.  
 
In terms of interests, the border has become a central element in the 
relationship of Indonesia and PNG. Moreover, the presence of West Papuan 
activists and supporters on PNG soil has often instigated a series of 
misunderstandings between Jakarta and Port Moresby. Such 
misunderstandings come at a price, and are considered to be beneficial to 
the OPM. In relation to the factors that determine the level of security, such 
advantages are perceived as an external force that influences both 
countries’ internal security. As a result, this often leads to tensions between 
the OPM rebels and the Indonesian armed forces (TNI/POLRI) at the 
border, because the OPM takes advantage to influence the security of the 
border. Actions taken by the OPM are sometimes desperate in the hope of 
gaining more international media exposure. Despite accounts of several 
border clashes between the OPM and the TNI, the PNG Defence Force 
(PNGDF) has kept a rather low profile in maintaining its role. Such behaviour 
would be deemed as taking a more cautious approach to security, keeping 
in mind the size and might of the TNI. Otherwise, it would be interpreted as 
not interfering with Indonesian domestic issues as it might cause 
misunderstandings.  
 
Secondly, the common border accommodates several interests of both 
Indonesia and PNG including the OPM as the third party. At some point, 
conflicts of interest are bound to occur given the political and economic 
developments taking place along the border. For instance, the border has 
been home for the OPM rebels for over 50 years. This means the OPM and 
some of its factions, have been using the border to escape from Indonesia’s 
military patrols and operations ever since the OPM was first established. 
Despite the ongoing Indonesian military surveillances and operations inside 
the jungles and along the mountain ranges, the border continues to serve 
an important political and security purpose for the OPM’s military wing and 
other sub-organizations that seek to procure independence from Indonesia. 
From an economic perspective, the impact on border security will surely 
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affect the economic trading that take place approximately a kilometre from 
the border. The border market, existing not too far from the border entrance, 
is a market well known for supplying the grassroots with a wide range of 
goods and service. Moreover, the market has been making huge financial 
gains in the last few years because of the increase in buyers that come from 
PNG. The market itself is deemed as one of the important assets of the 
Jayapura municipality. Despite its importance as a state property, that 
portrays the image of Indonesia on the forefront the market also serves a 
special purpose for the OPM and other resistance forces. Recent attacks 
have been launched purposely to frighten away buyers from PNG. Indeed, 
attacks carried out by the OPM on the border portrays its role as one of the 
players determining the case of border security.  Despite the heavy 
presence of the Indonesian armed forces, the OPM still has control of much 
of the border areas.  The main reason is that most areas along the border 
remain unmarked which makes it a prefect getaway zone for the resistance 
forces.     
 
A third point to note is that the campaign for self-determination has been 
greatly internationalized over the years, thus bringing different political 
interests from other important regional players such as Vanuatu, the 
Solomon Islands, Fiji and other small Pacific Island countries plus Australia. 
Therefore, the function of the border remains influential to the relationship 
of Indonesia and PNG amid growing international pressure. In some cases, 
the developments of the OPM through the Free West Papua Organization 
and the ULMWP in the MSG has often motivated OPM fighters along the 
border to increase tensions with the Indonesian armed forces. The main aim 
behind such hostility serves the purpose of synchronizing support in a 
search for wider international recognition and thus by creating instabilities 
along the border, economic activities are disturbed due to fears of a possible 
surprise attack from the rebels. As tension intensifies, the PNG counterparts 
are well informed of the situation on the ground within Indonesia. The 
sharing of information also helps to minimize inconveniences within their 
relationship specially to maintain order along the border.  
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This chapter seeks to elaborate on the major political determinants that 
internally and externally affect the relationship of Indonesia and PNG with 
respect to the existence of the OPM and the impact of separatism on 
Indonesian and PNG’s border security. In relation to this, it will also focus 
on the factors that affect the designing and implementing of border security 
policies. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to identify the relationship between 
separatist movements from both domestic and international spheres and 
the significant role it plays in affecting the daily functioning of the Indonesia-
PNG border. The role of Papua’s provincial bureaucrats -from the 
autonomous government- who are responsible for designing and 
implementing border security policies will be reviewed to justify the link 
between separatism and the internal and external factors that impact border 
security in general.    
 
3.1 Political Factors Influencing Separatism 
Throughout this research, it is understood that the act of separatism occurs 
based on several factors that directly affect the area of its origination. In this 
case, Papua’s separatist conflict has been the result of various unsuccessful 
political deals which occurred for over 50 years of the Papuan struggle for 
self-determination. The Papuan struggle for self-determination began first 
when the Dutch prepared Papua for independence. Nevertheless, the 
political dynamics regarding the status of the territories of Papua and West 
Papua provinces didn’t turn in favour of the Dutch, and basically the Dutch 
government failed to maintain its control over the said territory which then 
resulted in the Indonesian take-over (Saltford, 2003b).  In an attempt to win 
back the prematurely introduced self-determination, the OPM quickly 
established a military wing that later became the main faction serving as a 
resistance to counter the Indonesian armed forces. In this context, there are 
many factors that play a significant role in undermining the relationship of 
Indonesia and PNG.  
 
Like other separatist organizations around the world, the OPM, together with 
the Free West Papua Organization and some of its sub-organizations, is a 
political actor that has gradually grown in influence within the last decade. 
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Today, the OPM and its allies can’t be eliminated from the general 
relationship of Indonesia and PNG. The main reason is due to their 
involvement in the issues that directly impact on national security. More 
specifically, their developments are bound to have an influence along the 
common border of Indonesia and PNG. Secondly, the OPM as a political 
movement seeking to attain self-determination has managed to successfully 
cooperate with various groups to launch several internationally organized 
campaigns.  
 
The Free West Papua Organization for example, was launched in Oxford, 
in the United Kingdom by Benny Wenda, a prominent leader of the West 
Papuan Independence movement and senior spokesperson for the 
ULMWP. The ULMWP is also another organization that was purposely set 
up as a symbol of unification among the various factions of the West Papuan 
separatist movement. The ULMWP is currently an observer in the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group Forum (MSG). Despite being an observer at 
the MSG, the ULMWP is gaining more support from the governments of 
Vanuatu and Solomon Islands in its bid to upgrade its membership to full 
MSG member. ("Solomon Islands and Vanuatu to support full ULMWP 
membership at the MSG," 2016). 
 
Another point to consider is that besides the two groups mentioned above, 
there are also many other small sub-organizations (campaign groups) that 
operate to help support West Papua’s struggle for self-determination. For 
instance, the National Liberation Council for West Papua in the Netherlands 
(Nasution, 2014). Likewise, the Free West Papua Organization claims that 
campaign groups exist in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, PNG, Poland, USA 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Indonesia and 
Spain (Papua, 2004a). In general, these groups aim to secure further 
international political recognition, something that the prominent West 
Papuan independence leaders hope can help educate and influence more 
people and governments to support their pleas. More importantly, they aim 
to persuade the United Nations General Assembly to revisit the decision 
that granted legitimacy to the Act of Free Choice (Saltford, 2003a).  
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In relation to the pleas for self-determination, Saltford (2003a) argues that a 
genuine process for self-determination did not take place in 1969. Although 
there was direct UN supervision of the so-called Act of Free Choice, only 
1,022 local Papuans were hand-picked to participate. As a result, the 
integration of the territories of Papua into Indonesia is still deemed as illegal 
to many Papuans and their sympathisers around the globe including the 
OPM as an organization. In relation to the Act of Free Choice, Chauvel and 
Bhakti (2004) argue that, despite Jakarta having secured Papua, the 
general conduct of the Act of Free Choice has become a significant factor 
that determines both Papuan resistance and further international scrutiny.   
Moreover, according to  Papua (2004b), the main purpose of this campaign 
is to lobby for more political recognition from the wider international 
community whether it be in the form of governments, NGOs, IGOs, 
multinational corporations, political elites, political parties, or ordinary 
citizens. The OPM and its sub-organizations hope that with more organized 
international backing, the fight for freedom and justice can prevail. 
Furthermore, hopes of achieving freedom and justice are deemed vital in 
bringing an end to the conflict and violence that have occurred for almost 
five decades in the territories of Papua. One of the main political strategies 
that the organization applies is by finding ways to get engaged in 
international organized forums. Most forums are used to promote the issue 
of human rights and conduct awareness on other issues that have greatly 
affected the areas under Indonesian control.  
 
In fact, it is through international organized forums and meetings that the 
issue of West Papua begins to gain momentum. Today, campaigns and 
demonstrations occur more often both in Papua and overseas (Free West 
Papua Campaign, 2004a). This triumph has been made possible because 
of the successful international lobbying conducted by senior Papuan 
politicians. Another important point to consider is that the use of social 
media has contributed greatly to the international action of the pleas for self-
determination of West Papua. Demonstrations occurring at Indonesian 
consulates and embassies around the world have often captured the 
attention of the international media. One of the main reasons these 
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campaigns make the headlines is because of the involvement of local 
sympathisers and NGOs that help to fight for the cause of an Independent 
West Papua. NGOs and local supporters help to make up numbers in 
demonstrations and also help to provide finance and ideas to run the 
campaigns in a more organized manner.  
 
Another point to consider is the strategy which the campaigns and 
demonstrations are using to gain support. An example would be the 
materials used in demonstrations. Videos and photographs showing torture 
and killings are used in the campaigns and demonstrations and are 
incredibly successful. More and more people are being encouraged by this 
type of campaign.  Likewise, the organization has been using social media 
to educate ordinary citizens around the world on what has happened in 
Papua since the Indonesian takeover. More specifically, the movement is 
trying to seek more support from various interested parties who can 
continue to make known their desire to legally question what they claim as 
a “violation of international law and an illegal occupation of Papua”(Janki, 
2010) by the Indonesian government.  
 
It is clearly obvious that separatism occurs due to several factors that openly 
influence the area of its origination. In this case, separatism in Papua has 
been the result of various misdeeds which had taken place throughout the 
struggle for independence. Originally, the Netherlands are to be blamed for 
their failure to maintain control over the territory of Papua that in the end 
resulted in the Indonesian takeover of Papua (Saltford, 2003b). Despite 
Papua falling into the hands of Indonesia, the Papuans still maintain the 
ideas and doctrines that the Dutch had left behind. It was because of the 
ideologies planted by the Dutch that Papuans began to organize themselves 
to try to form an independent nation of their own. In this context, there are 
many factors that play an important part in the colliding of political interests 
between Indonesia, PNG and the OPM.  
 
The history of West Papua’s campaign for self-determination illustrates 
many of the events that have taken place over a long time, that contributed 
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neither to amplifying the Papuan struggle nor to lessening their chances of 
obtaining independence. It is through these crucial circumstances that the 
issue of separatism in Papua attained a more global recognition. 
Notwithstanding, the political arena through which the issue of Papua 
evolves is determined by a democratic political approach. Furthermore, in 
affiliation with democratic principles, both Indonesia and PNG recognize the 
need to continue to apply democratic means to gain and overcome certain 
inconveniences that occur in their relationship, especially that of the border 
area. Accordingly, the occurrence of political events in relations to the issue 
of separatism in Papua undoubtedly constitutes the political arena within 
which the relationship of both Indonesia and PNG takes place.  
 
At times, the political atmosphere was not conducive to providing solutions 
to both Indonesia and PNG because West Papuan politics had put them 
into a situation which they had no idea how to contain. It was extremely 
difficult for both Indonesia and PNG to deal with the separatism issue due 
to the involvement of several other political elements that are critical to the 
existence of the OPM. Hence, the development of political relations 
between Indonesia and PNG could not identify a straightforward answer to 
the issue. The Indonesian government was expecting the PNG government 
to cooperate more on the relationship specially to control movements of 
individuals linked to the separatist movement across the border into PNG 
territory. Despite expectations, the PNG government continued to let local 
Papuan refugees settle in PNG.  
 
The term political arena used in this context refers to the domestic politics 
of Indonesia and PNG and their relationship to the issue of separatism. Also, 
it accommodates for the addition of foreign politics that are aimed at 
securing a reasonable solution. The political arena is an invisible space 
whereby all conflicting parties come to pursue their political interests. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of other stakeholders such as governments and 
NGOs has created a rather larger political playing field whereby different 
interests will collide with one another thus causing the issue to be 
complicated and difficult to settle in the short-term. In relation to the overall 
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struggle for separatism, the presence of prominent Papuan leaders and 
activists around the world seems to be boosting the political wing of the 
separatist movement in their fight for self-determination. There is no doubt 
that the separatism issue in Papua is among the most significant and 
sensitive issues within the Asia-Pacific region and something the 
Indonesian government protects as an internal issue. Despite Indonesia’s 
efforts to cover up the issue, the OPM has been making huge progress 
globally and the impacts have not only tested Indonesia’s diplomatic sector, 
but raised doubts about Indonesia’s role in geopolitics.  
 
The OPM has managed to channel its interests as a rebel group that 
operates along the border of Indonesia and PNG. With respect to border 
security, there have been certain occasions where rebels infiltrated the 
border. Moreover, there were various accounts of where the OPM rebels 
had opened fire (using guns) on the border post or at army and police 
officers. Such irresponsible action has caused great fear and instability, 
especially to the locals who have made the border a part of their daily 
routine, either to visit the border market or their families across in Skouw-
Jayapura.  
 
Another point to consider is that the active role of the ULMWP as an 
observer in MSG has often place great pressure on the relationship of 
Indonesia and PNG. PNG, as the largest country in the MSG, officially 
recognizes and respects Indonesia’s sovereignty over the territories of 
Papua and West Papua provinces in accordance with the UN Charter. 
Despite PNG’s position in the MSG, other MSG members like Vanuatu, 
Solomon Islands and the Kanaks strongly condemn PNG for turning a blind 
eye ("Huge support for West Papua bid to join MSG, says under cover 
journo," 2015) eye to the minority of Melanesians in Papua’s two provinces. 
The support from the governments of Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the 
Kanaks have rallied positive results in their respective countries, for 
example, the solidarity support demonstration in the Solomon Islands 
capital of Honiara in June 2015 ("Huge support for West Papua bid to join 
MSG, says under cover journo," 2015).  
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Nonetheless, Indonesia and PNG remain the top actors involved despite 
interest from other parties in the region. Even though, geographically, 
Papua’s locations seem to confuse a lot of people, the Indonesian province 
is in both Southeast Asia and the Pacific with its integration to Indonesia 
(history) being one part and the other is its cultural relations with the people 
of the Pacific. Despite Papua being an Indonesian province, the origins of 
its people remain intact with the greater Melanesian ethnicity. Moreover, the 
term “One people One soul” found on the West Papuan state emblem used 
by the ULMWP, symbolizes its links to the greater Melanesian community. 
It is through this slogan that the Melanesian people from other countries 
recognized the people of West Papua’s pleas for self-determination.  
 
Lately, the ULMWP, through its leading supporters in the MSG (Vanuatu 
and Solomon Islands) has the opportunity to engage in more international 
cooperation. In terms of wider recognition, in 2015, the Pacific Island Forum 
(PIF) made the Indonesian province a priority in their leader’s agenda 
("ULMWP welcome forum focus on West Papua," 2015). Similarly, Vanuatu 
has often raised the West Papuan issue in various UN forums. For instance, 
in a statement to the 25th Session of the Human Rights council on 4 March 
2014, the Prime Minister of Vanuatu stated his country was “here in this 
conference to amplify the concerns for human rights in West Papua  
("Vanuatu PM raises West Papua in Geneva," 2014). On the contrary, it is 
obvious that PNG and Fiji have taken a different position regarding West 
Papua’s future. PNG and Fiji’s Foreign Ministers have occasionally made it 
clear that they will support Indonesia’s application to the MSG. Thus, PNG 
and Fiji are largely responsible for making Indonesia an associate member 
of the MSG in 2015 and further planning on supporting Indonesia to obtain 
full membership in the future (Mononimbar, 2016). Even though PNG and 
Fiji still maintain their support for Indonesia, it seems that Vanuatu, Solomon 
Islands and the Kanaks will still find a way around to vote the ULMWP into 
becoming a full member of the association as well. The West Papuan issue 
has successfully managed to secure top placing among the other agendas 
in the MSG. It is likely the that issue of West Papua will divide the MSG. 
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Whether it does or not will depend on how much it influences the struggle 
for self-determination in West Papua and abroad.  
 
The Free West Papua Organization and the ULMWP’s success in the MSG 
and other related forums have posed another domestic problem in 
Indonesia, particularly in the provinces of Papua and West Papua. The 
Melanesians of Papua view the success as a huge boost thus greatly 
affecting the people’s imagination of a free and independent West Papua. 
Such imaginations have been deemed to be a significant factor that 
influences the mind-sets of the local Melanesians of Papua. Many of these 
local Papuans still believe and support the cause of an independent West 
Papua. Despite the physical and economic developments taking place in 
both the Papuan provinces such as roads, bridges or buildings, agricultural 
projects and support for local business, most local Papuans still hope for 
that moment of freedom.  
 
One way this is identified is that whenever the Free West Papua 
Organization or the ULMWP makes a move in the MSG on behalf of West 
Papua, the people backing Papua always support these movements. For 
example, when ULMWP was promoted to the status of observer in June 
2015, many local Papuan churches and groups gathered to hold prayers 
and demonstrations to show support. This support didn’t just take place in 
towns but also in villages and remote areas. It is from this belief that the 
West Papuan people keep their hopes alive. Such emotions are also shared 
among the OPM fighters that still operate in the jungles of the Indonesia-
PNG border continuing their struggle to maintain political rights by 
occasionally putting pressure on Indonesia-PNG relations.  
 
It is also important to note that the struggle for West Papua’s self-
determination has developed into a racial and cultural struggle to defend 
and preserve the rights of the people of Melanesia. For instance, in 2013, 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group first provided its support to recognize the 
“inalienable rights for West Papua for self-determination” (Wenda, 2016). 
The recognition was later amended in the MSG constitution that provided 
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the legal standings for the ULMWP to manoeuvre in search of more support. 
Basically, what this amendment does is that it strengthens the core purpose 
of the organization which is to fight for the rights of the Melanesian people.  
Despite the view that the Papuan issue is an Indonesian internal issue, the 
people of Melanesia regard the Papuan issue as part of the Pacific and not 
Asia and that Papua should be given the chance for a referendum.  
 
3.1.1 Separatism and Human Rights 
Recently, separatist movements have gained more attention due to the fact 
that human rights violations have become more associated with the 
separatist struggles. Human rights violations and other issues such as 
environmental degradation and animal welfare have become demanding, 
especially in territories known for separatism.  Activists have managed to 
promote the campaign on different levels, involving a wide range of 
stakeholders. In fact, human rights issues do attract different interests. 
Moreover, both separatism and human rights violations relate to each other. 
Generally, human rights violations are usually the outcome of separatist 
demands and resistance to the ruling government. Nonetheless, both 
separatist movements and governments have seen the need to engage in 
a more peaceful and diplomatic manner. Such developments and 
engagements are seen to be more considered in approach. One of the 
reasons is to minimize security risks and possible violence and maintain 
stability while, at the same, time promoting the need to negotiate 
agreements to promote political goodwill between the parties.  
 
Despite such positive intentions, it is likely that either one of the concerned 
parties would disagree on the outlined terms and conditions. Indeed, such 
conditions are inevitable as these deal with state ideologies and principles 
that can’t be sacrificed for another. In fact, all these attributes and symbols 
remain irreplaceable to both parties. Another point to consider is the security 
risk that threatens economic stability, and whether or not they’re both willing 
to sacrifice their interests. In most separatist cases, regardless of 
geographical location and time, there will always be military action taken as 
part of preserving and safeguarding the national interest and territorial 
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integrity of the ruling state. Counter separatist-strategies have fallen short 
in providing a peaceful and promising outcome. Moreover, countries dealing 
with separatism issues are generally criticized for their approach because 
in most cases such dealings come at the cost of human security and 
generate outrage. Thus, the challenge to promote human rights arises as it 
threatens to harm the lives of citizens and make conditions on the ground 
worse. Countries with the threat of separatism are most likely to be held 
responsible for violating human rights laws. Despite acknowledging the 
need to submit under international conventions and resolutions, bilateral 
agreements and multilateral arrangements, states are more likely to first and 
foremost prioritize their own interests before others.  
 
States dealing with internal issues such as separatism are often victims 
themselves due to widespread international condemnation in regard to 
human rights abuses and violations. It is also important to note that the 
involvement of governments and human rights activists around the issue 
has contributed to more suspicion and deception. On the other hand, the 
support obtained through international mechanisms such as international 
human rights forums and conventions have increased the influence of 
separatist activists and leaders around the world. In relation to separatist 
movements, human rights cases have often become the benchmark in 
regenerating and remobilizing separatist interests and strategies over time. 
In general, separatist movements avoid dealing directly with the ruling state 
because it would only minimize their chances of obtaining international 
support for self-determination. For example, the ULMWP has refused to 
deal with the Indonesian central government because the Indonesian 
government will offer a different solution that is why the ULMWP has 
maintained its position within the MSG forum to have its dialogue with 
Indonesia observed by a third party.  
 
With respect to Papuan separatism and human rights abuse and violations, 
the role of both the local and international media has proven to be a vital 
part in promoting separatist interests at the international level. Various 
states and NGOs have pledged to support West Papua. Supporting states 
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have been voicing their concerns over the need for a UN approved 
international intervention to investigate human rights violations. Hafner-
Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer (2008) argue that a tremendous and astounding 
accomplishment in human rights movements has set a universal standard 
for nations and societies to respect. In fact, such accomplishments have 
produced distinctive arrangements in the form of treaties that rallied 
governments and NGOs to commit themselves to combatting issues linked 
to human rights abuse and violations. Hence, the more committed states 
and NGOs are in tackling human rights issues, the more influential 
separatist movements become. The main reason behind this claim is that 
when nations and other interested parties begin to show interest in the issue 
of human rights, separatist movements, especially the leaders, take their 
chance to manipulate the political atmosphere to their own advantage thus 
providing separatist movements with more political space to manoeuvre. As 
a result, the issue is further politicized forcing the government to implement 
strict security policies and actions to crack down on separatist ideologies, 
including the use of force when necessary.   
 
In general, separatist movements seek to project the issue of human rights 
violations whilst promoting and indoctrinating other parties on the need to 
end such anarchy and violence. One of the main arguments is that self-
determination is the only and best solution in ending such suffering caused 
by inhuman behaviours. The internationalization of domestic violence that 
lead to human rights violations have continually asserts more pressure on 
the state as the executor. Successful international awareness carried out 
on the campaign for Papua’s self-determination has been heavily 
dependent on the support it receives from organizations that fight against 
violence caused by human rights violations. Despite the connection found 
between both separatist actions and the human rights violations, 
governments are still held accountable for all the anarchy and chaos. In this 
case, the Indonesian government has been denounced on various 
occasions regarding their role in protecting their sovereignty in both the 
Papuan provinces. Moreover, the primary use of armed forces in containing 
issues that are sensitive in nature, like that of the Papuan separatism issue, 
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continues to trigger potential outbreaks. Overall, the longer the struggle for 
Papuan self-determination has been around, the more complicated it 
becomes.  
 
Notwithstanding Indonesia’s record on human rights violations, Indonesia 
still maintains close relationships with other states such as its neighbour 
PNG, Australia or the U.S in the fields of security, economics and trade. 
However, human right issues have often become a key problem in their 
relationships (Vaughn, 2011). The Indonesian government’s decision to 
directly employ the military in the handling of separatism in Papua (in the 
name of national interest) has painted a negative image. Ironically the 
military involvement has actually prolonged the Papuan conflict.  Overall, 
the involvement of the military triggers a wide range of concerns regarding 
Indonesia’s commitments to a peaceful outcome as outlined through its 
initiatives in ratifying international resolutions and human right conventions. 
Subsequently, the armed forces under Suharto’s regime used power to 
confine Papua’s self-determination. Here the armed forces pretended to 
protect Jakarta’s interests while simultaneously asserting overall control 
over Papua’s unlimited supply of natural resources. Nonetheless, Jakarta’s 
main interests lie in benefiting from the resource rich island. Thus, the role 
of the military was aimed to protect natural resources that have been 
deemed as important state assets. King (2004) argues that Papua’s natural 
resources acts as the “main glue” that holds Indonesia together, meaning 
that Indonesia heavily depends on gold and copper mines (e.g. Freeport) 
for its survival. Accordingly, many Papuans argue that Jakarta’s main 
interests lie in the natural resources and not its people.  
 
The conflict in Papua is more complicated. One of the main reasons to 
support this claim is because the conflict itself is not limited to political 
disintegration: it strongly involves other important values such as human, 
economic and social security. Another reason will, of course, be the 
involvement of international stake-holders as laid out in the history of the 
conflict, such as the involvement of international powers. Indeed, the impact 
caused by involving the international community will increase the chances 
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of addressing serious issues of human rights. In Papua’s case, it is vying for 
international support to force the United Nations to appoint an independent 
committee to investigate related claims of human rights violations and 
genocide. Despite such claims from the OPM and ULMWP, the Indonesian 
government continues to foster diplomatic relations with other countries in 
the region. Indeed, the increase in international pressure on the Indonesian 
government would mean that the separatist movement is gaining 
momentum. An important point to consider is that every time the separatist 
movement makes a mark, tensions are bound to occur in Papua. In general, 
there is some correlation between domestic and international campaigns for 
self-determination.  
 
With respect to the impact caused by the OPM’s international diplomatic 
activity, operating overseas is regarded as more effective. It seems that on 
certain occasions, it has been known to influence ground conditions. In this 
context, ground conditions are basically related to the situation that takes 
place at a particular time and space. Papuan activists are somewhat 
dependent on the outcomes of human rights violations as the driving force 
behind their pleas for self-determination. For example, claims of genocide 
in both the Papuan provinces continue to bombard Indonesia on the 
international arena. Despite all the accusations, countries such as PNG and 
Australia have claimed that there are no records of genocide in both the 
Papuan provinces. Ironically the same pleas have continued to become the 
basis of the separatist movements. Indeed, the prolonged struggle has 
claimed over five hundred thousand of human lives, however, the continuing 
appeal for an internationally supervised investigation has often been 
rejected. The unfortunate situation faced by Papuans has also revealed the 
stigma that labels every Papuan who disagrees with the government as a 
member of the OPM, therefore providing the armed forces with the 
legitimacy to violently commit human rights violations. The violations mainly 
occurred during the New Order regime of Suharto. Although Papua was no 
longer considered to be an area of regional military operations after 1998, 
many Papuans still live in fear.  
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The sensitive nature of the conflict remains the driving factor that often leads 
to anarchy and chaos during times of “peaceful demonstrations”. The main 
reason is that Papuans have indeed lost far too many lives over the course 
of their 50 years of struggle for self-determination. Most Papuans today live 
with trauma that motivates them to take action when necessary. In many 
cases, peaceful demonstrations often turn nasty with the loss of human 
lives, relatives and loved ones so they are often considered to be a high 
risk. For instance, provocations from both the pro and contra-independence 
groups have led to clashes that lead to deaths. The Indonesian military has 
no doubt performed unaccountable inhuman acts. Indeed, it can’t be denied 
that inhuman acts such as rape, torture and murder have become the 
trademark of the Indonesian armed forces over the course of 50 years in 
Papua. 
 
Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Papuans have perished under the 
brutal military occupation. There have been numerous accounts of military 
involved violence that have not been clarified. For example, the tragedy in 
Wamena (Wamena Berdarah) on 6 October 2000 that claimed the lives of 
30 innocent people and leaving at least leaving 40 others severely injured 
(Itlay, 2016). A similar incident in 2014 in Enarotali, Paniai also called the 
Paniai tragedy (Paniai Berdarah) claimed the lives of 4 students, leaving 
dozens injured (Yogi, 2016). The Paniai incident did involve a team of 
investigators assigned by Jakarta ahead of a human rights task force to 
collect evidence. The team consisted of senior investigators from the TNI 
and POLRI headquarters, together with the Papuan provincial police and 
army representatives. What happened during the investigations was that 
the Jakarta assigned team of military and police investigators swept clean 
the scene of hard evidence and then later left before the human rights task 
force arrived. Interestingly, the human rights task force lead by Indonesia’s 
human rights watchdog Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia), encountered a rather more difficult task. There was barely any 
remaining evidence or proof; there were only “written evidence and 
photographs of the incident” (Yogi, 2016).   
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In addition to the human rights cases in Papua, there is another report on 
an outbreak between student riots and the Indonesian armed forces on 16 
March 2006. The incident was later dubbed as the UNCEN Incident or 
Abepura’s bloody tragedy (UNCEN /Abepura Berdarah). Students from the 
university of Cenderawasih together with the majority of local Papuans 
gathered in front of the university in Abepura to demand three points. First, 
the closure of PT. Freeport Mc Moran; second, the removal of all Indonesian 
armed forces based at the Freeport mine site and thirdly, that the seven 
activists arrested after riots in Timika be released from jail (Belau, 2015). 
The related incident ended in clashes between students and armed forces 
leaving three victims shot by police and around 73 people detained; among 
the detainees 10 were later put on trial for treason. Indeed, such outcomes 
reveal Jakarta’s overall capacity to downplay evidence of human rights 
violations. ULWMP has accused the Indonesian government of waging 
slow-motion genocide in Papua. Furthermore, the organization claims that 
there are evidence of existing armed conflicts, unrest, extra-judicial killings 
and the jailing of Papuans and marginalization of the Papuan culture (Radio 
New Zealand, 2017). 
 
Another death of a promising activist and a prominent Papuan leader and 
Paramount Chief (Ondofolo) Theys Eluay from Sentani, Jayapura bravely 
stood up against the Indonesian government. His actions were to proclaim 
Papua’s intentions to separate from Indonesia. However, like other terrifying 
human rights abuses in Papua, Ondofolo Dortheys Hiyo Eluay was found 
murdered on the eve of celebrating the anniversary of the Indonesian 
special forces (Koppassus). Even though Major-General Hartomo was later 
convicted for the incident, it seemed that the Indonesian had no respect at 
all for human dignity. In a report published by human rights advocating 
group, Elsham Papua (Lembaga Study dan Advkoasi Hak Asasi Manusia) 
in 2001, it emphasized the importance and political motives surrounding the 
murder of the late Ondofolo Eluay. Based on the report, it was understood 
that the murder was arranged and set up following numerous meetings 
between the Koppassus and Police in specific locations within Jayapura 
including in Koya where Theys was later found dead on 10 November 2001 
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("Against forgetting, the kidnapping and murder of Theys H. Eluay by 
Kopassus with Political Motive (second phase)," 2014).  
 
Although it seemed obvious that such killings were done to politically 
maintain Jakarta’s influence over Papua after Suharto’s expulsion, Jakarta’s 
ongoing instabilities sparked tensions across Indonesia. The fall of Suharto 
revived separatism across Indonesia, especially in Papua, East Timor and 
Aceh. Nonetheless, tensions were a result of both unconstrained anger and 
joy at finally toppling Suharto after 31 years of militaristic power. In fact, this 
event shows how significant peoples power can be in influencing the 
government and its functions, especially when the people themselves have 
fallen victims to such oppressive and brutal rule. This is when human rights 
are considered an important tool in configuring political interests. 
 
The instabilities then forced a quick change in Presidential portfolios. When 
Suharto stepped down in 1998, his replacement, was Vice President B.J 
Habibie who was later made President. However, B.J Habibie’s time in 
office was also cut short due to a quick scheduled Presidential election (the 
first ever election after Suharto). Even though President B.J Habibie spent 
less time in his role as the nation’s third President, Habibie remains well 
known for his efforts in ending the long crisis in East Timor. Indeed, the East 
Timor case had a lot of human rights violations and many Timorese had lost 
their lives. The fight in East Timor brought new hope to Papua’s own 
struggle for self-determination. Despite being geographically miles away 
from each other, Papua and East Timor have a lot in common. Especially in 
cultural terms, the impact of being culturally related in some senses 
provided the motivation to stand up and fight back.  
 
The crisis in East Timor sparked international concern as the number of 
human victims increased. Fighting in East Timor triggered an outrage in 
Papua. The OPM and its resistance forces began to organize for 
international support. During this time, the PNG chapter of the OPM was 
activated to seek more international assistance. At this time, Papuan 
leaders thought that if they were to stand up against the Indonesians, there 
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would be a greater chance for self-determination; something similar to what 
the East Timorese had achieved. Nonetheless, Papua was not prepared to 
lose more human lives. A long history of missing people, killings and torture 
had implanted long-lasting trauma in their minds. Today it remains certain 
that the unsettled human rights violations in Papua continues to be the 
subject underlining numerous problems in their separatist struggle.   
 
Similar to those that occurred in the past, human rights abuses in Indonesia, 
especially in Papua’s provinces, have often been manipulated to cover for 
Jakarta’s wrong doings. Moreover, the appointment of teams of 
investigators actually serves as a cleaning up process. Usually after a 
human rights incident, a team of investigators arrive to clean up the mess 
before human rights organized teams arrive at the scene. Therefore, there 
has been very little evidence to actually prove that Papua is under threat of 
an ongoing systematic genocide. Despite continuous condemnations, 
Indonesia has managed to avoid dealing with the accusations. Although 
international pressure has been raised by concerned governments, such as 
Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, Indonesia has always defended the 
allegations with solid evidence from the investigations. PNG, on the other 
hand, refuses to get its hands dirty. PNG since its independence has 
continued to pursue a cordial relationship with Indonesia. However, PNG’s 
border with Indonesia remains under threat if the issue of separatism in 
Papua continues to exist. Several incidents near the border have shown that 
the border itself is quite vulnerable. 
 
Separatist movements, it must be recognized, often create violence while 
demanding self-determination. The violence or chaos triggers a reaction 
from the armed forces. With respect to military involvement in Papua, King 
(2004) argues that the military is more likely to play a double role: first, to 
provide security and second, to manipulate government bureaucracy and 
the economy as a whole. Indeed, such arguments best describe the New 
Order regime of Suharto who in person relied heavily on the armed forces 
to execute economic interests in the name of stability. The military’s 
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involvement across Papua remains solid until today; most businesses are 
backed by high-ranking military officers responsible for maintaining security.  
The early post-Suharto era was at one point regarded as the perfect timing 
for Papuans to proclaim self-determination. Jakarta’s massive riots that 
claimed the lives of many made a point that human rights were sacrificed 
through the violations conducted by Indonesian armed forces in the name 
of securing the national interest. Indeed, the human rights violations that 
occurred in 1998 remained a significant part of Indonesia’s modern history. 
It displayed the role of the brave students, including both men and women 
bringing in about a change in Indonesia’s government system. In relation to 
the chaos in 1998, Papuan leaders from both domestic and international 
levels quickly revived their struggle for independence and used the 
momentum of Suharto’s dismissal as a stepping stone toward seeking 
further international recognition and support.  
 
Not long after, President B.J. Habibie was replaced by President 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in 1998. President Gus Dur was Indonesia’s 
first ever President to be democratically elected by the people. Moreover, 
the human rights situation under President Gus Dur seemed promising in 
Papua’s case. Papuans were allowed to meet in Congress. In the year 
2000, under Gus Dur’s orders, Papuans were allowed to hold a congress 
meeting in Jayapura, the capital of Papua, to discuss its future. The 
congress, which was attended by around 350 plus Papuan independence 
leaders from both Papua and overseas, began to increase the opposition to 
the President in Jakarta (King, 2004). Congress or Mubes (Musyawarah 
Besar), is regarded by Papuans as the most rational approach to have ever 
been implemented by an Indonesian President throughout Papua’s history 
for self-determination.  
 
It was also at this time when President Gus Dur gave permission to raise 
the Morning Star flag as a symbol of the people’s aspirations and the name 
of the Province was changed from Irian Jayaprua to Papua (King, 2004). 
However, it was made clear that the Morning Star flag was to be flown only 
as long as there were not too many and that none was “larger and elevated 
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higher” than the Indonesian Merah Putih (the Red and White flag of 
Indonesia) (King, 2004). Nonetheless, Gus Dur was later condemned for 
“lack of achievements and political obstruction” and was later forced to step 
down in 2001 handing power to Megawati Sukarno Putri (Daughter of 
Sukarno) (King, 2004). Despite Gus Dur’s removal from office, he remains 
the only president in the history of the prolonged conflict to show great 
concern for the welfare for the people of Papua.  
 
Moreover, Suharto’s dismissal didn’t end the armed forces’ role in 
determining politics and economics in Indonesia. In 2000, according to a 
Sydney press report, there were clashes between the Red and White Militia 
(Satgas Merah Putih) and the Papuan Militia (Satgas Papua) (King, 2004).  
Both groups are believed to have been set up by the Indonesian armed 
forces. Indeed, such military strategies illustrate the role of influential TNI 
officers that were loyal to ex-President Suharto. Moreover, the involvement 
of the armed forces proved relevant in that it was planned to not look like 
human rights violations. Meanwhile growing tensions quickly added more 
than 3000 new mobile paramilitary police and non-organic Kostrad troops 
to Papua (King, 2004).  
 
As a replacement for Gus Dur, President Megawati Sukarno Putri’s (from 
the PDIP or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) time in office was also 
quite short. However, during Mega’s time in office from 2001-2004, human 
rights abuses and violations in Papua began to rise and were back in media 
reports. It was the death of Ondofolo Theys Eluay that shook the world about 
Indonesia’s ongoing human rights atrocities. Despite violence and the heavy 
presence of the military, Papuans were getting used to the situation. Daily 
routines with military supervision or having spies tailing them were just 
another usual thing. Indeed, there was a lot of trauma involved because the 
military and police imposed curfews to monitor and control the people’s 
movements and activities.  
 
Even though President SBY (Indonesia’s 6th President after Megawati) had 
a good reign in office that saw him finish two terms from 2004-2014, the 
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conflict in Papua under President SBY remained under international 
security. At some point, there were several cases of human rights violations, 
especially after peaceful demonstrations when the situation became tense 
resulting in several wounded and others arrested. Ongoing arguments in 
relation to democratic rights have provided the platform for Papuans to 
pursue a peaceful and effective dialogue with Jakarta. However, on multiple 
occasions, such an approach has failed to find a solution. One of the main 
reasons is because past traumas caused by military involvement have 
become the drive that causes the people to totally refuse Jakarta’s proposed 
agendas. Unsteadily, human rights violations in Papua have greatly affected 
the lives and opportunities of the young generation.  
 
To sum up, the role of human rights in separatism and vice versa do have 
an effect on each other. Human rights bring out the importance of humanity 
and in situations where conflicts such as separatism are prolonged, it 
becomes risky for both state and citizens. Another point to consider is the 
level of interest at stake and the number of stakeholders involved. Despite 
global recognition of human rights violations, states are protected by the law 
of sovereignty. However, states should apply a more transparent measure 
to deal with separatism because the more hidden the agenda is behind 
interests, the more complicated separatism issues become.  Papua’s 
human rights case has been around for a long time and to see that none of 
the perpetrators are being held accountable for committing crimes against 
humanity simply illustrates Indonesia’s growing influence in geopolitics and 
economics around the region.  
 
3.2 Indonesia’s Political Reaction 
The Universal Declarations of Human Rights has made it such that the 
principles of human rights have become the norm of practice for most 
governments around the world. With respect to the territorial integrity of 
Indonesia, the territories of Papua and West Papua provinces remain the 
sovereign territory of Indonesia which basically means that the issue of 
Papuan separatism remains an Indonesian domestic problem. Indonesia, 
as the largest Muslim democratic state today, takes up an important role in 
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geopolitics and global politics. Recent outcomes prove that Indonesia’s 
influence in global politics has given the country more power to protect its 
interests, including the issue of Papuan separatism.  
 
With respect to human rights, it places Indonesia into a rather more difficult 
situation because of the amount of human rights violations occurring in the 
Papua and West Papua provinces. The issue has no doubt, put Indonesia’s 
international political participation under pressure. It has become more 
challenging for Indonesia in various international and multilateral forums. In 
detail, the issue of Papuan separatism has often made it impossible for 
Indonesia to pursue its interests in the wider Pacific region. The issue of 
West Papua has given a bad image of Indonesia internationally. Overall, the 
human rights violations occurring throughout the struggle for West Papua’s 
self-determination reflects the characteristics of both Sukarno and Suharto’s 
regimes.  
 
The impact of West Papuan separatism on Indonesia was quite problematic 
because Indonesia as a sovereign state guided by its free and active foreign 
policy, interacts freely with all states including all the small Pacific island 
countries. In Indonesia’s view, the Pacific was a potential partner in building 
its international reputation which would set a positive image, enabling 
Indonesia to further promote its influence in other regions. A somewhat 
similar mechanism to that of ASEAN was intended to be pursued in the 
Pacific region, specifically the MSG. 
 
The violations of human rights in the territory of Papua and West Papua 
provinces are the most controversial factors that often affect Indonesia’s 
political participation within the Pacific region. The main reason is because 
Pacific island countries are aware of the human right issues that take place 
in Papua. This has meant that Indonesia has been unable to expand its 
influence in the Pacific because these violations have earned Indonesia a 
bad image in the Pacific. Nonetheless, until today, Indonesia is still trying to 
convince the Pacific community of the need to accept its participation in the 
region. There have been several initiatives undertaken by the Indonesian 
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government to maintain its influence in the Pacific. Moreover, Indonesia 
deals with PNG directly because most of the refugees have settled in PNG 
territory. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s interests in the Pacific greatly lies in the 
hands of PNG.  PNG’s support for Indonesia is determined by PNG’s size 
and economic capacity. As the biggest Melanesian state in the region, PNG 
has the power to influence the region’s political playground. Concrete 
developments show that Indonesia’s political influence in the Pacific has 
less impact ever since it denied West Papua the right to self-determination 
and, therefore, there has never been an Indonesian diplomatic office 
stationed in the Pacific region.  
 
PNG, Australia and New Zealand have Indonesian Embassies which also 
represent Indonesia’s diplomacy in the Pacific. The diplomatic relations 
clearly show how Indonesian political interests in the Pacific was indeed not 
beneficial to Indonesia’s governments before President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s term in office. If Indonesia had more power in the Pacific, it 
would mean that the West Papuan separatist issue would have been easily 
contained. However, up until the present day the government of Indonesia 
is still searching for options to try to get the issue under control in the Pacific 
region. Also, another important point to consider together with the 
arguments above would be that Indonesia was never a member of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group -a political organization similar to the ASEAN 
that consisted of mainly the Melanesian countries of the Pacific until late 
June 2015 (Fox, 2015). In the past, the Indonesian government was refused 
by the MSG to participate in the leaders’ summit. Nonetheless, the 
Indonesian government’s intention was to be part of the MSG because it 
was an important political platform where the Indonesian government could 
easily lobby for international cooperation in the region.  
 
Indonesia’s membership in the MSG would not only benefit its position 
regarding the West Papuan separatist issue but would also guarantee the 
role of Indonesia at the MSG to create more political avenues to 
accommodate Indonesian interests within the wider Pacific region. It is 
believed that Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Nauru were among the 
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governments that refused to accept Indonesia into the Pacific community. 
On the other hand, it seemed exceptionally difficult for Indonesia to progress 
with its ties in the Pacific due to the facts that were reported through local 
newspapers in PNG (The National and Post Courier) and other 
broadcasting media around the Pacific such as Radio New Zealand (RNZ) 
prior to the establishment of special autonomy. However, today it seems 
that after the granting of special autonomy to both the Papuan provinces, it 
has opened more doors for Indonesian involvement in the Pacific region.  
The actual purpose of the special autonomy in Papua was to be an 
instrument of peace building between the Indonesian government and 
Melanesian people of Papua. In fact, special autonomy was endorsed for 
Aceh before Papua. However, the growing instabilities in Papua after the 
granting of Independence to East Timor provided Jakarta no choice but to 
quickly plan for Papua. The autonomous decree in reality was focused at 
addressing the problems of equality and diversity in the social cultural life of 
the Melanesian that inherit the Papuan island. East Timor’s independence 
increased Papua’s hopes for self-determination. The central government 
knew that it had to act quickly to address the situation in Papua. Another 
reason for the implementation of the special autonomy in Papua is to 
actually cut down on secessionist movements. Before the actual autonomy, 
Jakarta had planned for Papua to be split into three provincial 
administrations. Of course, this idea was totally rejected by the Papuans, as 
it would actually add further complications. 
 
The Presidential change from Habibie to Gus Dur provided the momentum 
for Papua to begin visualizing their demands and Jakarta’s acknowledgment 
of their equal rights to social and cultural life. Together, with the help of the 
Papuan Council Presidium (Presidium Dewan Papua) the Papuan elites 
quickly elected Jab Solossa as governor Papua. Mr Solossa’s appointment 
encouraged a team of Papuan elites lead by then Chancellor of the 
University of Cenderawasih (UNCEN) Mr Frans Wospakrik and other 
Papuan intellectuals to draft a bill on special autonomy. The drafting of the 
bill caught Jakarta by surprise with the inclusion of strong independence 
aspirations. The team in charge of the drafting included a wide range of 
 92 
elites ranging from academics and activists, from other supporting 
organization such as, Forker LSM Papua (Forum Kerjasama Lembaga 
Swadaya Masyarakat papua-Cooperative Forum of Papuan Non-
governmental Organizations), and various human rights NGOs were all part 
of the early draft (King, 2004).  
 
The final bill drafted by the Papuans were later taken to Jakarta in which the 
initial draft become a reference to the current bill that constitutes Papua’s 
special autonomy. Nonetheless, the bill itself was an impressive document, 
“better then Indonesia’s own constitution” (King, 2004). In detail, the special 
autonomy decree in Papua entails measures to successfully obtain a 
genuine autonomy for the protection of human rights and Papuan traditional 
(adat) rights in coexistence with extra proposals that would official order an 
uncompressing response to the problems of Papua’s dark past by 
‘straightening history’(King, 2004). The bill provided the more legal room for 
representation from the adat, churches and women that were among the 
most endangered sectors of society in Papua. Nonetheless, the autonomy 
bill did allow for the name of Irian to be changed to Papua; the 
acknowledgement of nameless symbols and anthem of the province, the 
Morning Star (Bintang Kejora) flag was interpreted to be of cultural identity 
and most of all the acceptance of native Papuan (Melanesian) as Governor.  
In security terms, the decree will seek approval from the Papuan Parliament 
especially in the police context as entail in Article 48 which proposed that 
security (keamanan).  (King, 2004) points out the provisions of the bill that 
was concerned with the so-called ratification of history. In this case, the 
autonomous police force was installed while the role of the TNI was 
restricted to purely safeguard the nation from external threats. In which was 
entailed in under Article 6 (4) of the draft: 
the government shall arrange the placement of the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (TNI) units in Papua Province after 
consultation with the Papuan Parliament and the Provincial 
Government (King, 2004).  
Article 43 
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1. To thoroughly and comprehensively solve the differences of 
opinions on the history of Papua’s integration into the Republic of 
Indonesia, a Commission for the Ratification of Papua History 
shall be established; 
2. The arrangement, task implementation and financing of the 
Commission shall be carried out by Provincial Regulation. 
 
Article 69 
If the result of history revision as intended in article 43 of this Law 
indicates that the process of Papua integration into the territory of 
the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in the past was not 
based on the international law of the right to self-determination of 
a nation, the government and people of Papua through the 
Papuan Parliament shall take measures for settlement. 
 
Article 75 
After 5 years of enactment of this Law if it is apparent that it 
cannot be executed effectively, the Papuan people through the 
Papuan Parliament shall ask the MPR of RI to sit in session to 
make a referendum for determining the political attitude of the 
Papuan people. 
 
With regard to special autonomy, Wanggai (2009) argues that in nature, 
special autonomy is defined to be asymmetric and is widely acceptable 
because most states around the world such as Czech, Sudan, Albania etc. 
have adopted the system in search for a solution to the vertical conflicts that 
occur between the central government and the conflicting party which at this 
point refers to provinces. In this case, the applications of an asymmetric 
approach illustrate the involvement of other local institutional actors 
including individual elites in designing and conducting Papuan special 
autonomy. Despite its acceptance, the biggest problem that the asymmetric 
approach faces are how to conduct every single article in the constitution of 
the special autonomy. The main aim of the asymmetric approach is basically 
to make sure that the “perceptions that are obtained through government 
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institutions, private institutions, and the civil society must be attributed to 
good governance” (Wanggai, 2009). With respect to the goodwill of 
Indonesia to practise good governance, there is hope for better political 
relations in the future with the Pacific region.  
 
Furthermore, Wanggai (2009) explains that President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono has reiterated the government’s commitment to special 
autonomy. Solving the problem in Papua in a civilized and just manner was 
one of the government’s top priorities. With this, the special autonomy which 
had been opted for will be further strengthened to increase the level of 
prosperity and the welfare and dignity of the people of both Papua and West 
Papua provinces until these are truly realized. In doing so, Indonesia has 
promoted the Papuan special autonomy in PNG with programs such as the 
repatriation exercise in which Papuan refugees who reside in PNG are 
encouraged to return to Papua and take part in developments that will take 
place as part of the special autonomy. Apart from the special autonomy, 
there has been a “New Deals for Papua” based on the Presidential 
Instruction No. 5, 2007. New policies are to be prioritized in both the Papuan 
provinces (Wanggai, 2009) to;  
1. Speed up developments 
2. Increase the quality of education 
3. Increase the quality of health 
4. Increase infrastructure so that isolated areas could be reachable.  
 
In terms of political development, the granting of Papuan special autonomy 
has played a significant role in maintaining and increasing Indonesia’s 
bargaining power in the Pacific region. Indonesia’s current politics is 
penetrating throughout the Pacific in a more promising way. The Indonesian 
government’s initiatives to solve the Papuan issue within a diplomatic 
paradigm is beginning to gain support from institutions both local and 
international. Despite various support, there are several other countries in 
the Pacific such as the Kingdom of Tonga, Nauru and the Republic of Palau 
that still require Indonesia’s transparency in handling the West Papuan 
issue. Currently, Indonesia aims to further promote the Papuan issue 
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internationally. This strategy is aimed to counter promote the Papuan 
autonomy on a global scale in the hope that the policy does attain a more 
positive outcome.  The strategy to introduce Papuan autonomy is aimed to 
settle the Papuan issue once and for all in a more transparent manner based 
on good governance. Today, Indonesia is enjoying a little more success 
because Indonesia has been made an associate member of the MSG 
despite being rejected previously.  
 
3.2.1 Political Reactions in the South West Pacific and Impacts on 
Papua’s Domestic Politics.  
The nature of the acceptance of Papua as a member of the Pacific family 
relates to an ideology of being part of one big ethnicity called Melanesian. 
The initial idea of being Melanesian was being black in skin colour together 
with curly hair and equally important is the culture and traditions of being 
Melanesian. Nonetheless, the application of the Melanesian culture 
positively shows the bond among the people of Melanesia regardless of 
distance among the islands. Furthermore, the ideology is inherited to 
motivate and encourage the people of Melanesia to boldly proclaim their 
connections as members of a large and unique ethnic group. Moreover, in 
relation to the Papuan case, it has been confirmed that Papua’s ethnic 
political groups such as the OPM and ULMWP have gained more support 
from the Melanesian countries in the Pacific. In general, there have been 
several Pacific island countries that have been showing their concern 
regarding the human rights allegations in Papua’s two provinces. 
Indonesia’s interest in the Pacific solemnly relies on PNG and Fiji because 
of their recent show of support to promote Indonesia as an associate 
member of the MSG in 2015. Besides, PNG and Fiji are the most influential 
countries in the MSG. Therefore, some ongoing bilateral relationships 
between Indonesia and PNG or Indonesia and Fiji could boost an interest 
in reaching a common understanding and cooperation between the parties.  
The process of formulating a common understanding leading to trust has 
produced various positive outcomes between Indonesia, PNG and Fiji. Such 
important understanding has been illustrated in PNG’s ongoing support for 
Papua’s integration into Indonesia. The PNG government has often stated 
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its recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Papuan issue. Moreover, 
the PNG government has made sure that Indonesia is guaranteed a role in 
the Pacific region. Furthermore, it is clear that based on mutual trust 
Indonesia and PNG have successfully installed a good relationship to 
provide Indonesia with the credibility to expand its influence into the Pacific 
region. In relation to this, Indonesia successfully become a dialogue partner 
in the “Pacific Island Forum and furthermore strongly euphemized on the 
creation of the South-West Pacific Dialogue” (Bandoro, 2007).  
 
In relation to the impact of Papuan separatism in the Pacific region, it has 
been reported through a publication that Papuans do obtain a great deal of 
support from the Pacific islands. The publication was based on a series of 
data gathered through a first ever telephone poll conducted by the Pacific 
Institute of Public Policy across Melanesia in 2011. The record showed that 
out a total of the 363-people surveyed from four different Melanesian 
nations, 42% of the overall respondents considered the territories of both 
the Papuan provinces as part of the Melanesian family of nations. In detail, 
respondents in PNG voted 40.5% in favour of being Melanesia, 39.3% voted 
against while 22. 6% said they didn’t know. Fiji samples proved the same 
with about 40.4% voting for West Papua, 28.1% voting against, while 31.5% 
said they didn’t know. Vanuatu’s sample proved there was slightly more 
support for West Papua at 43.5%, however, a significant minority also voted 
against with 42.4%, while 14.1% didn’t answer. The Solomon Islands 
recorded around 43.3% voting that West Papua was part of the Melanesian 
family, 30.8% voting against, while 26.0% didn’t answer (Policy, 2011).  
 
The public judgement above illustrates that the issue of Papuan separatism 
still holds a key point in the politics of the Pacific region. The Melanesian 
people’s claim over Papua as being a brother promises to maintain its 
pressure on the Indonesian government regarding the plea for self-
determination. The public judgements are also likely to bring pressure upon 
elected leaders in the Pacific region to show support on the West Papuan 
issue. Lately the Papuan issue has increased its radius of sympathizers 
causing it to become an important debate within Pacific parliaments. More 
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importantly, the issue has managed to become the most significant and 
sensitive in the MSG because the MSG as an organization was mandated 
to facilitate the common interests of the Melanesian people and 
governments.  
 
In general, the issue of Papuan separatism has been dramatic within the 
Pacific region. The issue threatened to put off several treaties of cooperation 
between Indonesia and its potential Pacific island partners, thus showing 
that the issue of Papua had a significant impact in the Pacific, due to its 
cultural and ethnic ties. In fact, the impact of the Papuan issue in the Pacific 
when traced back, shows that it had already displayed signs of threat to the 
Pacific during the Dutch colonial era. For instance, during the Dutch era, the 
Australian ambassador to Indonesia warned Australia that the Dutch plans 
for Papuan self-determination posed a threat. The ambassador argue that 
it would be dangerous to keep Indonesia out of a territory that it had already 
claimed as its own (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004).  
 
Despite, the PNG government’s continual recognition of the Papua 
provinces as being an internal issue of Indonesia, it can be argued that on 
a daily basis, PNG has been more open to local Papuans. The tolerance 
towards the incoming West Papuan asylum seekers in PNG and to the 
Pacific has captured the attention of the Melanesian communities around 
the Pacific. Moreover, West Papuan refugees that crossed over to PNG 
were granted ‘permissive resident’ status as part of PNG’s humanitarian 
conduct. The granting of permissive residency status to Papuan refugees 
meant that Papuans were given equal chances to pursue life in PNG. 
Education and health were among the most important aspects made 
available to the Papuans upon their arrival in PNG. However, the permissive 
residency status did not allow Papuans to get involved in any form of political 
activities. Although there were restrictions set in place to encourage 
goodwill, Papuans were also granted the right to freely move ad interact with 
PNG citizens. Also, Papuans were given the right to pursue equal economic 
needs such as being allowed to work and get involved in small business. 
Overall it is suspected that civil societies in both PNG and the other Pacific 
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islands have indirectly contributed to determine the continuation of the 
conflict in Papua.  
 
3.2.2 PNG’s Political Reactions 
Until today, PNG has been the home and safe refuge for most of the Papuan 
activists who fled from the brutal Indonesian military occupation of the New 
Order regime (Orde Baru). The Papuan activists who now reside in PNG 
are victims that came from both the two Papuan provinces.  Nonetheless, 
the existence of the common land border between Papua’s city of Jayapura 
(Skouw) and PNG’s city of Vanimo (Wutung) enabled safe passage for local 
Papuans to travel across into PNG in massive numbers. During this time, 
Papuan activists and members of the OPM were surely aware that by 
entering PNG territory, they would be saved and protected by PNG’s 
territorial shield of integrity and sovereignty. The assurance of seeking 
safety in PNG soil motivated a lot of Papuans toward abandoning their 
homeland. Some Papuans who later became refugees thought that by 
crossing the border into PNG, support would come from PNG and perhaps 
from Australia. Despite their attitude, there was no such support. There was 
never a deal to achieve in terms of military aid to the OPM because, the 
issue itself was rather complicated and so sensitive that neither PNG nor 
Australia had prepared itself to counter the growing Indonesian military 
influence.  
 
Despite the security tension along the border, PNG’s policy toward 
Indonesia had to be considered based on merits. Moreover, PNG-
Indonesian policy could not expand to achieve its goals due to the fact that 
PNG was home to Papuan activists who had fled Indonesia and who the 
Indonesian authorities claims to be a “group of terrorists” (Osborne, 2001). 
Indonesia’s main reason behind such a claim was to promote its overall 
sovereignty and state ideology (Pancasila) over the territories of both the 
Papuan provinces. Therefore, it is based on the sovereignty of Indonesia 
that by default defined the OPM as an illegal organization that resisted the 
sovereign government that by right was installed upon Indonesia’s 
Independence.  
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Today, most Papuans consider Indonesia as a foreign entity that intends to 
take hold of Papua’s natural and environmental resources; a new system of 
colonialism. For instance, campaigns against Indonesia’s occupation of 
Papua have often involved environmentalists, conservationists and human 
rights activists.  Despite such demands the Indonesian government 
continues to reject accusations that its only interests are on the natural 
resources and not on the people of Papua. The Indonesian government’s 
moves to promote Papua’s special autonomy was also criticised by 
Papuans who claim that the special autonomy was nowhere near to 
providing the solution to the long conflict although Indonesian authorities 
have always proposed the Papuan special autonomy as a potential long-
term solution to the conflict. Chauvel and Bhakti (2004) argue that Papuan 
special autonomy was somewhat a concession to the Papuans because it 
had not involved them in the initial formulation of the constitution. 
Furthermore, special autonomy was considered a step toward 
independence, with local Papuans having given the right to lead the 
provinces under legal terms, triggering an understanding that would collide 
with Indonesian nationalism.  
 
Before PNG gained its independence, Australia was a prominent player in 
the Papuan conflict, possibly because during that time, PNG was still under 
Australia’s administration that was supervised by the United Nations. At the 
same time, Australian observations of Indonesia under President Sukarno 
was that it was becoming a communist state. The observation further 
complicated the relationship with Indonesia and its eastern neighbour PNG. 
Regarding the type of communist rule and Sukarno’s links to communism, 
Australia was not surprised with the early border crossing activities of the 
Papuan refugees to PNG. Despite developments in the border crossing 
activities, Australia had always displayed a rather sympathetic approach 
(Osborne, 2001). A parliamentary statement was made by then Australian 
Prime Minister, Sir Garfield Barwick, in 1962, as part of PNG’s foundation 
that problems arising from both political asylum and other aspects will be 
dealt with a very humane approach (Osborne, 2001).  
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The refugees that entered PNG territory were placed in concentration 
camps near the border. The Indonesian armed forces, were known to be 
attacking nearby refugee camps alongside the border. In this case, reports 
stated that an Indonesian attack had claim the lives of a district official and 
another two civilians in PNG (Osborne, 2001). Indonesian military 
operations were at times conducted in PNG territory which further caused 
instabilities the relationship between Indonesia and PNG. Such military 
operations were illegal under international law because Indonesia had 
violated PNG sovereignty and territorial legitimacy. To counter such 
irresponsible military conduct, the Australian government responded by 
pledging 50 of its defence force personnel to monitor the activities along the 
border area. Despite the presence of Australian defence personnel, there 
was an Indonesian military attack on a nearby refugee camp that held about 
more than 250 refugees just 12 miles inside the PNG border. Furthermore, 
the next day, Indonesian forces killed 6 PNG locals who were part of the 
Australian patrol unit (Osborne, 2001).  
 
However, the Australian administered territory of PNG did not respond to 
provocations conducted by Indonesian armed forces. A new policy was 
issued to have the Papuan refugees relocated to Manus Island (an island 
located just of the North Coast of the mainland of PNG). Even before PNG’s 
independence Sir Albert Maori Kiki conducted a secret meeting with senior 
OPM leaders to discuss several issues regarding the threat that OPM 
appears to pose against PNG and Indonesia. In the meeting between Sir 
Maori Kiki and the senior OPM leaders he also expressed his concern that 
Indonesian military attacks would prompt the OPM to retaliate against the 
Indonesians. Of course, a retaliation would have caused the two countries 
relationship to deteriorate drastically. Indeed, such retaliation would cause 
major problems for PNG. Sir Maori Kiki then the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade later stated that Indonesia should not see the OPM as 
a military threat but rather as a bunch of low class protestors (Osborne, 
2001).  
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Indonesia and PNG’s political relations have depended heavily on the 
developments of the Papuan struggle for self-determination. Political 
relations among the two states remain unstable due to the presence of 
Papuan guerrillas within PNG territory which has disappointed the 
Indonesian authorities. The presence of OPM guerrillas in PNG territory 
caused the Indonesians to be suspicious regarding OPM activities 
conducted within PNG’s side of the border. An important point to consider 
is that despite Indonesia’s military capabilities, fears that OPM guerrillas 
were planning their attacks from PNG side of the border have worsened and 
complicated the relationship of both countries. The growing political 
instabilities caused by military tensions along the border have posed a great 
concern for the PNG authorities. Such fears and instabilities in their 
relationship during the early years forced Sir Maori Kiki, then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, to produce a secret letter to the 
Australian High Commission stating that:   
In relations to strengthening our policies on OPM border crossing, our 
authorities fear that the OPM might regain their influence that have 
been concentrated at a secret Camp named Victoria. There is a 
possibility that our forces along the border will be attacked. It has been 
briefly explained in the previous meeting to your staff at the Australian 
High Commission, that there has been indications of OPM activities 
influencing our local villagers and there have been clear evidence that 
OPM possess a threat to both PNG and Indonesia (Osborne, 2001).  
 
Despite the increase in Indonesian military provocations, PNG government 
policy remained technically in line with its foreign policy of treating the OPM 
issue as an integral issue of Indonesia. Therefore, all Indonesian 
movements along the border were managed confidentially. The decision to 
keep things confidential with Indonesia was criticized on the floor of the 
National Parliament by both pro-government and opposition members. The 
critics then prompted the Indonesians to raise security concerns regarding 
the mass migration of refugees. Despite PNG having declared its position 
to respect Indonesia’s sovereignty over Papua indirectly, developments 
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both in and out of the National Parliament indirectly showed an interest in 
supporting the Melanesian OPM.  
 
In relations to the presence of supporters and non-supporters in the PNG 
national parliament, Papuan activists began to manoeuvre in search of 
support from the PNG government. During this time support from individual 
parliamentary elites seemed relative, although it was not in the form of pure 
government support. Despite the PNG government’s overall view that 
Papua remains an Indonesian domestic issue, in a visit to Jakarta via 
Jayapura Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare, was quoted as saying that the 
“feeling at that time when he shook hands with Papuan leaders in Jayapura 
felt like that he was shaking his own brother’s hand” (Osborne, 2001).  
Moreover, the PM’s statement was interpreted by the OPM as a potential 
gateway to obtain more support from the PNG government on ethnic 
grounds. Such information has been quite important to the OPM as a 
movement. The main reason is because it motivates the struggle and brings 
hope that one day PNG will support the OPM movement. The OPM as an 
organization thoroughly depends on such information that could help them 
plan their next moves or even capitalize on the momentum to gain more 
recognition. 
 
3.3 Basic Agreement 
The Basic Agreement between Indonesia and PNG was signed in 1986 was 
a symbol of political goodwill. The Basic Agreement on Border 
Arrangements (May, 1986), the Treaty of Mutual Respect Friendship and 
Cooperation along with other subsidiary bilateral agreements has served as 
the foundation and guiding principles for good and constructive neighbourly 
bilateral relations between Indonesia and PNG. Essentially, the relationship 
between PNG and Indonesia has been characterized by the two countries 
common land and sea border. Despite the affinity between the two sides of 
the island of New Guinea, a border placed in the middle of the island by 
European colonialists in 1895 and 1910 is the only imaginary line that 
differentiates them (Saltford, 2003b).  
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The common border of the two countries determines the structure and 
mode of the relationship which gave birth to the initial Agreement 
concerning Border Administration. According to this, Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik had declared that Indonesia already had 
a border agreement with Australia, part of which included an Australian 
undertaking to return every border crosser to West Irian (Saltford, 
2003b). 
 
The common spirit of understanding between Indonesia and PNG has 
positively shifted the state of the border affairs from a highly suspicious and 
hostile situation to a more mutual and friendlier area of cooperation. Such 
initiatives taken by both governments have effectively reduced fear on both 
sides of the border. Accordingly, a number of reviews have been undertaken 
on the Basic Agreement on Border Arrangements of 1973, 1984, 1989 
respectively and the latest in 2003 in the capital of PNG (PNG Embassy, 
2008). Indeed, attempts from both Indonesia and PNG to respect each 
other’s sovereignty has been underlined as an important part in maintaining 
profitable relations. The undertaking of the Basic Agreement deliberately 
shows that PNG maintains its position as an independent state and member 
of the UN that obeys UN constitutions to not intervene in Indonesia’s 
domestic politics.  
 
Moreover, in relation to the efficiency of implementing Basic Border 
Agreements, a number of formal subsidiary arrangements have been 
concluded such as: the Joint Border Committee (JBC), the Border Liaison 
Meeting (BLM) and the Joint Border Committee (JBC) (Bandoro, 2007). 
Meetings like this are held annually to resolve pertinent issues that arise 
from the common border to foster stable relations between Indonesia and 
PNG. With respect to the background of certain sensitive border issues such 
as border crossings, environmental degradation, health issues, illegal 
fishing, traditional border crossing status abuse not swiftly resolved at 
successive BLM and JBC meetings, contentious issues should be referred 
to the ministerial level such as the JBC for further deliberations and concrete 
actions to be taken at the government level.  
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In relation to the basic border agreement, PNG has reviewed and taken 
stock of impediments from within its status quo border arrangements; for 
instance, on the acceptance and settlement of border crossers inside PNG 
who are in most cases not qualified for refugee status under UNHCR 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Matbob, 2012). The 
PNG government has compounded with the existence of the so-called OPM 
elements in PNG territory that should also be removed swiftly to enhance 
relations between PNG and Indonesia but protect PNG’s overall 
international image.  
 
The bilateral agreements between Indonesia and PNG in relation to the 
border issues are intended to eliminate tensions along the border. However, 
it is not easy because the involvement of foreign parties also makes it almost 
impossible to manage border affairs. For instance, the support that the OPM 
receives from MSG countries such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and 
the Kanaks of New Caledonia has been quite instrumental in shaping border 
policies because this has been known to add to tensions along the border. 
The presence of OPM rebels along the border has in most cases, prevented 
Indonesia and PNG from building a strong relationship. OPM rebels have 
used PNG as a solid sanctuary from which to attack the Indonesian armed 
forces. Growing fear between both countries substantially affects the 
possibility of maintaining and gaining trust. The involvement of the OPM in 
determining security along the border has rather challenged Indonesia and 
PNG’s border arrangements. It is almost impossible for both Indonesia and 
PNG to actually focus on building trust due to the amount of threat and 
attacks that often occur on the common border. It is important to note that 
continuous border infringements caused by the OPM have always been 
followed by Indonesian border incursions. Despite the issue being regarded 
as under control by both Indonesia and PNG, at times, tensions along the 
border increase disagreements.  
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3.3.1 Factors Affecting the Designing and Implementing of Security 
Policies.  
Security, as Morgan (2006) describes, is the quality of being and feeling 
safe which is a  fundamental value in societies. It is the condition to live 
without being anxious over one’s own safety. Furthermore, when such 
conditions are threatened, people do all they can to protect themselves or 
the people they love. Like people, the state when threatened will take all 
necessary precautions to make sure that, first and foremost, security is 
guaranteed and its interests are safeguarded. The presence of security 
means stability is achieved to maintain a peaceful environment and retain 
the feeling of safety. Security policies are a set of important measures taken 
to act as guidelines with the aim to protect the national interests of states. 
Threats, either external or internal, often cause harm to the overall interest 
of states and therefore government officials and strategists are considered 
to provide the best advice in the designing of policies that will negate such 
impacts. In border areas, security policies are considered an important part 
of maintaining relations and providing the basic foundations for cooperation 
in the field of military, policies, customs, health, quarantine and other 
government related sectors.   
 
Security has become one of the most important aspects of foreign policy in 
recent years. For instance, powerful states like the US, Russia and China 
appears to take security matters seriously. Hence, security issues are a 
central part to their foreign policies because it comes at a huge expense 
with  the pursuit of serious harm and real risks (Morgan, 2006). On the other 
hand, weaker governments have tried to maintain the balance or either face 
the threat of going to war. With regard to Indonesia and PNG relations, 
security policies remain an important component of their existence as 
neighbours, especially in terms of providing security along the borders. 
Border security policies have been adjusted and nurtured to serve for 
mutual gains. As outlined in the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual 
Cooperation, Indonesia and PNG vow to accommodate each other’s 
interests with mutual understanding and goodwill. Nonetheless, the issue of 
Papuan separatism has often caused inconvenience in the relationship. 
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Threats that arise along the border have, to some extent, affected the level 
of trust between both countries. Despite such inconveniences, Indonesia 
and PNG have taken initiatives to closely cooperate to eliminate those 
threats.  
 
First of all, it is important to understand that the issue of Papuan separatism 
has not only been around for decades, but it has been psychologically 
indoctrinated throughout generations of Papuans who’s, whether old or 
young, understands his or her identity. Identity is known to be one of the 
most sensitive aspects of nationhood. Identity whether social or individual 
as defined by Tajfel (2010) is based on “self-concept” that relates to their 
relations to a particular group (family, tribe) that possess the same values 
with significant attachment to each other. Papuans, for over five decades, 
have tried to tell the world that identity is one of the main causes that drives 
separatism while suffering at Indonesia’s violent military hands.  
  
Secondly, the armed conflict, unrest, extra-judicial killings and jailing of 
Papuans and the marginalisation of their culture (Radio New Zealand, 2017) 
have all contributed toward Papuanization. The term Papuanization in this 
case simply means the feeling of being Papuan, or being Melanesian. The 
tribe that is totally different from Asian Indonesians. The suffering and 
trauma over decades of military occupation and violence have forced 
Papuans to develop a sense of dislike. Indeed, such mentalities would 
create more opposition which is unwilling to cooperate with an Indonesian 
nationalist. There is no doubt that Papuans have long suffered at the hands 
of the Indonesian armed forces. As a result, today Papuans simply display 
a don’t care attitude. Whether or not Jakarta is willing to develop Papua is 
entirely up to Jakarta. Moreover, Papuans are known to take around with 
them such mentalities. Driven by a disappearing sense of belonging, is often 
the cause of poor performance in carrying out responsibilities and duties.  
Basically, Papuans who work for the autonomous governments are also 
affected from this syndrome. Hence, the outcome of their responsibilities 
often portrays a lack of seriousness and effectivity (because of the ‘don’t 
care’ attitude). For instance, in dealing with the designing of policies, 
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Papuans who work for the autonomous government of Papua sometimes 
perform below standard. It is surely not because of poor education and 
training but has been accredited to a long history of Indonesian occupation. 
Papuan policy-makers for years have also failed to shine under the special 
autonomy. Despite the name being ‘special autonomy’, many Papuan 
bureaucrats reckon that there is nothing special about it. Therefore, policy 
makers are faced with the challenge to either come up with high quality and 
efficient policies that will defend Indonesia or defend Papuans. In most 
cases Papuan policy makers are trapped because the final policies will 
endanger or have adverse effects on their own kind. Indeed, policy makers 
are left with no choice, thus resulting in the designing of policies that will at 
least benefit both the local Papuans and the rest of Indonesia.  Hence, when 
policy makers from Jakarta arrive, they find out that policies lack connection 
to national interest and that these need to further accommodate Jakarta’s 
interests.  
 
Thirdly, the designing of border security policies often illustrates the problem 
between designing and implementing border security policies itself. Even 
though border security policies are often designed to cater to the overall 
interests of Indonesia, the implementation of the policies have often become 
the problem. Border policies are often meant to provide safe passage to the 
people who use the border, especially travellers and locals. However, in 
most cases, the Indonesian military often takes charge in the 
implementation process. The involvement of the military is where it all goes 
wrong. In Papua, under special autonomy, it gives the autonomous 
provincial government the right to be involved in the processes of designing 
and implementing security policies.  
 
Basically, what has happened here is that the autonomous government has 
tried to minimize the involvement of the military along the border apart from 
providing security. The military in this case is only needed to provide security 
and maintain stability. When the military is more involved, it overlaps the 
responsibility of other institutions that are part of the CIQS (Customs, 
Immigrations, Quarantine, Security). An overlap in responsibilities means 
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that the implementation of policies will experience problems because not all 
the institutions get to function according to their job descriptions. Mostly, the 
border policies would focus on trust-building and engaging all required 
institutions to improve credibility, stability and relations.  
 
Fourthly, is the impact of relationship between Papuan decision makers and 
the OPM. Decision makers and policy makers are faced with the challenge 
to provide effective policies that will benefit the relationship of Indonesia 
(Papua) and PNG. However, at some point, the decision makers are faced 
with situations that will force them to come up with policies that will not 
entirely be in Jakarta’s interests. Papuans who are involved in the designing 
and implementing of border policies are aware that either way they may also 
be in danger, thus causing them to try to implement policies that will also 
indirectly benefit the OPM and its people.  
 
Despite the OPM not directly being involved in the designing of the policies, 
Papuans who work inside are somewhat representing their aspirations on a 
low scale. For example, the operational hours of the border market are 8:00 
am to 4:00pm, however, sometimes the markets are open till 8:00pm for 
locals after hours to cater for local needs. Sometimes the border is open 
over long weekends or special occasions such as Easter and Christmas. 
Another would be the engagement of government officials which excludes 
the military; this method has been strictly based on a people-to-people 
approach. In this case, the Papuan government deals directly with the PNG 
border officials to address problems directly in order to find solutions.  
 
It is common in Papua that the implementation of policies be conducted in 
such a manner that it accommodates various interests. Another example 
would be the border portal; even though it is closed, the gate-keeper opens 
it when locals come after hours. Such actions have often created problems 
between the autonomous government officials and the armed forces who 
are stationed at the border. The main reason is because the armed forces 
carry direct orders from Jakarta, while the autonomous government officials 
are protected by the autonomy law to run the border’s daily management. 
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The autonomy law provides the legal basis for Papua province to design 
and implement border policies. The autonomy law accommodates for 
traditional and cultural approaches to settling issues that affect border 
security. For example, land disputes are dealt with traditionally in a dialogue 
form with related authorities. Basically, what the autonomous government 
does via its Border and International Cooperation Board is to try to maintain 
a good relationship with all parties; both domestic and in PNG.   
 
3.3.2 The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
The motto “Kartika Eka Paksi”, which symbolizes an unrivalled brave bird 
that upholds high values and ideals, illustrates Indonesia’s TNI Army 
(Angkatan Darat- AD-) land troops as a strong force that upholds the values 
and ideals of the nation and true soldier (The role of TNI AD in Indonesia’s 
Border Security, 2012). In the past, TNI AD used to be most feared because 
of its direct contact with the people. Despite its long, dark history under the 
rule of the dictatorship of the New Order regime, the TNI has undergone 
various reforms to transform as an organization. Vaughn (2011) claims that 
the TNI’s role in Indonesia has changed since 9/11 as it showed more 
concerns in combatting Islamic terrorist groups. Furthermore, he claims the 
US influence on Indonesia to pursue the war against terrorism has 
transformed the TNI as an organization, whilst at the same time improving 
its human rights record. In particular, Indonesia has received great support 
from senior US strategists regarding its increased role in geopolitics in the 
regions of Southeast Asia and East Asia, have been accredited to the 
government’s reforms.  
 
Such evidence illustrates internal reforms which have transformed the role 
of the TNI into a more important part in Indonesia’s national interest. Today 
the TNI together with the Police, has transformed itself to protect and defend 
the rights of Indonesian citizens. Moreover, the reforms in the TNI have 
been focused to improving its human rights records which, while losing 
much of its influence on the political sphere, this has helped it to improve its 
professional standards (Mietzner, 2006). TNI improvements are considered 
part of an ever-changing democratic process in Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia 
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has often boasted its democracy as one of the most vibrant and unique 
democracies in the world. Moreover, the Indonesian army has always 
claimed to be the protector and upholder of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan 
Indonesia) Indonesia’s Unitary Republic.  
Until April 1999, the armed forces, together with the police who were 
subordinated to them, were collectively called ABRI (Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia). When the POLRI gained notional autonomy under 
reformasi in 1999, the armed forces, including the air force and navy, 
became TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia –litterally, the National 
Army of Indonesia, and the original name of the army in fact). As one 
American expert points out, the army (as the usual voice of the armed 
forces) regards itself as alat negara rather than alat pemerintah, the 
instrument of the nation rather than the government. The Soldier’s 
Oath potentially flies in the face of the law of war by commanding 
‘devotion’ to superiors ‘without questioning their orders or decisions’. 
(Robert Creveling, Loyalty and Integrity in the Indonesian Armed 
Forces, Foreign Area Officers Association, Springfield, Virginia, 
1999) (King, 2004) pp 98.  
 
Moreover, Indonesia has managed to significantly democratize and 
transform its institutions and civil society. Indeed, Indonesia’s 
transformations has led to an ever-expanding civil society and more open 
media. In relation to the institutional transformations, the military’s role in 
politics has decreased and the police have been separated from the military 
(Vaughn, 2011). In general, TNI is considered to be the most solid 
organization in Indonesia. Furthermore, Vaughn (2011) argues that in a 
traditional sense, the TNI has been literally centred in politically protecting 
its territorial integrity –mainly from internal threats- rather than concentrating 
on external security threats. However, the TNI’s role in maintaining a 
vigorous attachment to secular nationalism has greatly contributed to 
maintaining a unified Indonesia. Although the TNI’s focus is aimed at 
overcoming internal threats, separatism for instance, level of alertness to 
also cater for external threats has increased. As we know, separatism has 
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imposed a wide range of threats to Indonesia. One of the reasons is 
because separatism do attract international interests.  
 
Interestingly, in the case of Papua’s separatism, the TNI has also 
transformed itself to meet and cater for the growing demands in civil society. 
Despite the ongoing allegations of human rights abuses, the TNI as an 
organization has been changing itself to meet the needs of Papuans. 
Interestingly, under the leadership of President SBY, between 2004-2014, 
the TNI has been mobilized to uphold a rather different approach. In dealing 
with separatism in Papua, and especially along the Indonesia-PNG border, 
the TNI has managed to cut down its influence. The downsizing of the TNI 
presence along the border can be seen clearly. Although the TNI still 
maintains its role as the protector of Indonesia national security from 
external threats, it has managed to implement the ‘thousand friends zero 
enemy’ policy along the border with PNG.  
 
Moreover, the TNI’s role along the border has undergone huge changes. In 
Papua alone, the TNI’s influence on border management has decreased. 
Decision making for instance does not entirely show pure TNI influence. The 
autonomous government through BPPKLN (Badan Perbatasan dan 
Kerjasama Luar Negeri) Border and International Cooperation Board of 
Papua Province has been taking the leading role in managing border affairs. 
With regard to BPPKLN’s roles in the field of foreign relations cooperation, 
border potential, infrastructure and trans-border issues, it has downplayed 
the role of the TNI, therefore, giving the TNI a back-seat role in border 
affairs. The TNI’s position as the protector of Indonesia’s sovereignty and 
integrity has been transformed to paint a good image. With less involvement 
in bureaucracy and politics, the TNI is forced to focus on deterring national 
threats that surface along the border.  
 
Although the TNI’s operations involved preparations for war, it is also vital 
that the TNI’s involvement in border areas helps deter illegal activities and 
makes sure that the law is upheld. In Papua, the TNI’s Kodam XVII/ 
Cenderawasih is tasked with the role of maintaining a conducive 
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atmosphere along the border. This includes showing military strength and 
force if necessary to protect its borders from external threats (The role of 
TNI AD in Indonesia’s Border Security, 2012) . Furthermore, the main 
purpose of the TNI on the border is to prevent the neighbouring countries 
from infiltrating and carrying out illegal activities on Indonesian soil. 
Although it seems that the TNI’s function at the border should be focused 
on addressing problems that arise from PNG, nevertheless, domestic issues 
are so serious that they need to be addressed by the TNI. 
 
The issue of separatism in Papua has at times put the TNI under pressure 
along the border. Even though the TNI maintains a heavy presence along 
the Skouw-Wutung border in Jayapura (Northern Border), the OPM has at 
times caused inconvenience. This illustrates that the role of the TNI has 
changed since the new order regime of Suharto. Today the TNI has 
implemented an open approach to accommodate people-to-people contact 
("RI-PNG agrees to increase the cooperation of people to people contact," 
2015). Transparency in the hope of creating a better image for the TNI is 
vital towards trust-building in Papua. International pressure has been quite 
immense on the role of the TNI, however, under President SBY, the TNI has 
showed signs of openness to dialogue with the people. The transformations 
that the TNI has undergone has proved to be a determinant within border 
relations, because it has opened new doors for further dialogue between 
counterparts in the PNGDF. Military cooperation among the TNI and the 
PNGDF have been discussed in annual border meetings such as the BLM 
("BLM must provide contributions to the governments of RI_PNG," 2015). 
 
Overall, the role of the armed forces especially the TNI has been limited in 
recent years. One of the main reasons is because of past human rights 
violations. Today, the TNI still maintains a considerable influence along the 
border, but its overall function has been monitored by various parties 
including the provincial government. The provincial government, under the 
autonomous constitution, legally has the right to conduct border 
arrangements, however, it does not have the right to control the armed 
forces. Therefore, the provincial government has tried to keep the military 
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influence out of border arrangements as it will ignite more suspicion 
between PNG and Indonesia. Basically, the autonomous government 
represents the TNI, police and other institutions as a whole after their 
internal issues are sorted out.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Making of Foreign Policy 
In the aim to procure a substantial relationship with other countries, the 
government of Indonesia has over the years demonstrated the significance 
of adopting and maintaining its ‘free and active’ (bebas-aktif) foreign policy 
as the mother of all policies (Hatta, 1953). Accordingly, Indonesia’s founding 
fathers (Sukarno and Hatta) chose to implement the ‘free and active’ foreign 
policy as the means for guiding the young Indonesian republic throughout 
the uncertainties of the dangerous Cold War era. This was later illustrated 
through Indonesia’s leading role in the ‘non-alignment’ movement of 1955 
in Bandung, Indonesia (Piccone & Yusman, 2014) which practically 
empowered Indonesia to became an important partner in geopolitics. 
Apparently, Indonesia’s foreign policy has undergone key strategic 
developments throughout the number of leadership changes (Presidential 
Cabinets) since the post Suharto era. Subsequently, Indonesia’s foreign 
policy has yielded concepts such as the ones outlined within the ‘treaty of 
mutual respect friendship and cooperation’ with PNG (May, 1986) as 
discussed in the previous chapter of this research.  
The Republic of Indonesia realizes that cooperation with other 
countries is essential if these ideals are to become a reality. It has 
made the United Nations the focal point of its over-all policy of seeking 
good relations with all other nations. More specifically, its objectives in 
foreign policy are: 1, to defend the freedom of the people and guard 
the safety of the state; 2, to obtain from overseas those articles of daily 
necessity required for increasing the standard of living of the 
population--food, especially rice, consumer goods of various kinds, 
medicines, and so on; 3, to obtain capital equipment to rebuild what 
had been destroyed or damaged, and capital for industrialization, new 
construction and the partial mechanization of agriculture; 4, to 
strengthen principles of international law and to aid in achieving social 
justice on an international scale, in line with the U.N. Charter, with 
special reference to Articles 1, 2 and 55, in particular by endeavouring 
within the U.N. framework to help people still living within the colonial 
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system to achieve freedom; 5, to place special emphasis on initiating 
good relations with neighbouring countries, the majority of which have 
in the past occupied a position similar to Indonesia; and 6, to seek 
fraternity among nations through the realization of the ideals enshrined 
in the Pancasila (Five Postulates) which constitute the basic 
Indonesian philosophy. In short, Indonesia will pursue a policy of 
peace and of friendship with all nations on a basis of mutual respect 
and non-interference with each other's structure of government (Hatta, 
1953). 
 
In order to clearly understand the ‘the making of Indonesia’s foreign policy, 
firstly, it is important to note that the end of (the dictatorship) Suharto’s new 
order era practically made possible the dramatic changes in the measures 
leading toward a vibrant and dynamic foreign policy approach. Secondly, it 
is equally important to note the process by which foreign policy is designed 
and implemented in Indonesia today. Accordingly, it is profound that during 
the Suharto days, a large amount of strategic decision making was 
particularly decided by the high-ranking officials from the military (ABRI, now 
the TNI) who were highly trusted by Suharto. Basically, Suharto’s 
authoritarian era did not allow for other external powers to intervene in 
decision making, as it was considered a threat to national security. Anwar 
(2010) argues that during the Suharto period, there was hardly any 
intervention from individuals or elites’ outside the appointed executives who 
played the most part in decision making. On the other hand, the function of 
the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat- the House of Representatives) did not 
fulfil its overall mandate as the (only) legal body that was tasked to ratify 
treaties and dealing with major policies that needed further consultations. 
The House of Representatives was hardly consulted during the Suharto era 
(Anwar, 2010). Nevertheless, Anwar (2010) claims that the resignation of 
President Suharto in 1998 paved the way for the development of a more 
pluralistic democracy in Indonesia. Furthermore, in spite of the growing 
domestic political and economic pressure throughout the post Suharto and 
in some point the reformasi period, Anwar (2010) further claims that 
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Indonesia managed to secure four successful amendments of the 1945 
constitution which strictly emphasized on; 
 
1. The abolishment of the armed forces in socio-political related role 
2. The clear separation of power between the executive, the legislative 
and the judiciary 
3. The incorporation of Human rights into the constitution 
4. Encouragement of the development of a multiparty system. 
 
Nevertheless, during the Suharto era, the role of foreign policy decision 
making was only limited to the few who were among the high ranking military 
bureaucrats that topped his trusted people list. The thirty-two years of 
Suharto’s monopoly left a huge dent in the Indonesian political life. This can 
be illustrated by how the authoritarian president managed to manipulate the 
consultative assembly to vote him back as president for five straight years. 
In contrast to Suharto, the post Suharto governments of Gus Dur, Megawati 
and SBY democratically pursued the executive, legislative and judicial 
levels of government to amend the constitution, purposely to prevent 
another dictatorship like government. In their efforts, they also managed to 
set the terms by which the president and vice president are to be elected, 
and this time, it’s the people who gets to vote their president through 
presidential elections, unlike Suharto’s monopolistic appointments. 
Furthermore, elected presidents and vice presidents are allowed to be in 
power for just a non-renewable ten-year period. Nonetheless, the changes 
have greatly benefited Indonesia’s foreign policy because it allows for a 
more open and transparent decision-making process, free press and more 
vibrant civil society involvement.  
 
Today, Indonesia’s decision-making process goes through a long list of 
checks and balances. Moreover, not all the decision making is done at the 
executive level, some are executed at the legislative and judicial levels. 
Others are referred to the regional level (provincial) as part of regionalism 
to encourage more regional participation in politics. However, the policies 
that are mandated to be dealt with at the regional level are compulsory to 
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be synchronized with state objectives. Despite it being easy to explain, 
Indonesia did go through a lot of political instabilities between 1998-2004. 
The Suharto legacy was full of problems and domestic conflicts were among 
some problems that needed direct attention. Armed conflicts between the 
TNI and local separatist movements in Ache, Ambon, Papua and East Timor 
were so sensitive that it considered a strategic foreign policy approach was 
required.  
 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s term in office also exposed 
Indonesia’s difficult transition due to the ongoing armed conflicts as 
mentioned above except for East Timor which had already been 
independent by then. One of the main causes of conflicts in Indonesia was 
separatism. Separatist movements have over the years prompted Indonesia 
to implement certain strategic foreign policy approaches to defend its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Changes in the foreign policy approach 
began to take actual form under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
first five years in office. In particular, the roles of the House of 
Representatives were re-activated to serve the purpose of a transparent 
and democratic decision-making system.  
 
Nonetheless the newly open democratic system under President SBY 
paved the way for a more persuasive foreign policy approach with the aim 
of overcoming domestic issues. It was during this time that Indonesia began 
to build a new international image by engaging in global issues. According 
to President SBY in 2005, Indonesia’s ‘international identity’ was made up 
of three important elements. Firstly, Indonesia is the fourth most populated 
country in the world. Secondly, Indonesia is the largest Muslim democratic 
nation, and thirdly Indonesia is ranked the third largest democracy in the 
world (Anwar, 2010). Furthermore, the international identity propelled 
Indonesia to pursue democracy as the new foreign policy agenda. 
Subsequently, the legacy of President SBY remains one of most impressive 
among other presidents, due to his efforts in building a strong foundation in 
Indonesia’s relationship with other countries and setting a benchmark in 
Indonesia’s role as the third largest democracy. Indonesia’s role in the 
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international arena has rather increased in the last decade, due to more 
international engagements. Back at home, Indonesia increased the 
participation of its citizens as part of fixing its international image that was 
ruined in the past.  
The Newly democratic Indonesia recognizes freedoms of expression 
and association as key principles, giving rise to a vibrant and 
increasingly critical civil society, free- wheeling media, and numerous 
political parties (Anwar, 2010).  
 
In this research, Indonesia’s foreign policy to PNG refers to the (border 
security) sets of policies that are designed and implemented to firstly, 
protect state sovereignty, secondly protect state interests, and finally protect 
its citizens from external and internal threats along the Indonesia and PNG 
border. Nonetheless security policies implemented along the border 
represent a set of guidelines which regulates and accommodate for mutual 
interest by further encouraging cooperation between the government of 
Indonesia and PNG. In fact, Indonesia’s ‘non-alignment and pragmatist’ 
approach in foreign policy seemed to encourage greater desire in dealing 
with democracy and human rights matters under President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (Piccone & Yusman, 2014). Furthermore, such cooperative 
desires have activated the initiatives to comprehend an essential bilateral 
relationship with PNG. As a result, both Indonesia and PNG have formally 
agreed to mutually participate in the strengthening of political and security 
measures. Accordingly, the security measures taken in this context are 
actually aimed at downplaying the role of the OPM along the two countries 
border. Their policies are also aimed at gaining a more favorable and stable 
cooperative relationship.  
 
Moreover, President SBY’s foreign policy of “a million friends and zero 
enemies” (Piccone & Yusman, 2014) has guided Indonesia to achieve more 
international praise. Accordingly, the approach did set the momentum by 
providing the basis to strengthen the developments of Indonesia’s 
democracy and economy since the Asian financial crises. The approach 
itself has provided concrete outcomes through the use of various measures 
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which include, increasing Indonesia’s geopolitical participation in various 
fields such as political, economic, international security and human rights. 
This can be seen in Indonesia’s active involvement in forums such as the 
G20 (the group of twenty) (Mustafa, 2016) and APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation),and the WHRF (World Human Right Forum) etc. 
Indeed, Indonesia’s involvements in related forums have been pivotal in 
consolidating relationships with neighboring states and other states in the 
region.  
 
In particular, it has also provided Indonesia with more room to improve and 
pursue its relations with PNG. As sovereign states, both Indonesia and PNG 
has agreed to pursue and maintain a stable relationship with each other 
within the guidelines of the United Nations Charter ("Chapter I: Purpose and 
Principles," 1945) . With respect to sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
Indonesia has always welcomed PNG’s sovereign argument (position) in 
regard to the separatist conflict in the provinces of Papua and West Papua 
as an Indonesian domestic issue. Despite the fact that their relationship has 
been cordial as outlined in an understanding, both countries still endure 
difficulties in coping with the issue of separatism as it causes security risks 
along their common border. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the previous 
chapters, separatist insurgencies operating along the border have been the 
prominent factor in determining the conditions of the two countries’ 
relationship. The presence of the OPM has caused Indonesia and PNG to 
continuously strive in improving their relations and border security. 
 
In particular, this chapter examines the designing and implementation of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially its border security policy based on 
Lentner (1974a) foreign policy theory. Lentner (1974a) argues in his book 
entitled Foreign Policy Analysis that policies are forms of actions which 
involve three important parts: first comes the ‘selection of objectives’, 
second, is the ‘mobilization of the means for obtaining those objectives’ and 
third is the ‘implementation, or the actual expenditure of the efforts of 
resources in pursuit of selected objectives’. Moreover, this part of the 
chapter explores the set of objectives that the Indonesian government has 
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considered as its interests. Furthermore, the chapter will emphasize more 
on the mobilization of means that the Indonesian government applies as 
necessary in obtaining those objectives. The next section emphasizes the 
applications of certain instruments as a means to secure its interests. In 
addition, it will focus on the implementation process of the Indonesian 
foreign policy and furthermore discuss the link between democracy and 
Indonesian foreign policy.  
 
4.1 Indonesian Cabinets and Foreign Policy  
Until today, different Indonesian cabinets have illustrated the significance of 
the ‘free and active’ foreign policy (Hatta, 1953). The policy has in detail 
been the spine of Indonesia’s international relations. In fact, the non-
alignment approach introduced by Indonesia’s first ever cabinet lead by 
Sukarno did greatly benefit Indonesia both politically and economically ever 
since it was introduced during the Cold War era. The decision to remain 
neutral without claiming alliance to either of the super powers presented 
Indonesia with the opportunity to propel itself forward. Indonesia took this 
opportunity to build stronger relationships with other countries, for example, 
the non-aligned. The momentum of Indonesia’s international relations 
gained more popularity, especially before the Asian financial crises in 1998. 
However, Indonesia’s neutrality in foreign policy has often been questioned 
especially under the dictatorship of Suharto. In general, Suharto’s strong 
connections with the US confined the role of the ‘free and active’ foreign 
policy. The relationship began to show strong signals that in actual terms 
the free and active foreign policy may seem to be the perfect tool in pursuing 
state objectives.  
 
Despite Suharto’s robust links with Washington, the free and active foreign 
policy also displayed weaknesses. In particular, during the post-Cold War 
period, when superpower rivalry was considered no longer active. 
Nonetheless, if the government of Indonesia was to continue practicing 
neutrality it would have faced major challenges in achieving national 
objectives. As a matter of fact, international relations itself has rather 
developed to become more interdependent. International relations in this 
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case, refers to the relationships among independent sovereign states. 
Countries have rather turned to focus on building trust and stretching 
cooperation.  
 
In fact, the post Suharto era provided the shifts in foreign policy’s strategic 
decision making that basically embarked on strengthening further 
international participation whilst at the same time projecting Indonesia’s 
national interest. Indonesia was introduced into pursuing wider peace and 
stability as the means of obtaining more friendly relationships with other 
countries. The main reason behind Indonesia’s outward push was that its 
international relationships with other countries would activate the 
alternatives and open more doors in obtaining its national interest. For 
example, Indonesia’s growing international relationships with USA, China 
and Australia have often down played domestic issues such as separatism. 
Despite all the ups and downs in the pattern of Indonesia’s foreign relations 
throughout the post Suharto period, President SBY’s period between 2004-
2014 stands out to be the most effective period of Indonesia’s foreign 
participation. 
 
Before sinking deeper into discussion, it is important to firstly understand 
the process in which foreign policy and other related policies are carried out 
within the Indonesian government. As a sovereign state, Indonesia’s foreign 
policies are being designed by the government. In this case, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia is tasked with the responsibility to design the 
strategic structure of foreign policy aspects.  Since its Independence, the 
principles of the free and active policy have been the core aspect in pursuing 
diplomacy. Despite the fact that the foreign policy has been around for 
decades, especially as a guideline to maintaining neutrality and stability in 
international relations, it seemed that developments in both global and 
regional trends in international relations has caused Indonesia to 
strategically re-think its direction in achieving state goals ("The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs discusses the essentials  principles of the free and active 
policy," 2016).  
 122 
Nevertheless, it is for sure that the ‘free and active’ foreign policy approach 
will always maintain a dominant role in guiding Indonesia toward achieving 
its national objectives. Moreover, Indonesia’s foreign policy will always be 
designed in such a way that it will always benefit the state and other major 
pillars of democracy. In order for foreign policy to be deemed as successful, 
it has to be considered as a benefit to the citizens as a whole. As part of 
Indonesia’s growing global influence, Indonesia has partaken in several 
important aspects of building international cooperation such as anti-
terrorism, sustainable developments, international peace keeping 
operations and other international issues ("The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
discusses the essentials  principles of the free and active policy," 2016).  
 
Indeed, Indonesia’s growing international participation has proved to 
increase Indonesia’s bargaining power. In addition, Indonesia’s position as 
the world’s third largest Muslim democracy has indeed provided Indonesia 
with the platform to actively strengthen ties with other states. Overall, 
Indonesia’s involvement in both regional and global politics have forced 
Indonesia to take up a leading role in maintaining peaceful international 
relations. For instance, Indonesia’s leading role in ASEAN in relation to the 
South China dispute. In the context of Indonesia and PNG relationship, 
foreign policy has rather maintained the overall initiative as outlined in the 
‘treaty of mutual respect, friendship and cooperation’. However, border 
policies are designed differently to foreign policy. Foreign policy does not 
change in this context.  In the Indonesian side border policies are widely 
managed by the BNPP (Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan) 
 
4.2 PNG Government and Parliament 
In PNG, the government sector is highly responsible for the making of 
foreign policy. The national executive council (NEC), also known as 
members of the cabinet, is the executive branch of the government that is 
responsible to determine the foreign policy of the country.  The national 
executive council basically consists of the prime minister, deputy prime 
minister and other ministers of the government such as foreign minister, 
defense, police, health, etc.  However, the presence of other political elites 
 123 
is considered vital in the making of PNG Foreign policy to Indonesia in the 
context of the Papua separatism issue. Some members in the government 
have been showing support for separatism over the years and it has 
affected the implementation of PNG Foreign Policy. In fact, the PNG 
government’s position has been quite clear. Despite the clear foreign policy 
approach, there have been members of the parliament showing some 
sympathies to the Papuan separatist movement.  
 
In pursuit of its foreign policy to Indonesia in the context of the Separatism 
issue, PNG has always denied negotiating with the OPM on multiple 
occasions where the OPM leaders such as Seth Rumkorem who persuaded 
the PNG government by asking the government to acknowledge the 
existence of the OPM within PNG territory. In response, PNG foreign 
minister Sir Albert Maori Kiki stated that PNG has refused to deal with the 
OPM and that the separatism issue remains an Indonesian domestic affair 
(Osborne, 1985). It was during this time that the PNG government officially 
made its point by addressing that it will use all means possible to protect its 
borders. First by play down of the existence of OPM elements within PNG 
territory. Second, to consider all members of the OPM in PNG as illegal 
immigrants and to return them to the Indonesian authorities at the border. 
Third, to order PNG citizens to stop helping the OPM with food and basic 
supplies along the border.  
 
Despite the government of PNG’s initial moves to pursue its foreign policy 
as outline in the previous paragraph, practically, the system does not 
operate very well. The government of PNG has often failed to live up to their 
policies. Moreover, the PNG government is also known to have not properly 
executed their policies towards Indonesia, thus, it was once stated by a 
visiting Australian consultant that ‘PNG had no capacity for problem solving’ 
(May, 2009). The statement shows that there have been several failed 
outcomes and misdiagnoses as well as ineffective responses to reform 
initiatives. 
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PNG does not have any advantages in securing its national interest in 
regard to the separatism issue. Within this environment, the policies aimed 
at resolving the Papuan separatism issue can’t be implemented 
successfully because the government can change its approach or either 
substitute the policy with another policy at any time. Even though the 
policies have been agreed upon if, there is a slight change, then the policies 
can be twisted to benefit other parties. As a result, it is quite hard for the 
PNG government to maintain control over the implementation process of its 
policies, because the government is often influenced by political elites. 
Therefore, the policies that are being implemented seem to produce the 
opposite outcome. This has showed that the policies have failed to obtain 
the national objects.  
 
For over four decades, PNG has always maintained and developed a good 
relationship with Indonesia. One way of making sure that PNG and 
Indonesia’s relationship would remain stable to achieve growth and 
developments depends entirely on how PNG designs its policy to tackle the 
Papuan separatism issue. In the past, consecutive PNG governments have 
tried to deal with the Papuan separatism issue but only a few succeeded. 
So far, the relationship is stable but it is not always guaranteed due to the 
sensitivity that surrounds the separatism issue. More importantly it is 
important to note that even today the issue of separatism in Papuan remains 
an important problem that both governments need to find ways to solve, 
especially given the impact if there is conflict along the common border.  
May (2009) argues that another reason why the government of PNG often 
fails to tackle the separatism issue is because at the national level of PNG 
is missing a “synergy between active individuals in the bureaucracy and 
committed individuals who have a shared vision and trust with their 
bureaucrats.  
Resistance to change is neither unique to PNG nor exclusive to the 
public sector. Comparative studies of public sector reform provide 
copious example of behaviour by public servants and ministers 
designed to delay, stall or generally undermine proposed changes in 
established policies and practices. In PNG this tendency has 
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probably been exacerbated by the unusual influential role which 
ministers public officials play in policy implementation (May, 2009) 
The PNG government’s weakness to design policies to tackle the Papuan 
separatism and also to make sure that both domestic and foreign policies 
do not collide, absolutely gives the OPM the edge to pursue their political 
rights in PNG, including their existence along the common border. In 
addition, (May, 2009) argues that “ministers frequently dictate to their 
departmental officials and the appointment of senior officials has tended to 
become increasingly politicised”. According to Mays’ research, this has 
been true up until now because it is: 
Also true in the sub-national level, where in some provinces, 
notwithstanding formal procedures, provincial governors (who are 
normally national MPs) have selected provincial administrators and 
even district administrators who can be relied on to carry out their 
wishes (May, 2009). 
 
It is clearly not a good way of conducting polices because when individuals 
are driven with their own ambition for power, it is likely that the policies are 
being carried out according to their individual interests. For instance, 
previous figures show that PNG is known to have a “high turnover of MPs 
(50-55 percent from 1972 to 2002, about roughly 80 percent in 2002 and 
just over 60 percent in 2007), and an even higher turnover of cabinet 
portfolios has reinforced this trend. Moreover, Defence had seven ministers 
and seven secretaries, and between 1975 and 2002, there were twenty-four 
changes of ministers (May, 2009) 
Political parties in PNG are not sharply differentiated by ideology or 
policy; as a result, changes of government are unlikely to produce 
major changes in policy direction. Nevertheless, the constant 
turnover of ministers and senior bureaucrats, and frequent if often 
relatively minor shifts in policies, create a lack of stability which 
makes commitment to a given set of policy actions difficult to 
maintain (May, 2009). 
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In these realistic examples, it can demonstrate that the Papuan issue to 
some extant is not dealt with seriously by the national government of PNG. 
Thus, the existence of Papuan organizations in PNG is a failure of poor 
control of the national government. Which did not portray the national 
government objectives because policies where not executed as planned 
due to the internal instabilities that often occurred. The issue of Papua 
separatism did not only affect the government policies in PNG by also 
managed to penetrate other neighbouring Pacific governments. The 
Papuan struggle for self-determination has gained more support from other 
neighbouring Pacific Islands like Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the Kanaks 
of New Caledonia. In return, several Pacific islands, have been voicing their 
support through their respective governments and also through their civil 
society. Amongst the pacific Islands state, Vanuatu has been the most 
influential actor in the Pacific that raises concerns over Papuan separatism. 
Several Vanuatu governments in the past have pledge continuous support 
for Papua’s self-determination.   
 
The difference between the support for Papuan independence in PNG and 
Vanuatu is that in PNG, the government denies its support for the Papuan 
issue. However, in reality there is still support for the Papuan issue from 
several political elites and also from the civil society. Thus, Papuan people 
in PNG are given the freedom to participate in all sectors. On the other hand, 
Vanuatu is the most dominating Pacific island state that is always vocal in 
regard to the Papuan issue. The support for Papuan independence has 
been around for a long-time in Vanuatu and even up till today following the 
opening of a Papuan office in Vanuatu to deal with issues relating to Papuan 
independence. Unlike Vanuatu, PNG does not allow Papuans to 
permanently build an office in PNG in order to maintain a good relationship 
with its neighbour Indonesia. The different roles that PNG and Vanuatu have 
in the Papuan issue contribute to completing the acceptance of Papuan 
people and the Papuan issue in both states. However, in PNG it is not really 
clear and to some extent hard to pinpoint the interest of PNG itself within 
the Papuan issue. 
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The existence of OPM and its supporters in PNG is a result of contractionary 
government news. In one way, it can be said that PNG is directly violating 
its foreign policy to Indonesia or it can also be said that PNG is supporting 
the OPM. Despite the possibilities mentioned above, it can also be seen that 
the outcome is also a result of a failure of the government in carrying out its 
duties. Especially in implementing its policies, the government can be seen 
to be weak because even after the objectives of foreign policy have been 
set the government cannot work towards achieving its objectives. Once the 
objectives can’t be restored, it makes it absolutely hard for the government 
to mobilize its means in order to achieve those objectives. This totally 
creates a problem when it comes to implementation because the 
government has already lost control within its functions. As a result, it often 
shows a completely different foreign policy outcome in regard to Papuan 
separatism.  
 
4.2.1 The Involvement of Political Elites 
With regard to PNG’s democratic government practice, political elites often 
get involved with policy making. Political elites in PNG have a lot contributed 
to its domestic and foreign policies. Political elites are amongst the most 
influential individuals who possess the power to mingle with politics. Political 
elites in PNG sometimes to some extent misuse their political role to gain 
an outcome that best suits their interests. Elites are highly considered in 
making the foreign policy due to a high level of experience and a well-
educated background. Elites of every country in the world value their own 
protection safety and well-being and strive for self-respect and some 
measures of deference. These universal values are embodied in the goals 
of sovereignty, independence, and security. These means of achieving 
these goals vary as situations and the relevant determinants vary, but the 
values are widely shared (Pahre, 2006).  
 
In some cases, political elites significantly appear with a great deal of ideas 
and opinions as to how the government would work towards pursuing its 
national interests. Some results have shown that political elites in PNG do 
have a significant part in the government decision making despite its status. 
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Some elites that are influential are retired politicians such as ex-prime 
ministers and foreign ministers. In the case of Papuan separatism, several 
political elites from the PNG government have come up to support the 
Papuan plea for independence. Several high profile political elites are 
known to be great supporters of the Papuan Separatism. Several governors 
also had their opinion to what the PNG government should do to help 
Papuan separatism. These efforts earned these political elites fame. Their 
criticism and opinions were making impacts in PNG and these elites knew 
as to how it would benefit them politically. Keeping in mind that PNG is home 
to around ten thousand Papuan people, it is quite a large number to make 
an impact. 
 
These political elites try to convince the PNG government to be part of the 
Papuan campaign. The problem that occurs is that the government still 
allows the Papuan issue to be brought to the public’s concern despite clear 
efforts to refrain from dealing with the Papuan issue as clearly stated in its 
foreign policy in the beginning of this chapter. The ongoing Papuan struggle 
for independence has brought up concerns from PNG political elites such 
as Members of parliament voicing their support for an independent Papua. 
For example, a newly elected PNG MP says he “wants to raise the issue of 
self-determination for the people of Indonesia’s Papua region.(Campaign, 
2011) Powes Parkop is the governor of PNG National Capital District. He is 
also a lawyer and human rights activist, having headed an NGO called 
Melanesian Solidarity. Mr. Parkop says he: 
Respects the diplomatic relations the country has with Indonesia but 
he says he has a moral obligation to speak out about Papua. I will 
speak on the issue of West Papua so that it is raised as a serious 
issue in Papua New Guinea and in the region so it can be addressed, 
because this is a real issue. It’s been pushed under the carpet for too 
long (Campaign, 2011). 
 
4.2.2 Civil Society 
As a democratic state, the civil society is regarded as an important part of a 
country’s life. It also the same in PNG. Civil society is included as a 
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determinant to foreign policy decision making. Normally the civil society is 
included to find out if government policies are good policies. The greater the 
support, the greater the success of that policy will be in implementation. 
Within this research, PNG’s civil society supports the Papuan separatism 
issue, therefore, it is complicated for the government to include the voice of 
the civil society. The simplest excuse to their support is due to the ethnic 
similarity to Papuans. Being fellow Melanesian tribesmen is what tends to 
make them feel a part of them. Equality is most often taken to mean that all 
are the same in some important respect. Being part of the civil society can 
also be classified as citizens with citizenship to a particular state. With 
citizenship to the independent state of PNG the people have the ability to 
decide what is best for “oneself; a capacity of rational thought; an economic 
stake in the country; the ability to defend one’s country” (Catt, 1999). 
 
Another reason that the civil society is giving its support to Papuan 
separatism is because there are a large number of Papuans who reside in 
PNG and have already managed to mix around with PNG people. It is hard 
to identify Papuans from Papua New Guineans because as part of 
Melanesia there is no difference. It is a problem because some Papuans 
have managed to be important figures in PNG, therefore, it is easier for the 
civil society to raise their concerns over the Papuan issue. The civil society 
is easily motivated due to its feeling of belonging to a particular ethnic group. 
The Melanesian culture has a significant impact in both Papua and PNG. 
These cultural ties create a common understanding. The Melanesian 
ethnicity bonds the peoples of PNG and Papua together which in this case 
have contributed to the support that Papuan activists are getting from their 
brothers in PNG. 
 
The ability to mix amongst themselves creates a problem for the 
government because the government often identifies Papuan activists as its 
locals. Indonesia also faces the same problem because they cannot identify 
Papuan activist’s due to being the same ethnic as Papua New Guineans. 
Demonstrations that occur in PNG often ignite supports in the neighboring 
Vanuatu and Nauru. Demonstrations often provoke the Indonesian 
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government to question PNG’s role in the issue however PNG denies 
having contributed directly to the demonstrations that occur in PNG and its 
neighboring Melanesian states. Basically, the civil societies of Melanesian 
states demand that Papua be given the right to be equal like them and that 
Papua should also be given the right to choose its path of destiny. 
When all individuals are seen as equal it follows that no person is 
deemed to be any better or any worse than any other person. That 
is, all should be seen as the same as far as rights and treatment are 
concerned. Given this understanding of equality as treating people in 
the same way, two important ideas follow for the democratic decision 
making (Catt, 1999). 
 
These refer to equality and respect in that no one should be deciding for 
another, which means all the people are expected to participate in decision 
making; no matter of their status within the civil society. Furthermore, the 
democratic system needs to cater for the involvement of participating 
members of the society. In this way, all will have the same chance to 
participate in the decision-making process. These refers to equality and 
respect that no one should be deciding for another, and all the people are 
expected to participate in decision making no matter of their status within 
the civil society. Furthermore, the democratic system needs to cater for the 
involvement of participating members of the society. In this way, all will have 
the same chance to participate in the decision-making process. 
 
Civil society in this case, refers to both individuals and organizations. Non-
governmental organizations or NGOs are also part of the civil society. In 
relations to the Papuan issue, there have been a number of NGOs 
supporting the Papuan plea for independence. The Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG) is one of the most influential NGO groups voicing its opinion 
through to the governments of Melanesian background. A basic example 
that can be used to show that civil society is part of the Papuan campaign 
in PNG is that because Papuans are given the freedom of speech, Papuan 
activists do small campaigns in public whereby the public is then conscious 
of what is happening in its surroundings. The Papuan activists in PNG are 
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made up of different groups. In PNG, it is known that there are several 
groups operating under the OPM but is almost impossible to identify 
whether the motive of the groups is in relation to Papuan Independence. 
There have been several Papuan leaders influencing the groups of civil 
society through campaigns such as carrying out awareness about Papuan 
independence and human rights violations in Papua. These campaigns are 
often being broadcast on television stations such as EM TV a national 
television company and the NBC (National Broadcasting Commission) radio 
station and often published in daily newspapers. This form of campaign is 
highly productive in a democratic state such as PNG because the citizens 
are being directly engaged with the issue, therefore, it is where civil society 
comes in with opinions as to why and how the government should deal with 
the Papuan people.  
 
The civil society often comes up with strong reasons that PNG is a 
Melanesian state, therefore: it should be leading the campaign for an 
independent Papua. There have been other reasons that state that because 
PNG is a Christian country, it should also give support to its fellow Christian 
brothers of Papua to form an independent state. As a result, the Papuan 
issue is also known to gain the support from churches in PNG through its 
joint programs with churches from Papua. The Churches have been working 
together to find solutions to solve the Papuan issue. The exchange studies 
of church leaders in PNG and Papua have strengthened the relationship 
amongst churches to voice out their opinions. Churches have always been 
supporting the Papuan case because of the brutal violence that the 
Indonesian military often carries out in the name of national security.  It is 
simply the tortures and abuses that occur in Papua which concerns the 
churches to work together to find a solution to put an end to those bad 
practices. It is politer to say that religion also plays a part in creating a 
supportive part of the civil society. 
 
It is important to know that civil society places an influential role in foreign 
policy in PNG. The role that the civil society places directly puts pressure 
on the government. When the pressure increases, the government often 
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fails to select its objectives because the civil society has a very strong 
impact on the decision making. Civil society does not make the policies; 
however, they have the right to protest against the government policies. In 
PNG case, it often occurs that PNG’s civil society has the power to make 
the government fail to implement its policies on Papua. It is impossible to 
mobilize the means of achieving its goals because the civil society tends to 
slow down the process. As a result, the policies are often not implemented 
because civil society together with the political elites appear to force the 
government not to implement. Sometimes the failure to implement comes 
with the help of certain political elites who are linked to the civil society.  
 
4.3 Democracy and Foreign Policy Making 
The end of the War in 1945 seemed to make the world safe for democracy. 
New nations evolved with a democratic system and PNG was also among 
those nations. Democracies tend to have a greater support compared to 
authoritarian regimes because democracies may also be more responsive 
to public opposition to certain policies, changing course or modifying them 
consistent with public opinion. One difference in democratic governments is 
that in democratic governments public opinion is highly considered whereas 
it is not considered in authoritarian regimes. The process of foreign policy 
making in PNG is linked with a democratic system of government. Today a 
majority of the world’s governments are democratic including PNG and 
Indonesia. With the exception that both PNG and Indonesia are democratic 
states, it can be seen clearly that “democracy plays a central role in foreign 
policy (Pahre, 2006). Besides, authoritarian regimes play a central role in 
foreign policy because there is only one actor which is the government. It is 
also common in authoritarian regimes that public opinion is not considered.  
In PNG and Indonesia’s case, democracy acts as guidelines to foreign 
policy whereby each state and its citizens are involved in shaping their 
national interest towards achieving their goals. In addition, PNG was 
democratically guided by Australia. Australia is the most influential state in 
PNG’s development both prior to independence and post-independence. 
Especially in the early years of PNG independence, Australia guided PNG 
on special matters of foreign policy such as border issues with Indonesia 
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because Australia was afraid that Indonesia’s expansion under the 
communist regime of President Sukarno and then later the authoritarian 
regime of President Suharto, might invade PNG. 
 
Today, PNG is an independent state with a democratic system of 
government which more or less adopts and implements its foreign policy 
like any other democratic state. It is assumed that all the decisions taken, 
including the process of foreign policy making, are based on democracy. In 
the context of Papuan separatism, it is important to understand the process 
of PNG foreign policy making in order to be able to understand the PNG-
Indonesian relationship in regard to the Papuan separatism issue, although 
PNG and Indonesia are democratic states that share a similar attribute. It is 
perhaps premature to say that they are similar and that there should be no 
problem in handling certain issues such as the Papuan issue. In 
democracies, the implementations remain different depending on its 
interests. The Papuan separatism issue has shown that even democracies 
face difficulties in implementing their foreign policies because policies are 
vulnerable to change at any time. 
 
In linguistic terms, “democracy is derived from the Greek demokatia that can 
be broken down into demos meaning the people and kratos meaning 
rule”(Catt, 1999). In summary democracy means “rule by the people” which 
basically implies that decision making is guided by the will of the people. 
Democracy is also used to mean a set of rights or an entire way of 
organizing the political and economic life of a state. Democracy is also used 
in governments in order to reach collective decisions with the participation 
of its citizens. In line with democracy and its gradual acceptance are the 
basic ideas of “equality and individual liberty” and what these concepts 
entail (Catt, 1999). 
 
PNG’s a member of the Commonwealth of Nations joins British and 
Australia alongside many other countries by having a democratic 
parliamentary system of government, although most Commonwealth 
members do not have parliamentary systems and many are not 
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democracies. In parliamentary democracies, the government is led by the 
Prime Minister as the leader elected based on a democratic voting system 
to lead the government. There is sometimes a coalition of political parties 
forming the government. On the other hand, the opposition is led by the 
opposition Leader who maybe a candidate for prime minister who failed to 
gather the majority of votes. Normally the losing candidate automatically 
forms the opposition to counter the government’s policies. This type of 
leadership contributes significantly to the domestic and foreign policy 
making because the parliament has to decide based on the valid guidelines 
of democracy to achieve an outcome. 
Each country has its own procedures, each claiming to be democratic 
but based on a distinctive mix of beliefs about what is important for 
democracy, what is feasible and what is acceptable to the population 
(Catt, 1999). 
In this type of leadership, it is common to have debates in parliament to 
consider a certain outcome as its policies. In PNG, it is common that 
domestic and foreign policies are debated in parliament before they are 
implemented. The reason that a debate is held is to encourage the members 
of parliament to have a chance to express their views. It is through these 
debates that the public become aware of the dynamics of the issues. The 
final outcome should be in the best interest of the government in working 
towards achieving its goals. It is said that “Democracy at home shapes 
foreign policy making” (Catt, 1999). With the presence of democratic norms 
in domestic politics it sets the foundation for foreign policy to build up. For 
PNG’s case, democratic norms have been dominating the policy making 
since independence. Despite the efforts of the PNG government in making 
sure that its domestic and foreign policies are set to bring the best outcomes 
especially on the Papuan separatism issue. PNG has to an extent fallen 
short of achieving that goal. Research has shown that; 
There were plenty of policy recommendations and ample policy 
making. There was also considerable interest and funding from 
donors. But policy design and implementation were often poor while 
consistent political support from top decision makers was not 
forthcoming (May, 2013). 
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It seems that the PNG government is supporting the Papuan separatist 
movement because the PNG government often violates its foreign policy 
aims as stated in the beginning of this chapter. Another reason would be 
that the PNG government’s domestic policy tends to collide with its foreign 
policy when it comes to implementations of policies. In other words, the PNG 
government sees domestic policies as more important than its foreign 
policy, despite the recognition of the Papuan separatism issue as an integral 
issue of Indonesia, PNG’s domestic policy in reality is totally opposite to its 
foreign policy.  
Under PNG’s democratic governments, several potentially useful 
reforms have not been implemented, either because senior public 
officials or politicians were unsympathetic to changes proposed or 
were inhibited by inertia, or because the resources needed to effect 
change were not provided, or because the proposed changes had 
not been adequately communicated to personnel down the line of 
command (May, 2013). 
 
It is important to note that in democratic governments such as PNG, national 
interest remains the most important aspect. Despite the importance, on the 
other hand it is also important to understand that “democracies differ from 
one another” (Pahre, 2006). In democracies, citizens are regarded as an 
important part because it is through citizen’s disagreements that democracy 
is actually born. Despite the important role of citizens in democratic 
governments, “many observers have argued that democracy is somehow 
bad for foreign policy” (Pahre, 2006). 
 
The presence of democracy clearly shows that the PNG government has 
selected its objectives as a means to secure its national interest based on 
its relations to Indonesia. Regarding the objective of foreign policy, since 
independence, PNG has come up with different foreign policies on different 
issues concerning its national interest. With an independent democratic 
system of government, PNG has always implemented its policies both its 
foreign and domestic policies based on the nuances of democracy. Despite 
 136 
the successes of repetitive foreign policies by the PNG government, the 
most crucial foreign policy issue within the history of PNG foreign policy is 
the issue of Papuan Independence which is subjected to Indonesia. 
 
Papua’s plea for independence has surely put the PNG foreign policy to test 
because in reality PNG’s foreign policy is a straight forward policy aimed at 
recognizing the Papuan issue with respect to Indonesian sovereignty. PNG 
has always treated the Papuan issue as an integral issue of Indonesia. 
Although there have been certain failures, PNG foreign policy has always 
been designed to favour Indonesia and at the same to build trust and 
cooperation, aimed at maintaining a good relationship. The better the 
relationship between PNG and Indonesia, the more chances there are for 
PNG to benefit. PNG foreign policy is conducted in accordance to 
democratic norms and guidelines whereby the government decides to 
pursue its national interests in a more transparent and public manner. The 
formation of PNG foreign policy is based on its universal approach which is 
aimed to make PNG a friend to all countries. This approach also includes 
Indonesia. The PNG foreign policy is made by the political elites by setting 
their objectives in order to acquire a set of rules that can be implemented 
as guidelines to in dealing with the Papuan issue. In relations to the issue, 
the PNG government aims to protect its integrity by refusing to support the 
Papuan independence movement. PNG foreign policy is created by the 
elites or the National Executive Council aimed to secure its national interest. 
Foreign policy passes three levels of government before it is finally 
implemented.  
• The National Government 
• The Provincial Government 
• Local Level Government 
 
After PNG, foreign policy is made and finalize then later it is being handed 
over to provincial governments to be executed. The provincial government 
later passes down the policies to the local level governments and then to 
the district administrators to be implemented. In a democracy like PNG it is 
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normal and also welcomed by the government to get the civil society 
involved in deciding its domestic and foreign policies. The citizens are 
welcome to make known their ideas and opinions before the decision 
making process. Political elites are specialists who also have a say in policy 
making including political parties with their own interests. Also involved are 
government departments who are involved based on the issue of concern. 
Not forgetting the NGO’s who work tirelessly to voice the unheard voices of 
a particular group of the civil society. It is important that we classify the levels 
of power that is basically found in PNG. 
Figure 4.1 The pyramid of the distribution power 
  
 
According to the diagram above, it can be seen that in PNG, political elites 
do have an influential role in the making of both domestic and foreign policy. 
Here, elites tend to have a greater influence on the resources that are 
available. Not only do they dominate the business sector, however, in the 
case of PNG these elites also contribute to the making of policies. Political 
elites are made up of major politcal figures like the Prime Minister, members 
of the cabinet, other higher ranking officials, major businessmen and high 
ranking military official who make up the higher level of the pyramid.  
 
The second layer of the pyramid is made up of members of the provincial 
government, city administrators and leaders of the important organizations. 
The last level of the pyramid is made up of the civil society which is the 
general public. The general public in PNG do not have the power to make 
decisions, however, it has the power to raise concerns or to influence the 
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government to make decisions. PNG’s approch to the Papuan issue can be 
said that it implies a democratic approach in implementing its domestic and 
foreign policies. The permission for Papuan activists to be permissive 
residents in PNG have showed that even though PNG is against the Papuan 
struggle for independence, it cannot just close its eyes on the Papuan 
people. PNG is aware that Papuans are culturally blinded, therefore, it can 
not completely turn its back on its own race.  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that even though PNG’s foreign policy towards 
Indonesia says that PNG has nothing to do with Papuan separatism, still 
behind its foreign policy PNG gives space for Papuans to interact with local 
communities even to the extant of forming groups who are sympathetic to 
Papuan separatism. This actions has simply shows that PNG still supports 
Papuans, however, the support is not transparent enough to be an evidence 
of failure or sometimes it can be said that the support appears to be a result 
of a democratic government applying a democratic approach in its foreign 
policy. Papuans live and interact alongside with Papua New Guineans on a 
daily basis. Papuans are also given the right to education and the freedom 
of speech whereas in this case, it completely gives the Papuans the 
advantage to participate in voting during the election period. All these rights 
that are being granted to Papuan people are part of the democratic norms 
which are implemeted by the PNG government. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
As a Papuan born in Papua New Guinea to parents who were part of the 
great influx of refugees that fled into PNG territory in the 1980s, it has 
provided the drive and motivation to explicitly and sincerely express ideas 
and viewpoints regarding this research entitled: ‘Indonesia-PNG border 
security’. The writing of this research has no doubt brought back many fond 
memories of my early life and struggles as a Papuan refugee living in PNG. 
It all started from the concentrated refugee camps situated along the border, 
in the hostile jungles of PNG’s Sandaun and Western provinces to 
eventually finding the comforts of Port Moresby, the capital of PNG. Indeed, 
it’s not easy to explain the causes of history, especially to have lived and 
experienced life in exile for most of my early childhood period. However, it 
can be understood that all of these experiences together with the 
experiences of other Papuans have provided the basic reasons for Papuans 
that chose to escape the brutal occupation of Suharto’s authoritarian 
regime. Nevertheless, growing up as a Papuan refugee in PNG territory 
provided different challenges for survival and opportunities in education. 
Thankfully, the PNG government recognizes the rights of individuals and it 
made it a priority to house the Papuan refugees by providing food and 
education. PNG was generous enough to take in refugees while at the same 
time PNG had to face difficulties in maintaining a good relationship with 
Indonesia, especially during the Suharto era. 
 
Among all the experiences from living in PNG, till moving back to Jayapura-
Papua in 2007, one thing remains a great privilege. It was the chance to 
have ever witnessed the brilliance and kindness of the early generation of 
Papuan leaders, who are indebted to the internationalization of the Papuan 
separatism conflict. In fact, to be able to grow up amidst some of Papua’s 
finest leaders such as the Late Mr. (Bapak) Clemens Runawery and Late 
Mr. (Bapak) Wilhelm Zonggonau was arguably the moment that had shaped 
and given meaning to a struggle of identity that in reality was somewhat 
unreachable to Papuans. Overall, such experiences have also installed the 
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purpose to understand and inherit a sense of belonging that simply referred 
to a certain ethnicity (Melanesian) that until today has never stopped fighting 
to reclaim what rightfully belongs to their ancestors and their generations to 
come. The land of Papua remains to motivate the young Papuan generation 
about the values of human dignity and the right to freedom which is the 
reason why the Papuan fight for self-determinations has never stopped.  
 
Nonetheless, spending my early childhood education in PNG provided the 
basic knowledge to understand the role of PNG within the Papuan separatist 
conflict. Moreover, it provided more background knowledge to analyze the 
role of the Papuan conflict itself on border security and the impacts it had 
on the overall relationship status of Indonesia and PNG. However, it is 
important to consider that the sensitivity that lay behind this topic has 
provided difficulties in gathering and analyzing up to date information and 
references, apart from the references that have been considered. It is also 
important to note that there is also not much research on the topic itself. 
Furthermore, the availability of references was also limited from both 
Indonesia and PNG. Since the Suharto era, not much information on 
domestic issues and especially on border security is perceived to be valid. 
The ban on foreign journalists and researchers in Papua and West Papua 
had a great impact on the availability of research materials. Despite the 
changes in the government system from Suharto’s new order towards 
SBY’s term in office, there is still very little research done in this field. Other 
researchers have been forced to comply with certain terms in order to be 
published. Accordingly, such restrictions have also limited the scope of this 
research. 
 
Despite such deficiencies, decades of instability and violence instigated by 
the Indonesian military rule in Papua has in reality resulted in more than five 
hundred thousand deaths of both men and women of all ages. Many 
Papuans have vanished into the earth without any trace. The violations 
caused by the Indonesian military is the main reason why Papuans never 
trust Indonesians. Whether it be government or people, Papuans have 
learned that surely identity is worth protecting. Although the Papuan 
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struggle has claimed many lives, Papuans still consider fighting for their 
indigenous rights as inhabitants of the Melanesian island of Papua. The 
Island of Papua is known for its rich natural resources, diverse culture and 
traditions. Papuans have been trying to protect the resources but today, it 
is the Indonesian government that has the power to decide. These are some 
of the basic factors that Papuans demand. The Indonesian government has 
dealt with the same demands for a long time however, different 
governments have failed to answer same questions.  
 
As an ex-refugee living on a permissive residential status for over 20 years 
in PNG, it was certainly challenging to be brought up under such immense 
political and psychological conditions as a young child. It is understood that 
morally, the Papuan issue was something most Papuans found to be part 
of their daily routines. Papuan refugees in PNG are used to gathering in 
groups; every Papuans knew themselves. Different from PNG, the Papuan 
refugees in PNG treated each other as family. The bond they formed in exile 
was something the Indonesian government nor the PNG government could 
ever take away from them. The bond to come together and celebrate family 
gatherings, Easter or Christmas was considered important moments. 
Nonetheless it is from this bond that the Papuan struggle continues to be 
voiced. It can be concluded that such bond has also developed over the 
Indonesian and PNG border. The bond between Melanesian brothers, PNG 
and Papuan people has greatly benefited the existence of the OPM along 
the border. Therefore, both Indonesia and PNG will never ever succeed in 
addressing the security issues along the border.  
 
The bond between Papuans, and Papua New Guineans is just one of the 
many reasons that continues to remind them of their existence as refugees 
in PNG. Meetings after meetings of senior Papuan leaders were held in 
PNG throughout the 80s and 90s as a sign of hope for the struggle for 
Papua’s self-determination. Subsequently, the younger generation of 
Papuans who were born in PNG found themselves entangled within the 
doctrines of Papuan nationalism and separatism. Nevertheless, the Papuan 
it seems the Papuan conflict is here to stay for a long time. The challenge 
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remains in the hands of Indonesia and PNG. Whether or not the conflict will 
stop will depend on the policies that decision makers from both sides come 
up with. The designing of border policies will actually need to consider the 
overall development of the Papuan conflict from both the domestic and 
international point of view. 
 
Today, the dynamics of Papuan politics has managed to influence both the 
internal and external spheres of interests. Papua’s current political map 
shows that there are more and more international parties interested to 
support the Papuan struggle. The involvement of international actors would 
mean that the Papuan struggle will set sights on yet another milestone. To 
Papuans it will definitely mean that there has been progress. The idea of 
progress will be interpreted to be a success. The meaning of success in this 
context will then trigger more and more support. The support that occurs 
domestically in Papua will definitely be countered with force by the 
Indonesian authorities. Despite the involvement of the TNI and Police, 
Papuans will move forward to fight their rights under the Papuan autonomy 
constitution with reference to the declaration of human rights. Nonetheless, 
the domestic tensions will trigger wider public involvement thus activing the 
OPM wing that operates along the border to add more pressure on the 
Indonesian authorities.  
 
The links between domestic instabilities and border security incidents have 
illustrated strong indications that both factions of the struggle cannot 
correspond with each other. The idea behind the border incidents is actually 
to portray the OPM’s power, in addition to the developments of Papuan 
politics in the international arena. OPMs back in Papua have taken the 
initiative to support one another. One way of showing support is simply to 
instigate border security issues. During the SBY period, there have been 
records of shooting done by the OPM along the border. This shows that 
even SBY could not provide the remedies needed as a solution to the 
prolonged struggle. At one stage border shootings occurred so often that 
the border market had to be closed by the Indonesian border authorities 
with consultations with the PNG border authority for safety reasons. Such 
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incidents illustrate the OPM’s role along the border. Despite Indonesia’s 
tireless diplomacy, the OPM as the resistance surely has the upper hand, 
because on various occasions the attacks that occurs along the border have 
caught both Indonesia and PNG surprise.  
 
In relation to the role of the OPM in the separatist conflict, it can be 
concluded that the Indonesia and PNG border has been a crucial factor in 
the OPM’s survival. Ever since PNG took over control of the responsibilities 
of its own border from Australia, PNG has dealt with the OPM. With respect 
to the border and its role, there are several factors that illustrate the border’s 
importance: First, the border is the only line that distinguishes Indonesia and 
PNG’s territorial integrity and national jurisdictions. Second, the border has 
been a line of protection to the tens of thousands of Papuan refugees who 
fled the province during the Suharto era. Third, the border extends both 
internal and external security threats to both Indonesia and PNG due to the 
existence of the OPM (third party). Fourth, the geographical features of the 
border make it difficult to cover the exact area of the border, which tends to 
become the weak points that are continually used by the armed resistance. 
Finally, Indonesia’s massive military size, border patrols and surveillances 
have often resulted in border incursion, which has often sparked concerns 
from PNG and its citizens.  
 
Nonetheless, security concerns surrounding Indonesia and PNG’s common 
border will remain to become the most sensitive and dangerous issue 
affecting their relationship in the decades to come. In addition, the separatist 
conflict in Papua has been around long enough to establish itself as one of 
the most complicated and serious political and humanitarian conflicts of the 
modern era. Although the relationship between Indonesia and PNG has 
strengthened and flourished over the years, it seems that the issue of 
Papuan separatism will remain to be the prominent factor in determining 
stability and development between the relationship of both countries. In fact, 
Papuan separatism is the only problem that stands between the 
governments of Indonesia and PNG and the challenge to further harness a 
fruitful relationship. Basically, the issue of Papuan separatism will increase 
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border insurgencies and tension between the TNI the PNGDF and the OPM 
if not carefully managed. 
 
Accordingly, such effects would encourage military build-up on the 
Indonesian side, which is something both Indonesia and PNG have tried so 
hard to eliminate over the years. Indeed, the increasing presence of the 
OPM continued with border threats will suggest to the TNI of the need to 
increase its military power along the border. The PNGDF will not counter 
Indonesian power because of its size and incompetency. PNG will look to 
maintain further cooperation with Indonesia by adhering to formally cut 
down on the OPM’s activities on PNG soil. This is not to say the PNGDF is 
incapable of covering its borders, however, PNG would see the diplomatic 
approach as the best option to negotiate terms and conditions. The 
government of PNG through the PNGDF has occasionally showed the OPM 
that it does tolerate such irresponsible acts. This includes several raids on 
the OPM camps that was conducted on the PNG side with consultations 
with the TNI.  
 
The relationship between TNI and the PNGDF will prosper in the coming 
years despite the vulnerability along the border. The recent joint navy 
program between the Indonesian Navy and the PNGDGF Navy along the 
cost of Sumatera illustrates the willingness to cooperate. In addition, the 
regional security condition will enhance Indonesia and PNG relations, thus 
catering for the cooperation of both the military and the police. Overall, this 
will see huge changes within the relationship of Indonesia and PNG. 
Developments of this kind need to accommodate local tolerance and 
changes within the ideology and frameworks that have been constituting 
border security policies. Future cooperation between the PNGDF and TNI 
will definitely be subjected to public condemnation, especially to the PNG 
public due to their restless support for the Papuan issue.   
 
Moreover, the separatist conflict in Papua has proved on many occasions 
that the Indonesia and PNG border is quite vulnerable. Attacks from the 
OPM have on several occasions, ended with a cross fire between the TNI, 
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the police and the OPM.  Furthermore, domestic instabilities such as 
violence, anarchy and chaos that result from peaceful demonstrations and 
protests in Papua will of course become the subject of the deteriorating 
border cooperation if the OPM’s involvement along the border is to be 
intensified.  Moreover, it will affect the general relationship of Indonesia and 
PNG will. The Papuan separatism issue has strong connections to the 
border and therefore will encourage other related problems such as illegal 
border crossings, illegal transactions of drugs and narcotics, illegal 
transactions of firearms and motor cycles and other economic goods if not 
carefully dealt with by decision makers. In reality, the Papuan conflict is 
more than capable of sabotaging and ruining the relationship of Indonesia 
and PNG. In fact, the Papuan separatism issue can also ruin Indonesia’s 
international reputation.  
 
Furthermore, the issue of Papuan separatism will be highly subjected to 
impact the level of security along the border despite the continuity of annual 
bilateral talks between Indonesia and PNG. Bilateral talks between 
Indonesia and PNG will need to discuss more on the solutions part instead 
of discussing more on the problems. Border security issues remain a high 
priority issue in the annual bilateral meetings. Despite of its importance, both 
countries have failed to provide clear and tangible outcome to counter the 
issue. There is a strong need to further involve specialists on border security 
issues to provide first had advice on how to tackle various types of border 
threats. In most case, the bilateral meetings are boring because it covers 
the same topic has the previous meeting. If this is the case then border 
security issues will remain influential regardless of annual border meetings. 
In this case, both the Indonesian and PNG decision makers need to meet 
more often so that border meetings will cater for mutual solutions.   
 
Moreover, the Indonesia-PNG border security will also be determined by 
external factors that result from ongoing international campaigns. Papua’s 
international campaigns on human rights issues have regained worldwide 
recognition, and has proved to be effective in stirring up the domestic 
political conditions in Papua. Developments in the Melanesian Spearhead 
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Group (MSG) has sent a very strong signal to policy makers that externally, 
the issues do impact domestic security in Papua. The research identifies 
that when domestic security in Papua is threatened causing instabilities, the 
activities of the OPM along the border usually simultaneously intensify. 
Furthermore, the involvement of the NGOs and other concerned political 
elites has also proved to provide hope. In separatism conflicts hope is 
known to immensely provide the moral boost toward the fighting spirit, thus 
the issue of separatism is not an easy issue to contain in the short term.  
 
The issue of separatism has been around long enough that it has 
emotionally blended to become the part and parcel of Papuan lives. 
Papuans that hold peaceful demonstrations in the towns across Papua are 
exposed to the high risk of being detained by the TNI and the Indonesian 
police. In this case, when a Papuan is being detained, it actually forces 
different forms of retaliations from the other Papuans. For instance, if 
member of the community or the protesting group of Papuans is being 
attacked and arrested by the Indonesian security forces then the other 
Papuans will demand his release. The demands will first peacefully be 
relayed to the related authorities, however, when the authorities fail to 
consider a solution the people then becomes violent. The violence that 
occurs here is purposely to protest their democratic rights, however, some 
peaceful demonstrations does actually violate the existing laws and 
regulations that have been enshrine in Indonesia 1945 constitution. 
 
For several years the peaceful demonstrations tend to affect the activities 
of other Papuans or the general public. The demonstrators will need to be 
reminded by the TNI and police that their actions have put someone 
innocent in danger. In this case, sometimes there is a misunderstanding 
between the TNI, the police and the demonstrating group. To the 
demonstrating group it is their right to democratically protest, however to the 
TNI and police their protest have violated the constitution because it a form 
of disturbance. Such misunderstandings tend to ignite conflicts, when the 
situation is in an uproar, someone instigates it by shooting a firecracker to 
the police or throwing rocks at the TNI this is when further chaos happens. 
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The sort of violence that occurs on the streets in Papua mainly in Jayapura 
is quickly communicated to the OPM along the border and in a response the 
OPM along the border tries cause inconvenience. The main purpose of this 
acts by the OPM is to attract international attention. The ULMWP, the OPM 
and other related organization hopes that through these acts there will be 
more recognition on the Papuan issue.   
 
Indeed, special autonomy has provided legal terms for the conduct of 
peaceful rallies and protests. However, the protests are sometimes being 
manipulated by other groups within Papua that support the ULMWP’s 
progress in the MSG. International coordination among the ULMWP and 
other sub organization of pro Independence supporters have in recent times 
proofed vital to the conditions of domestic politics and security. Indonesia 
and PNG’s border security and the issue of Papuan separatism does 
somewhat correspond with each other, the correlation found between them 
has by far become the basis of the ongoing security threats instigated along 
the common border ever since the birth of the resistance. The presence of 
the OPM along the border has increased the level of suspicion from the 
Indonesian government.  
 
The Indonesian government has accused the PNG government for allowing 
OPMs to operate from PNG soil. Recent attacks and hostage taking from 
the OPM along the border has increased the level of security concerns 
because the OPM has increased its game along the border. Even though 
Indonesia and PNG continues to engage themselves in attempts to counter 
the resistance it seems that their cooperation needs more focus on building 
trust between governments. More specifically this thesis seeks to answer 
the research question “How internal and external factors affect the making 
of Indonesian policy in dealing with separatism and its impacts on border 
security”. After analyzing the relationship of Indonesia and PNG based on 
the achievements of their border policies, the thesis has drawn the following 
conclusions.  
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the Papuan conflict has remained one of the hottest political issues in 
Indonesia for over 5 decades, including the era of President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. The issue of separatism in Papua has been one of 
the main issues threatening Indonesia’s domestic political stability and 
international political influence. Today, the conflict remains a massive 
problem for Indonesia because of the number of interests surround the 
issue and in addition, the number of interested parties willing to be involved. 
The more other countries and organization are involved the more 
complicated the Papuan issues becomes. Despite the wrong doings of the 
Suharto era, which has claimed the lives of thousands of Papuans and also 
left Papuan psychologically affected, the Indonesian government under 
President SBY has not actually done enough to provide the solutions to the 
Papuan conflict.  
 
The Indonesian government under SBY promised to change its policies 
from a security oriented policy to an economically driven approach in Papua. 
The change was focused to encourage more developments in the economic 
sector which will increase the involvement of local Papuans. The aim of the 
change is to downplay the role of the TNI while encouraging more local 
participation in sectors such as agriculture and livestock, tourism, farming 
and small businesses across both Papua and West Papua provinces. 
Another aim of the SBY government was to adversely remove the stigmas 
behind the TNI and set a positive image internationally. Despite the 
willingness from the SBY administrations to increase investments and 
focusing its policies on further developing the economic sector in Papua, in 
reality the situation was far worse than what they had expected. Papuans 
were showing signs to refuse the autonomy funding with reasons that 
Jakarta was systematically giving and taking back the money to Jakarta 
through its development programs. 
 
Moreover, the constitution on special autonomy promised huge sum of 
funding for Papua’s political and economic and social development. 
Accordingly, the program would last for twenty-five years of Indonesian 
developments in Papua. Papua’s huge autonomy budgets created more 
 149 
problems. Problems such as corruption and mismanagement of funds were 
rather usual. As result the situation in Papua become more complicated 
because a lot of funding has been credited into Papua with very little 
supervision. Many programs were designed to increase the welfare of the 
Papuan people which prompted the government to speed up developments 
and infrastructure in Papua and West Papua provinces. Despite the huge 
allocation of autonomy funding throughout both the Papuan provinces, the 
lack of human resources has been one of the issues that affects the 
outcome of programs. Papua’s human resources are lack the capabilities to 
manage and use the funds appropriately. One thing the central government 
wasn’t aware off was that autonomy in itself has been known to increase 
more difficulties in the relationship between Jakarta and Jayapura. Local 
Papuan elites were who are in charge at the provincial government to some 
extent pretend to overlook these problems.  
 
Another important factor that contributes toward instability in Papua is the 
function of the DPRP (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Provinsi - Provincial 
House of Representatives). The DPRP has in many occasion fail to fulfil its 
functions as the people’s representatives. In fact, the DPRP has not been 
able to play its function to accommodate the interests of the local Papuan 
people such as focusing on the realization of laws and regulations which 
are interpreted within the actual implementation of the Papua’s autonomy. 
The DPRP has also played very little role in determining border security 
policies. One of the main reason is because the lack of professionalism and 
commitment to address security related issues with PNG.  On the other 
hand, there are indications that the government of SBY did not run the 
special autonomy with a vengeance that is visible from the efforts of the 
government to just splash out huge sum of money as the answer to the 
ongoing conflict in Papua. The situation in Papua is becoming more and 
more complicated because of the magnitude of demands from the 
community. Other groups also take advantage to voice their demands which 
purposely aims to acquire Independence. The impact of the protracted 
relationship has in such a way attracted more international attention such 
as the US Congress that raised concerns of Papua’s status or even when 
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dozens of Papuans who seek asylum to PNG, Australia, Vanuatu or 
Solomon Islands. This indicates that there is a serious problem in Papua 
but not well handled by the government.  
 
Since the implementation of government policies are inconsistent and does 
not provide Papua with long term solution, therefore the conflict in Papua 
remains active. Indonesia and PNG’s relationship has remained cordial 
regardless of the threats that occur along the border. Their stable 
relationship has been accredited to PNG’s recognition of the Papuan conflict 
as an Indonesian domestic issue. PNG’s commitment to refrain from 
addressing the Papuan conflict has been highly appreciated by Indonesia. 
Indonesia and PNG as members of the UN have undertaken the need to 
respect each other’s sovereignty, meaning there will be no interference. As 
supporting evidence the PNG government has maintained its position by 
addressing its foreign policy to officially request the Indonesian government 
to withdraw all its military operations form PNG soil, PNG vows to further 
crack down on OPM elements operating in PNG soil, PNG considers OPM 
elements who operate on PNG soil as illegal immigrants and will be 
subjected to deportation, stop PNG locals from providing basic support to 
them to the Papuans.  
 
The insignificance and inaccuracy of the government in implementing 
policies for Papua is also illustrated from the lack of government regulations. 
Government regulations fail to comprehend and provide support in the 
realization Papua’s special autonomy. In practice the central government, 
breaks its own rules that exist in the constitution of the special autonomy. 
For instance, the central government prohibits the expression of identity 
from within Papuan communities. Such expressions and aspirations are 
regarded as intolerable by the government because it is seen as acts of 
separatism. The decision to bypass the autonomy and to take matters into 
their own hands as at times deteriorate relations between the Papuan 
people and the central government. The Indonesian government is known 
to have violate its own constitution in Papua therefore it has become the 
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basis of the conflict. Thus, many local Papuans consider to be free and 
independent than being ruled by the ruthless government of Indonesia.  
 
Of the discrepancy, it looks clear that the government policy has not been 
able to facilitate the basic needs of communities regarding development, 
access to political expression, identity, and security in Papua. Meanwhile, 
to solve problems that exist, the view between the government and the 
people of Papua are clearly different. This has been a result of poor 
government policies simply do not match in terms of Papua, thus, igniting 
the need to fight for self-determination. Indeed, poor government policy 
toward Papua have been the result of the ongoing fight for self-
determination. As long as the central government continues to reject the 
peoples’ aspirations for self-determination, human rights violations or other 
historical claims. The people of Papua will continue to sue the Indonesian 
government.  
 
As a recommendation to the Indonesian government; Firstly, it is absolutely 
vital to enhance internal cooperation between the provincial and the regional 
border authorities in Papua. The enhancement cooperation the provincial 
border authorities will provide the basic platform for the further 
enhancement cooperation with the national border authority BNPP (Badan 
Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan). Such cooperation will allow for a concrete 
internal cooperation that will involve all aspects of like the CIQS (Customs, 
Immigration, Quarantine, Security). A solid internal cooperation is likely to 
be the best counter solution to the existing external threat. The coordination 
should intimately involve authorities such as the TNI and the police from 
various posts along the border.  
 
Secondly, Indonesia needs to continue its efforts to maintain a high quality 
of relationship with PNG. The relationship needs to be natured without 
sacrificing the national interest of Indonesia. It is also vital to consider the 
aspects of diplomacy, not only the by the Indonesian representatives in 
PNG but also through the bureaucrats that are in charge of the border 
authorities in Papua province. In this case, it referrers to the BPPKLN (the 
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border and international cooperation board of Papua Province) both in the 
provincial and regional level in order to support the management of the 
border and the relationship of Indonesia and PNG. The relationship of 
Indonesia and PNG needs to be enhanced with mechanisms that will allow 
for more intergovernmental cooperation that will mutually benefit their 
relationship. Overall their security cooperation between Indonesia and PNG 
needs to be further enhanced in order to cater for mutual trust, including the 
responsibility to secure the entire Indonesia PNG border.  
 
In addition, the Indonesian border authorities in Papua especially the 
BPPKLN should also focus on developing the human resources along the 
border. Infrastructural developments have been the main focus during the 
SBY period has managed to transform the border into a more urban outlook. 
Despite the progress in border developments there is still some weakness. 
The main weakness in maintaining a strong border cooperation with PNG is 
the role and function in developing the border area. The problem of 
coordination and planning is vital to the implementation of development 
programs along the border. So far, the level of cooperation and planning 
has not yet reached its full capacity. The overall infrastructural 
developments along the Indonesia PNG border has not yet reached its 
maximum capacity because not all the areas along the border will be 
developed. In maintaining a crucial role in the development of its 
relationship with PNG, Indonesia has to optimize the role of the national 
border agency. The national border agency should in this case be the 
highest in commend to make sure that all the policies are being 
implemented to serve the national interest. The national border agency 
(BNPP) should be the sole institution tasked to coordinate border security 
and developments with other related Ministries such as the Coordinating 
Ministry for Security and Justice, the TNI and the police etc. it also needs to 
implement a system of monitoring and evaluating in order to minimize the 
potential failures while addressing priority issues such as border 
cooperation.  
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In PNG’s case, firstly it recognizes that Papua is an integral part of 
Indonesia. Therefore, PNG as an active member of the United Nations is 
obliged to respect the sovereignty of Indonesia. In its official foreign policy 
to Indonesia PNG has officially stated that it will; Request that the 
Indonesian government withdraw all its military operations from the territory 
of PNG; Crack down on the existence of the OPM; Consider members of 
the OPM in Papua New Guinea as illegal immigrants and will return them to 
the Indonesian authorities at the border; Order PNG citizens to stop their 
aid to the OPM as mention in chapter four. This has shown PNG’s interest 
in cooperating with Indonesia toward establishing a secure and trouble-free 
border.  
 
However, PNG has been facing difficulties in implementing its foreign and 
border policies due to internal factors that affect the processes of foreign 
policy making. Internal factors refer to factors that occur within the national 
government system such as government turnovers and frequent changes 
to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. These changes have 
caused instabilities within the state system. Frequent changes of senior 
departmental positions in turn affect the consistency of the national 
government’s aim to deal with the Papuan issue. In addition, the failure also 
rests upon the poor design and decision makings that often affect the 
implementation process. Outcomes were often poor because there is also 
less support from PNGs top decision makers.  
 
Elites also appear to have their own individual interests which often force 
policies to change course. PNG elites have an influence in dealing with the 
Papuan issue because it is also through this issue that PNG elites find fame. 
Nevertheless, political parties also have an important part to play within this 
issue because political elites represent the political parties in parliament 
therefore political elites often recommend their party’s interests in foreign 
policy making to pursuing their interests. The internal factor discussed 
above clearly influence the fact that PNG fails to implement strictly border 
policies to back its foreign policy statements. The presence of OPM 
members in PNG clearly shows that PNG fails to implement its border 
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policies because in the beginning PNG stated that it has nothing to do with 
Papuan separatism issue but in reality, PNG is it not strict with implementing 
its policies. In addition, the permissive resident status granted to the 
refugees automatically violates its original policy.  
 
Secondly, external factors refer to factors that contribute from outside the 
national government system such as the involvement of the media and the 
general public or the OPM activities that are carried out along the border. 
Like many other countries, the public is made aware of certain issues 
through the media. It is the media that plays an important role in keeping 
the public up to date with the latest news. The civil society does have direct 
influence to make decisions but the civil society has the right to know what 
decisions are made after long debates in parliament on the Papuan issue. 
The growing public support for Papuan separatism in PNG is a good 
example of the external factors that affect the PNG and Indonesian 
relationship. As part of the concerned civil society several NGO’s, churches 
and other public institutions have vowed to support the Papuan activists.  
 
In additions, there have been support for the cause of Papuan separatism 
from the Pacific that has been linked with Melanesian societies also has an 
impact in the making of PNG foreign policy. The supports from the 
Melanesian societies such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group has over 
the years given spirit and hopes to the Papuan activists to keep on 
struggling for independence. These supports from the civil society have as 
a whole the implementations of PNG foreign policy. So far PNG have not 
taken any major actions such as capturing and detaining Papuan activists 
who operate in PNG soil because of both failure and sympathetic 
governments that indirectly allows Papuan activists to carry out its 
campaigns in PNG.  
 
Thirdly, it can be stated that democracy plays a central part in relationship 
of PNG and Indonesia, in particularly the making of foreign and border 
policies. PNG and Indonesia are both democratic states. However, it can’t 
be said that both states have the same democratic system of government. 
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PNG has a parliamentary system of democracy which is led by the prime 
minister while Indonesia has a presidential system of government which is 
led by the president. Nevertheless, both states possess the same attributes 
which are based on the values and norms of democracy. Furthermore, both 
states are faced with the common need to make decisions as part of a 
democratic society. Democracy means ruled by the people and clearly 
points out the involvement of civil society in democracies. Since PNG’s 
independence, its relationship with Indonesia has so far been steady. Even 
though some-times situations go out of control along the border still both 
states have never used cohesive power as means of problem solving. 
 
Fourth and finally, over the years of their relationship PNG and Indonesia 
have been faced with the issue of Papuan separatism, so far, the one and 
only major issue affecting that relationship. The Papuan issue is capable of 
causing damage to the relationship. Moreover, the Papuan separatism 
issue still remains the most vital issue with the capacity to affect the border 
cooperation and the relationship of PNG and Indonesia in general. 
 
Despite neglecting to support the Papuan plea for self-determination in a 
direct manner, PNG have been contributing a lot to the development of 
Papuans. Today there are almost 10,000 Papuan refugees who reside in 
PNG with permissive residence status. The permissive residence status 
enables Papuans to participate in all sectors society and the economy. 
Several Papuans have proven to be amongst the top PNG elites. The failure 
to compromise with its foreign policy to Indonesia can’t be seen because 
there is no evidence to prove that PNG is directly supporting the Papuan 
separatists. If PNG was to completely say no to Papuans it would have 
implemented strict policies to limit the refugee’s activities in PNG. However, 
with respect to human rights and democratic norms the government of PNG 
has allowed the refugees to settle in PNG with the freedom like any other 
citizen of PNG to pursue their basic rights in PNG. Papuan children are 
given right to education while Papuan adults are given the chance to be part 
of the Papua New Guinean workforce. Although it is straight forward that 
PNG regards the Papuan separatism as a domestic issue of Indonesia and 
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that PNG denies allegations of supporting the Papuan separatism issue, it 
can also be seen that PNG has contributed a lot in shaping Papuans. The 
chance to live without fear and to forget their traumas, gives Papuans the 
edge to learn more and develop into becoming more productive people. The 
Papuans who are granted permissive residence do not belong to a particular 
state. PNG has accommodated them to live under the seal of PNG. The 
right to be protected and the right to be free is what PNG is lending to 
Papuan refugees for decades. 
 
PNG itself is faced with several challenges within its government bodies. 
Several turnovers of ministers and secretaries within the Departments of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs have contributed to the internal failure of policy 
implementation. PNGs internal problems such as the Sandline crisis which 
led to the military coup in 1997 after the PNG government under the 
leadership of Sir Julius Chan hired foreign mercenaries to fight in 
Bougainville shows a failure by the national government to maintain stability 
within the state itself. Over the years PNG has been facing difficulties in 
policy implementations. This is due to the lack of discipline from the 
members of parliament. Also amongst several reasons PNG was once said 
to have lost its capability to solve its problem because the function of the 
government has been designed to serve individual interests. In reality, the 
national government of PNG sets the foreign policy, later it is socialized to 
department secretaries who transfer it to several levels before it is finally 
being implemented. The corrupt use of power by certain politicians in the 
national executive council creates a misunderstanding amongst members. 
This misunderstanding is later transferred to the bureaucrats, then being 
transferred to other senior officers. The long line of political functions also 
turns to create a potential breakdown of communication which leads to the 
malfunction of individual political units. 
 
Internal political problems that occur in PNG also create more chances that 
a particular foreign policy can fail. PNG have been faced with several 
changes in the leadership roles. The changes in government also slow 
down the implementation process of foreign policy, in this case the PNG 
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foreign policy to Indonesia based on the Papuan separatism issue. As one 
leader steps, down and another takes his position there can be 
misunderstanding that could lead the end of that policy. Different individuals 
come up with different ideas based on different interests. It is common that 
nepotism becomes one of the main reasons of the unsuccessful 
implementation of foreign policies. Over the years PNG have been facing 
problems such a misappropriation of funds or corruption. This has also 
contributed to the downsizing of the public servants especially in the Foreign 
Affairs Department where it had to close several postings. It also contributes 
substantially to the Papuan issue because PNG has no capacity to come 
out clearly on the issue of Papuan struggle for determination because 
leaders have been corruptly using their power and also misusing public 
funds for personal interests.  
 
The Papuan issue has been used as a political tool when it comes to 
elections. A lot of elites see the Papuan issue as a good excuse to pursue 
political interests. Therefore, at most occasions political candidates give 
support for the Papuan issue only prior to elections. After elections, the 
Papuan issue usually disappears. The media also plays an important role 
in promoting the Papuan campaign. Several on air interviews with several 
leaders or activists is enough to pull some strings with the political arena. 
The main problem affecting the relationship of PNG and Indonesia is that 
Indonesia suspects PNG of being the breeding ground of Papuan activists. 
Indonesia sees PNG as not cooperating to its agreement. PNG on the other 
hand denies allegations of turning its back on Indonesia. Several 
agreements have been signed as part of the deal to maintain friendship and 
mutual cooperation based on common understanding. On the other hand, 
the Papuan cause is gaining more support from PNG elites and also several 
NGOs within PNG.  
 
Apart from this, also several churches have been committed to support the 
Papuan struggle. Despite the growing support caused by the external 
factors it can be concluded that the Papuan issue seems to be losing the 
interests of its Melanesian brothers of the Pacific in the long run. Support 
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from countries like Vanuatu and Nauru, who used to be vocal on the Papuan 
issue in international summits, are beginning to fade because these 
countries have been put up by the challenge of globalization. New trending 
topics such as climate change, natural disasters, and terrorism have been 
dominating the political arena therefore the Papuan struggle for self-
determination is losing support. Recently Vanuatu has accepted Indonesia 
as a special observer in the MSG, showing that Vanuatu is changing its 
course to pursue other interests with Indonesia.  
 
In order to avoid future conflicts PNG and Indonesia should enhance further 
cooperation in all sectors such as economy, social, political etc. By doing 
so, this could contribute to trust building and a stable environment in which 
Indonesia could have the chance to pursue its interests in the Pacific region 
while PNG could also have the chance to pursue its interests in ASEAN. 
Papua New Guinea’s acceptance that Papua is an integral part of Indonesia 
means that it would be Indonesia’s responsibility to find a better solution to 
solve the Papuan issue. PNG can help to facilitate in communicating with 
the refugees. It is Indonesia’s responsibility to meet the demands of the 
Papuan people. The best way would be to seek help from the international 
community to settle the Papuan separatism issue once and for all. PNG has 
made it plainly clear that it has nothing to do with the Papuan issue. 
Therefore, it is totally left to the Indonesian government to decide the future 
of Papua. 
 
In this case, it can be said that PNG failed to keep up to its foreign policy 
because it is still indirectly giving support to Papuans. On day to day basis 
Papuans are tolerated with freedom whereas in the foreign policy it is 
straight forward that PNG has nothing to do with the Papuan struggle for 
self-determination. It is premature to state that PNG is supporting the OPM 
because at the same time internal factors also affect PNGs foreign policy 
implementations. PNG is also faced with internal government problems of 
which corruption and nepotism are the main ones. Political parties also 
contribute to what failures of implementing foreign policy. Because new 
leaders come up with new expectations and new ideas which makes it hard 
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for the government to carry out its foreign policy. An example would be the 
change of ministers are sworn in to power the next day they fire their 
secretary then the secretary would be either a tribesman (wantok sistem) or 
a member of the same political party. 
 
Hence it can be seen like war amongst the government itself. Each member 
of the government is pursuing his or her own interests or political party’s 
interests, having no concern for their main purpose which is to serve the 
government and the people. In conclusion although failures in both internal 
and external factors turn to give the Papuan activists the advantage to 
continue their campaign for independence, it seems hard because, the 
national government still denies its role in the Papuan issue but maybe one 
day it can change its mind on the Papuan issue. Politics is all about the 
interest based on gains and losses so if the Papuan deal is of benefit to 
PNG then maybe PNG will reconsider to support Papuans but for now it is 
clear that based on its foreign policy to Indonesia that PNG has nothing to 
do with supporting Papuans for independence but failures in the 
government system tends to create a negative image of PNG in Indonesia 
with respect to this issue of border security. 
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